Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV03471, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03471, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03471 Hearing Date: June 20, 2024 Dept: G

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Annette Brooks

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority is ordered to file its Answer to the FAC in ten (10) days.

BACKGROUND

This is a premises liability action. In November 2022, Plaintiff Annette Brooks was on premises allegedly owned or operated by Defendants City of El Monte (the City) and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) in El Monte when Brooks tripped and fell. Brooks alleges the cause of Brooks’s fall was “metal sticking out of the ground” and poor lighting.

On November 7, 2023, Brooks filed a complaint against the City and Does 1-50, alleging a single cause of action for premises liability.

On April 11, 2024, Brooks filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the City, LACMTA, and Does 1-50, alleging the same cause of action.

On May 15, 2024, LACMTA filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing on May 13, 2024, LACMTA’s counsel attempted to meet and confer telephonically with Brooks’s counsel. (Sood Decl., ¶ 4.)

On May 20, 2024, Brooks dismissed the City from the present action.

A hearing on the demurrer is set for June 20, 2024. A case management conference is also set for June 27, 2024.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

LACMTA requests the Court take judicial notice of a tort claim submitted by Brooks to the LACMTA. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), the Court GRANTS LACMTA’s request. (See Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 368, fn. 1.)

ANALYSIS

LACMTA demurs to Brooks’s cause of action for premises liability on the grounds that the facts alleged in the FAC are inconsistent with the facts stated in Brooks’s tort claim. For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES LACMTA’s demurrer.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

The sham pleading doctrine precludes the amendment of complaints that “omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for summary judgment.” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.) “If a party files an amended complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of the original complaint by either omitting facts which made the previous complaint defective or by adding facts inconsistent with those of previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings and may disregard any inconsistent allegations.” (Colapinto v. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 147, 151.)

Discussion

In this case, LACMTA argues the FAC is a sham because it omits facts stated in Brooks’s claim for damages that was submitted to LACMTA. (Demurrer, p. 7:17-20.) But this argument ignores the rule that “‘facts’ offered to contradict key allegations are not properly the subject of judicial notice.” (Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1191.) The court finds that LACMTA’s attempt to contest the allegations of the FAC with evidence in Brooks’s claim for damages is not appropriate for a demurrer and better suited for a motion for summary judgment or adjudication.

LACMTA next contends the FAC fails to identify the source of statutory liability for LACTMA. (Demurrer, p. 8:25-9:2.) This contention is unsupported as the FAC alleges LACTMA is liable for a dangerous condition of public property (Gov. Code, § 830). Further, LACTMA argues the insufficiency of this claim in its demurrer. (Demurrer, p. 9:15-10:9.)

Last, LACMTA maintains the FAC is not pled with specificity because it fails to identify the time of the incident, the existence of any witnesses, and the extent of Brooks’s injuries. (Demurrer, p. 9:11-13.) While negligence may be ordinarily “pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty,” a cause of action against public entity must plead “‘every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability . . . with particularity.’” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795, quoting Peter W. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 819.) The court finds that the time of the injury, the existence of witnesses, and the extent of Brooks’s injuries are not material facts required to adequately allege LACMTA’s liability for the creation of a dangerous condition of public property.

Therefore, LACMTA’s demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, LACMTA’s demurrer to Brooks’s FAC is OVERRULED.

LACMTA is ordered to file its Answer to the FAC in ten (10) days.