Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV03306, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03306, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV03306 Hearing Date: April 23, 2024 Dept: G

Defendant Estate of Mirza Hassan Mirza Mousa Al-Sulaimi’s Motion to Strike Complaint and for Monetary Sanctions Against City of Knowledge and their Counsel

Respondent: Plaintiff City of Knowledge

Defendant Estate of Mirza Hassan Mirza Mousa Al-Sulaimi’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens and Request for Statutory Attorney Fees and Costs Against Plaintiff

Respondent: Plaintiff City of Knowledge

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Estate of Mirza Hassan Mirza Mousa Al-Sulaimi’s Motion to Strike Complaint and for Monetary Sanctions Against City of Knowledge and their Counsel is DENIED.

Defendant Estate of Mirza Hassan Mirza Mousa Al-Sulaimi’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens is GRANTED. Furthermore, Defendant Estate of Mirza Hassan Mirza Mousa Al-Sulaimi’s Request for Statutory Attorney Fees and Costs Against Plaintiff is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $1,252.50, payable in thirty (30) days.

BACKGROUND

This is an action to quiet title. In 1994, Plaintiff City of Knowledge was established as a local mosque and temporary location for a K-7 school. The City of Knowledge then approached Mirza Hassan Mirza Mousa Al-Sulaimi about purchasing a property that the City of Knowledge could use as a permanent location for its school. Al-Sulaimi allegedly agreed and purchased a property in Pomona for the City of Knowledge in 1996. In 1997, the City of Knowledge began operations at the Pomona property after receiving a conditional use permit. In 2000, Al-Sulaimi passed away and the City of Knowledge alleges the title to the Pomona property passed to Al-Sulaimi’s estate (the Al-Sulaimi Estate).

In December 2015, representatives of the Al-Sulaimi Estate allegedly assured the City of Knowledge that the Pomona property would be for the City of Knowledge’s indefinite use and that ownership of the property would be ultimately transferred to the City of Knowledge. In allegedly relying on these representations, the City of Knowledge used donations to fund multimillion-dollar upgrades of the Pomona property that began in March 2020. In May 2023, the City of Knowledge alleges the Al-Sulaimi Estate notified them of its intent to sell the Pomona property to a third party.

On October 25, 2023, the City of Knowledge filed a complaint against the Al-Sulaimi Estate, all persons unknown, and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) quiet title, (2) intentional misrepresentation, (3) negligent misrepresentation, and (4) unjust enrichment.

On February 5, 2024, the Al-Sulaimi Estate filed a cross-complaint against the City of Knowledge, Haleema Shaikley, and Roes 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) quiet title, (2) trespass, (3) waste, and (4) ejectment.

On February 6, 2024, the Al-Sulaimi Estate filed the present motion to expunge a notice of lis pendens that was recorded against the Pomona property by the City of Knowledge. On March 11, the Al-Sulaimi Estate filed the present motion to strike.

A hearing on the present motions is set for April 23, 2024, along with a case management conference and OSC Re: Failure to File Proof of Service.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Al-Sulaimi Estate requests the court take judicial notice of records and filings in a previous action before this court that include (1) a declaration filed by Haleema Shaikley, (2) portions of a trial transcript, and (3) a copy of the judgment entered in the previous action. The court GRANTS Al-Sulaimi Estate’s request as the court may take judicial notice of state court records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); see Hart v. Darwish (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 218, 224 [trial transcript of court’s ruling are court records].)

ANALYSIS

The Al-Sulaimi Estate moves for monetary and terminating sanctions against the City of Knowledge and the City of Knowledge’s counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The Al-Sulaimi Estate also moves to expunge the notice of lis pendens recorded against the Pomona property. For the following reasons, the court DENIES the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion for sanctions and GRANTS the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion to expunge the notice of lis pendens.

