Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 23PSCV03877, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 23PSCV03877, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV03877 Hearing Date: March 18, 2025 Dept: G

Defendants Roberto Carlos Garcia and Westrux International, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Respondent: NO OPPOSITION

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Roberto Carlos Garcia and Westrux International, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff Tobey Bowen (Plaintiff) alleges the following. On April 28, 2023, Plaintiff was driving westbound on State Route 60 when Roberto Carlos Garcia (Garcia) lost control of his vehicle after Sophia Garcia Carrillo (Carrillo) collided with Garcia’s vehicle. The impact of the collision caused Garcia to collide with the right rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result, Plaintiff suffered property damage, bodily injury, and wage loss. Plaintiff alleges defendants Westrux International, Inc. (Westrux) and UPS Freight LSE employ Garcia.

On December 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Carrillo, Jose A. Campos, Kim Marie, Johnny Carrillo, and Does 1-100. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Carrillo, Garcia, Jose A. Campos, Kim Marie, Johnny Carrillo, Westrux, UPS Ground Freight Inc. dba UPS Freight LSE, and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2) general negligence.

On December 12, 2024, defendants Garcia and Westrux (collectively, Moving Defendants) filed this present motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion is set for March 18, 2025, with a post-mediation status conference/trial setting conference and two orders to show cause on April 15, 2025.

ANALYSIS

Defendants Garcia and Westrux (collectively “Defendants”) move for summary judgment on grounds that the sudden emergency doctrine bars Plaintiff’s causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against Defendants. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

Legal Standard

Motion for Summary Judgment

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) “A cause of action has no merit if either of the following exists: (1) One or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded. (2)A defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).)

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication provides “courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) It must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the opposing party must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Negligence

The elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) With regard to operators of motor vehicles, they are “under a duty, both by statute and common law, to operate [their] vehicle without negligence so as to abstain from injuring any other person or his property.” (Bewley v. Riggs (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 188, 194.)

Discussion

The sudden emergency doctrine, also known as the imminent peril doctrine, shields a defendant from liability in a negligence action. (Shiver v. Laramee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 395, 397.) The affirmative defense of the sudden emergency doctrine is set forth in CACI No. 452:

“[Name of plaintiff/defendant] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was not negligent because [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] acted with reasonable care in an emergency situation. [Name of plaintiff/defendant] was not negligent if [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] proves all of the following:

1. That there was a sudden and unexpected emergency situation in which someone was in actual or apparent danger of immediate injury;

2. That [name of plaintiff/defendant] did not cause the emergency; and

3. That [name of plaintiff/defendant] acted as a reasonably careful person would have acted in similar circumstances, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.”

“The doctrine of imminent peril is properly applied only in cases where an unexpected physical danger is presented so suddenly as to deprive the driver of his power of using reasonable judgment. [Citations.] A party will be denied the benefit of the doctrine of imminent peril where that party’s negligence causes or contributes to the creation of the perilous situation. [Citations.]” (Pittman v. Boiven (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 207, 216.)

Here, the court agrees that the sudden emergency doctrine applies and shields Defendants from liability as to (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2) general negligence.

In this case, the following facts are undisputed. On April 28, 2023, Garcia was travelling westbound on State Route 60 in lane seven or the far-right lane while Defendant Carrillo was driving to the left of him in lane six. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SSUMF), ¶¶ 1-2, 25-26; Teja Decl., Exh. C, ¶¶ 2, 4(d), Exh. I, p. 31:7-8.) Plaintiff was driving a truck with two trailers in front of Defendant Carillo with three cars separating them. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 3, 27.) Traffic was slowing to a stop, but Defendant Carrillo was not. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 6-7, 30-31; Teja Decl., Exh. H, ¶ 5(c)-(d), Exh. I, p. 33:8-24.) As a result, Defendant Carrillo’s vehicle veered into lane seven and collided with Garcia’s rear left tire/axle area. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 8, 32; Teja Decl., Exh. A, p. 5, Exh. C, ¶ 4(e), Exh. G, ¶ 5(e)-(g), Exh. H, ¶ 5(c).) Immediately before the impact, Garcia attempted to avoid the collision by moving right. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 15, 39; Teja Decl., Exh. C, ¶ 4(g), Exh. G, ¶ 5(l).) The impact of the collision caused Garcia’s axle to break and Garcia to lose control. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 17, 41; Teja Decl., Exh. C, ¶ 4(h), Exh. E, Exh. G, ¶ 5(o), Exh. H, (e)-(f).) Garcia attempted to regain control of his vehicle by breaking and moving right. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 18, 42; Teja Decl., Exh. C, ¶ 4(i), Exh. G, ¶ 5(p).) Despite his attempts to regain control, Garcia’s vehicle collided into the rear of the two trailers attached to Plaintiff’s vehicle. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 19, 43; Teja Decl., Exh. G, ¶ 5(r).)

Based on these facts, the court finds there no triable issues of material facts as to whether the sudden emergency doctrine applies to Plaintiff’s claims for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against Defendants Garcia and Westrux. Further, the court notes that Plaintiff did not file a timely opposition.

Carrillo’s collision with Garcia’s vehicle caused Garcia to confront a sudden and unexpected emergency that presented actual danger of his immediate injury. Garcia did not cause the emergency. Carillo’s failure to slow down and her collision with Garcia caused the emergency. The third element of the sudden emergency doctrine is also met, because Garcia acted like a reasonably careful person would have acted in similar circumstances. In response to the oncoming collision, Garcia attempted to avoid the accident. When the collision occurred, Garcia attempted to regain control of his vehicle by breaking and moving right.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants’ Garcia and Westrux.