Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03466, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03466    Hearing Date: June 20, 2024    Dept: G

Defendants Noel Galang and Inspire Mobility Access Co.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

 

Respondent: NO OPPOSITION

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Defendants Noel Galang and Inspire Mobility Access Co.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

 

BACKGROUND


This is a personal injury action rising from a motor vehicle collision that occurred at Rowland Avenue and Lark Ellen Avenue in West Covina on September 26, 2023. On November 7, 2023, Plaintiffs Linda Rangel and Crescencio Rangel filed a complaint against Defendants Napaporn Ratana, Noel Galang, Inspire Mobility Access Co. (Inspire), and Does 1-100, alleging a single cause of action for motor vehicle negligence.

 

On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs Cresencio Rangel, Brian Ethan Rangel, Chris E. Rangel, Anissa N. Zabala, and Carie L. Rangel (collectively, the Rangels) filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action.

 

On February 15, 2024, Inspire and Galang filed the present motion. Prior to filing, Inspire and Galang’s counsel met and conferred telephonically with the Rangels’ counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Carrillo Decl., ¶ 3.)

 

A hearing on the motion to strike is set for June 20, 2024, along with a case management conference.

 

ANALYSIS


Inspire and Galang move to strike negligent entrustment allegations from the Rangels’ FAC on the grounds that Inspire has admitted to vicarious liability in its answer. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES their motion.

 

Legal Standard


Motion to Strike

 

Upon a party’s motion or the court’s own motion, the court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

 

An immaterial or irrelevant allegation includes “(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense,” “(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” or “(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10.)

 

Negligent Entrustment and Vicarious Liability

 

When an employee causes injury in a motor vehicle collision during the course of the employee’s employment, the employer may be held liable directly for negligent entrustment and indirectly through vicarious liability. (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1151-1152.) But, when both theories are asserted, the employer can bar negligent entrustment liability by admitting vicarious liability. (Id., at p. 1152.)

 

Discussion


In this case, the FAC alleges Ratana and Galang operated the motor vehicle at issue. (FAC, ¶ MV-2(a).) The FAC alleges they operated the vehicle in the course of their employment and were employed by Inspire. (FAC, ¶ MV-2(b).) The FAC also alleges Inspire owned the vehicle and entrusted it to Ratana and Galang. (FAC, ¶ MV-2(c), (d).) In their answer to the FAC, Inspire and Galang deny that there was negligence but admit that Galang “was acting in the course and scope of his work relationship with” Inspire when the collision occurred and that if Galang acted negligently, Inspire would be held vicariously liable. (Galang and Inspire Answer to FAC, p. 1:28-2:4.)

 

However, the court finds that Inspire and Galang’s answer does not actually admit to Galang being the driver of the motor vehicle. Instead, despite admitting Galang was acting within the scope of Galang’s employment with Inspire, Inspire and Galang otherwise deny each and every allegation of the FAC. (Galang and Inspire Answer to FAC, p. 1:23-27.) Ratana’s answer also denies each and every allegation of the FAC and does not admit to being the driver of the vehicle. (Ratana Answer to FAC, ¶ 1-2.) Because neither Galang nor Ratana admit to being the driver of the vehicle and Inspire has not admitted that they are vicariously liable for Ratana’s actions, Inspire may still be held liable for negligent entrustment if Ratana was the operator.

 

Accordingly, Inspire and Galang’s motion to strike is DENIED.

 

CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, Inspire and Galang’s motion to strike portions of the Rangels’ FAC is DENIED.