Legal Standard

Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, “a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually.” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189.) “A claim is factually frivolous if it is ‘not well grounded in fact’ and is legally frivolous if it is ‘not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.’” (Ibid, quoting Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 167.) The moving party bears the burden of showing the “the party’s conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable.” (Ibid.) “A claim is objectively unreasonable if ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.’” (Ibid, quoting In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) But this section “should be utilized only in ‘the rare and exceptional case where the action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal foundation, or brought for an improper purpose.’” (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1121 (Kumar), quoting Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. A-C Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2d 1336, 1344.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 also includes a safe harbor provision that states a “[n]otice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1); Li v. Majestic Industry Hills, LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 585, 590-591.) This safe harbor requirement is strictly enforced, and substantial compliance is not sufficient. (See Cromwell v. Cummings (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th Supp.10, 15.)

“If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) An award of fees is not warranted unless the motion was “frivolous, unfounded, filed for an improper purpose, or otherwise unreasonable.” (Musaelian v. Adams¿(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1258.)

Expungement of Notice of Lis Pendens

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.30, a party may move to expunge a notice of lis pendens if they meet the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 405.31 and 405.32. Code of Civil Procedure section 405.31 states the court must expunge a notice of lis pendens if “the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim.” If the pleading does contain a real property claim, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.)

Discussion

Prior to the filing of the motion for sanctions on March 11, 2024, counsel for the Al-Sulaimi Estate served a copy of the motion on the City of Knowledge’s counsel via email on February 14, 2024. Because the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s original service of this motion was twenty-six days before it was filed, the court finds the Al-Sulaimi Estate complied with the safe harbor provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.

Motion to Expunge Notice of Lis Pendens

The only real property claim alleged in the Complaint is the first cause of action to quiet title on adverse possession grounds. The Complaint alleges the City of Knowledge became the owner of the Pomona property through adverse possession in possessing the Pomona property “by actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for more than five (5) years.” (Complaint, ¶ 35.) The Al-Sulaimi Estate argues the City of Knowledge cannot establish the probable validity of this cause of action because it is collaterally estopped by a judgment entered in May 2018 that confirmed the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s ownership of the Pomona property. (Motion, p. 9:6-8; RJN, Ex. 3.)

Here, the court need not determine whether the City of Knowledge’s adverse possession claim is collaterally estopped as it lacks probable validity on its face. “The elements of an adverse possession claim consist of the following: (1) actual possession by the plaintiff of the property under claim of right or color of title; (2) the possession consists of open and notorious occupation of the property in such a manner as to constitute reasonable notice to the true owner; (3) the possession is adverse and hostile to the true owner; (4) the possession is uninterrupted and continuous for at least five years; and (5) the plaintiff has paid all taxes assessed against the property during the five-year period.” [Citations.] Unless each of these elements is established by the evidence, the plaintiff has not acquired title by adverse possession.” (Bailey v. Citibank, N.A. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 335, 351.)

“To be considered hostile, the acts relied upon must operate as an invasion of the right of the party against whom they are asserted.” (Laubisch v. Roberdo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 702, 706.) Thus, “title by adverse possession cannot be acquired where the occupant has entered into possession by permission or consent of the owner.” (Janes v. LeDeit (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 474, 489.) Here, the City of Knowledge alleges Al-Sulaimi agreed to purchase the Pomona property for the City of Knowledge’s use in 1996. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) The City of Knowledge acknowledges that title passed to the Al-Sulaimi Estate in 2000 and alleges they requested the title be transferred to the City of Knowledge in 2001. (Complaint, ¶ 16, 19-20.) In 2013, a representative from the Al-Sulaimi Estate informed the City of Knowledge that ownership of the property would be transferred to the City of Knowledge. (Complaint, ¶ 25.) In December 2015, representatives of the City of Knowledge met with representatives of the Al-Sulaimi Estate who again assured them that the City of Knowledge could use the Pomona property indefinitely and that ownership would ultimately be transferred to the City of Knowledge. (Complaint, ¶ 22.)

