Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03831, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling
The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.
Case Number: 23PSCV03831 Hearing Date: June 20, 2024 Dept: G
Defendant Lori Lonchin Chuang’s Demurrer to Complaint
Respondent: Plaintiff Yueh Chun Tseng
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant Lori Lonchin Chuang’s Demurrer to Complaint
is CONTINUED to a date to be determined at the
hearing in Department G (Pomona).
Defendant’s counsel is also ordered to meet and confer
with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the Demurrer and to file a supplemental
declaration describing such meet and confer efforts at least nine (9) court
days before the next scheduled hearing on the Demurrer.
BACKGROUND
This is an action to quiet title and for negligence. Plaintiff
Yueh Chun Tseng alleges Tseng is the sole owner of a property in Walnut. In
March 2020, Tseng alleges Defendant Lori Lonchin Chuang notarized Tseng’s
signature on a grant deed for the Walnut property when Tseng never appeared
before Chuang to sign any documents. In April 2020, Tseng alleges Defendant
Randy Chan recorded an illegitimate grant deed that claimed ownership of
Tseng’s property.
On December 11, 2023, Tseng filed a complaint against Chan,
Chuang, and Does 1-25, alleging causes of action for (1) quiet title and (2)
negligence.
On February 1, 2024, Tseng filed a First Amended Complaint
(FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action.
On April 2, 2024, Chan filed a cross-complaint against
Tseng, Chuang, and Roes 1-20, alleging a single cause of action for equitable
lien.
On April 9, 2024, Chuang filed a cross-complaint against
Roes 1-50, alleging causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) conversion, (3)
equitable indemnity, and (4) equitable contribution.
On May 9, 2024, Chuang filed the present demurrer. A
hearing on the present demurrer is set for June 20, 2024, along with a case
management conference.
ANALYSIS
Chuang demurs to Tseng’s second cause of
action for negligence. For the following
reasons, the Court finds parties did not adequately meet and confer.
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41,
subdivision (a), prior to filing a demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet
and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that
is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can
be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.”
This section further provides that “the demurring party shall identify all of
the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and
identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41, subd. (a)(1).)
While Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision
(a)(4) makes clear failing to meet and confer is not grounds to overrule a
demurrer, courts “are not required to ignore defects in the meet and confer
process” and if the court determines “no meet and confer has taken place, or
concludes further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it
retains discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with
an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a
demurrer, and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort.” (Dumas
v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355
& fn. 3.)
Discussion
In
this case, Chuang’s counsel states counsel first attempted to set up a
telephonic meet and confer conference on April 29, 2024. (Feazell Decl., ¶ 9.)
After being advised Tseng’s counsel was unavailable, Tseng’s counsel and
Chuang’s counsel attempted to meet and confer over email on May 1, 2024.
(Feazell Decl., ¶ 10.) Because email communications are not code-compliant means
of meeting and conferring and counsel’s declaration does not state if counsel
held telephonic discussions on May 1, the Court finds parties have failed to
adequately meet and confer. Thus, a continuance of the hearing on their
demurrer is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Chuang’s demurrer is CONTINUED to a date to be determined at
the hearing in Department G (Pomona).
Chuang’s counsel is also ordered to meet and confer with Tseng’s counsel regarding the demurrer and to file a supplemental declaration describing such meet and confer efforts at least nine (9) court days before the next scheduled hearing on the demurrer.