Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03652, Date: 2024-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03652    Hearing Date: January 22, 2024    Dept: G

Defendants Rita Hernandez, Alfredo Hernandez, and FRAAI Management Group, Inc.’s Motion for Order to Stay Unlawful Detainer

Respondent: Plaintiff Maria Mercy Moreno

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Rita Hernandez, Alfredo Hernandez, and FRAAI Management Group, Inc.’s Motion for Order to Stay Unlawful Detainer is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is an unlawful detainer action. In September 2018, Defendants Rita Hernandez, Alfredo Hernandez, and FRAAI Management Group, Inc. (FRAAI, collectively FRAAI Defendants) agreed to lease commercial property in Covina from Plaintiff Maria Mercy Moreno for a 3-year term with a monthly rent of $6,200. Subsequently, the lease allegedly converted to a month-to-month tenancy. On September 15, 2023, the FRAAI Defendants allegedly failed to comply with a 30-day notice to quit by Moreno.

On November 22, 2023, Moreno filed a complaint against the FRAAI Defendants, all unknown occupants, and Does 1-10 for unlawful detainer.

On December 4, 2023, the FRAAI Defendants filed the present motion. A hearing on the motion is set for January 22, 2024, with a case management conference and OSC Re: Failure to File Proof of Service on April 30.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The FRAAI Defendants’ request for judicial notice of filings in a separate action brought by the FRAAI Defendants against Moreno (Case No. 21STCV45867) is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS

The FRAAI Defendants move for a stay of the present action pending the resolution of a separate action for declaratory relief regarding the same Covina property. For the following reasons, the court DENIES their motion.

Legal Standard

“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.)  They also have inherent powers to manage and fashion procedures to control litigation and ensure the orderly administration of justice.  (Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3) and (a)(5).)

Discussion

On December 16, 2021, the FRAAI Defendants filed a complaint against Moreno that requests declaratory relief. They allege they entered into an agreement with Moreno in which they would be provided with an irrevocable option to purchase the Covina property. (Case No. 21STCV45867, Complaint, ¶ 10-11.) They also requested a judgment declaring that Moreno cannot demand past-due rent as a condition of lease renewal or purchasing the Covina property. (Case No. 21STCV45867, Complaint, ¶ 10-11.)

In this case, the FRAAI Defendants argue this action should be stayed pending the resolution of their declaratory judgment action. In arguing so, they do acknowledge that they are generally estopped from denying a landlord’s title during the pendency of their tenancy. (Evid. Code, § 624 [“A tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation.”]; see People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Rice (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 207, 211.) Instead, in citing to Greenhut v. Wooden (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 64, 68-69 (Greenhut), they argue title may be litigated when either party has put the title at issue by filing a prior action for declaratory relief and a judgment quieting title. The court finds this argument fails as it misstates the law.

In Greenhut, the court noted “that when a landlord not only seeks possession of real property, but also attempts to quiet title thereto as against the tenant, either by cross complaint or otherwise, the tenant is not estopped from denying the landlord's title . . . .” (Id., at p. 69, quoting Yuba River Sand Co. v. City of Marysville (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 421, 425.) Nowhere in Greenhut does it say that the tenant may be the one to put the title at issue. Instead, this exception relies on the landlord’s conduct. (See, e.g., American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210, 220 [holding this exception applies when lessor brings an action to place the title at issue]; San Juan Gold Co. v. San Juan Ridge Mut. Water Ass’n (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 159, 168 [“When a landlord by his pleadings not only seeks to recover possession, but also to quiet his title, the tenant is not estopped to deny his title but may set up his own superior title.”]; Collier v. Johnson (1926) 79 Cal.App. 322, 325 [holding this “exception is given effect when the landlord, by the form of procedure instituted by him, puts his title in issue”].)

Here, the underlying declaratory judgment action was brought by the FRAAI Defendants, not Moreno. Furthermore, Moreno did not file any cross-complaint in that action. And in the present action, Moreno has only sought possession of the premises and forfeiture of the lease agreement. Because Moreno was not the one who placed the title at issue, the exception that the FRAAI Defendants rely on as the basis for their stay request is inapplicable.

Accordingly, the FRAAI Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the FRAAI Defendants’ motion for a stay of the present action is DENIED.