In 2018, the City of Knowledge informed the Al-Sulaimi Estate that they had obtained donor funding for $2,000,000 worth of renovations for the Pomona property. (Complaint, ¶ 26.) The City of Knowledge alleges the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s representatives “expressed their approval and gratefulness.” (Complaint, ¶ 26.) The City of Knowledge also alleges the Al-Sulaimi Estate expressly and implicitly approved the renovations as the City of Knowledge kept the Al-Sulaimi Estate informed of the progress made on the renovations and the Al-Sulaimi Estate never communicated any disproval. (Complaint, ¶ 27-28.) In fact, the City of Knowledge admits that “notwithstanding repeated communications between the [City of Knowledge] and [the Al-Sulaimi Estate] regarding the donations and ongoing renovation process, the Estate never expressed any change in position regarding the School ultimately taking ownership of the property” until May 2023 when the Al-Sulaimi Estate announced an intent to sell the Pomona property. (Complaint, ¶ 31-32.)

Thus, based on the City of Knowledge’s own allegations, the City of Knowledge’s possession of the Pomona property was never hostile to the interests of the Al-Sulaimi Estate as they had the estate’s explicit and implicit permission to occupy and renovate the premises. Even when the Al-Sulaimi Estate informed the City of Knowledge of their intent to sell the Pomona property, the Complaint does not allege if the Sulaimi Estate actually ordered the City of Knowledge to leave the premises. (Complaint, ¶ 32.) Because the City of Knowledge’s possession was not hostile and adverse to the Al-Sulaimi Estate, their claim of adverse possession lacks probable validity. As such, the Al-Sulaimi Estate is entitled to the expungement of the notice of lis pendens.

Accordingly, the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion is GRANTED.

Motion for Sanctions

Notwithstanding the court’s above conclusion that the Complaint’s first cause of action for quiet title lacks probable validity, the Al-Sulaimi Estate must also establish that the Complaint’s other causes of action are equally and indisputably without merit. In addition to the first cause of action, the Complaint also alleges intentional representation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment claims.

The Al-Sulaimi Estate contends these claims are without merit as they are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel or “[i]ssue preclusion¿prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) “[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id., at p. 825.) But unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not bar entire causes of action. Instead, it prevents relitigation of previously decided issues.” (Id., at p. 824.)

Here, Al-Sulaimi Estate contends the issue of the estate’s ownership of the Pomona property was adjudicated in the previous 2018 action, of which the court has taken judicial notice. (Motion, p. 12:2-4.) That, however, is not the issue in the City of Knowledge’s fraud and unjust enrichment causes of action. Rather, the City of Knowledge alleges that the Al-Sulaimi Estate fraudulently induced the City of Knowledge to occupy and renovate the Pomona property by falsely or negligently representing that the Al-Sulaimi Estate would ultimately transfer the Pomona property to the City of Knowledge. (Complaint, ¶ 49-52, 62-64, 69-70.) The fact that the Al-Sulaimi Estate owns the Pomona property does not defeat the City of Knowledge’s claim that Al-Sulaimi Estate promised to eventually transfer the property to the City of Knowledge. Thus, the Al-Sulaimi Estate cannot establish the City of Knowledge’s Complaint utterly devoid of merit.

Accordingly, the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

Request for Attorney Fees and Costs

Last, the Al-Sulaimi Estate requests an award of attorney fees and costs for bringing the two present motions. Because the court has denied the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion for sanctions, the court declines to award any fees or costs incurred on that motion.

As to the Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion to expunge the notice of lis pendens, the court determines the Al-Sulaimi Estate is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.) Accordingly, utilizing the loadstar approach and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court awards reasonable attorney fees and costs in the amount of $1,252.50 payable to the Al-Sulaimi Estate in thirty (30) days ($1,192.50 for 0.8 hours drafting correspondence, 2.0 hours drafting the motion, 2.0 hours reviewing opposition and drafting a reply, and 0.5 hours attending the hearing at an hourly rate of $225 plus $60.00 in motion filling fees).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court rules as follows:

The Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion to strike the Complaint and impose sanctions is DENIED.

The Al-Sulaimi Estate’s motion to expunge the notice of lis pendens is GRANTED. Furthermore, the Al-Sulaimi Estate is awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of $1,252.50, payable in thirty (30) days.