Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV00350, Date: 2024-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV00350, Date: 2024-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV00350 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: G

Defendant L.A. Specialty Produce Co. Inc.’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Ana Massiel Garcia Castro

Defendant L.A. Specialty Produce Co. Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Ana Massiel Garcia Castro

Defendant Marvin Antonio Hernandez’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Ana Massiel Garcia Castro

Defendant Marvin Antonio Hernandez’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Ana Massiel Garcia Castro

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant L.A. Specialty Produce Co. Inc.’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant L.A. Specialty Produce Co. Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

Defendant Marvin Antonio Hernandez’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant Marvin Antonio Hernandez’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision. In May 2022, Plaintiff Ana Massiel Garcia Castro was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Defendant Marvin Antonio Hernandez on Azusa Avenue near State Route 60.

On February 2, 2024, Garcia Castro filed a complaint against Hernandez, Westrux International, Inc. (Westrux), and Does 1-20, alleging causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2) general negligence.

On June 7, 2024, Garcia Castro filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Hernandez; Westrux; L.A. Specialty Produce Co. Inc. (L.A. Specialty Produce), doing business as Vesta Foodservice; and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) negligent entrustment, and (3) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.

On July 17, 2024, Hernandez, Westrux, and L.A. Specialty Produce filed the present demurrers and motions to strike. Prior to filing on July 9, 2024, Hernandez and L.A. Specialty Produce’s counsel met and conferred telephonically with Garcia Castro’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Ball Decl., ¶ 2.)

On August 6, 2024, Garcia Castro dismissed Westrux from the present action, rendering Westrux’s demurrer moot.

A hearing on the present demurrers and motions to strike is set for August 21, 2024, along with a case management conference and OSC Re: Default/Default Judgment.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Hernandez and L.A. Specialty Produce request the court take judicial notice of a traffic crash report prepared by the California Highway Patrol. While the court GRANTS these requests and takes judicial notice of the existence of this report pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), the court declines to take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted within this report.

DEMURRERS

Hernandez demurs to Garcia Castro’s first cause of action for negligence while L.A. Specialty Produce demurs to Garcia Castro’s second cause of action for negligent entrustment and third cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. For the following reasons, the court OVERRULES both demurrers in their entirety.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Negligence (First Cause of Action)

Hernandez argues Garcia Castro’s first cause of action for negligence fails because it does not allege sufficient facts to establish a breach of the duty of care. (Demurrer, p. 6:15-7:8.) The court disagrees.

Legal Standard

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) Because “[a]llegations of negligence have long been exempted from the code pleading requirement to state the facts constituting the cause of action,” it may be pleaded generally. (McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56, 102.)

Discussion

In this case, the FAC alleges Hernandez unsafely, negligently, and carelessly changed lanes and collided with Garcia Castro. (FAC, ¶ 10.) At the time of the collision, the FAC alleges Hernandez was operating a truck without the proper commercial license. (FAC, ¶ 19.) While Hernandez argues the allegations regarding Hernandez’s lack of licensure are insufficient to establish breach, Hernandez’s demurrer fails to address the explicit allegation that Hernandez made an unsafe, negligent, and careless lane change. And to the extent Hernandez may claim this allegation is too general or conclusory, the court notes such general pleading is allowed when alleging a cause of action for negligence.

Accordingly, Hernandez’s demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Negligent Entrustment, Hiring, Supervision, and Retention (Second and Third Causes of Action)

L.A. Specialty Produce contends Garcia Castro’s second cause of action for negligent entrustment and third cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention fail because they do not allege L.A. Specialty Produce knew or should have known that Hernandez was unfit or incompetent to drive. (Demurrer, p. 7:5-13, 8:1-8.) The court disagrees.

Legal Standard

The elements of a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are: (1) the employer’s hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee; (2) the employee was incompetent or unfit; (3) the employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and (4) harm occurs. (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836-837.) Likewise, one may be held liable for negligently entrusting a vehicle to one who is incompetent, unfit, or inexperienced. (Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 415, 420.)

Discussion

In this case, the FAC alleges L.A. Specialty Produce knew or should have known that Hernandez was unfit to drive the truck in question because Hernandez did not have the proper commercial license, training, and skills to operate that truck. (FAC, ¶ 30, 34, 48.) The court finds these allegations sufficient.

Accordingly, L.A. Specialty Produce’s demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Hernandez and L.A. Specialty Produce move to strike punitive damages from Garcia Castro’s FAC. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS their motions.

Legal Standard

Motion to Strike

Upon a party’s motion or the court’s own motion, the court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

An immaterial or irrelevant allegation includes “(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense,” “(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” or “(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10.)

Punitive Damages

Civil Code section 3294 allows punitive damages when a plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) For the purposes of determining punitive damages, malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Lastly, fraud is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) Furthermore, “[p]unitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid.)

Discussion

In this case, the FAC alleges Garcia Castro acted in conscious and reckless disregard for the safety of motorists by willfully operating a truck without the proper commercial license and engaging in unsafe lane changes. (FAC, ¶ 22-23.) The FAC alleges L.A. Specialty Produce acted in conscious and reckless disregard for the safety of motorists by willfully allowing Hernandez to operate their truck without the proper commercial license because it was more cost effective than hiring a properly licensed driver. (FAC, ¶ 38-41.) The FAC also alleges L.A. Specialty Produce’s executives, directors, officers, and managers were aware of these actions and ratified them. (FAC, ¶ 42-43.)

An “actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him.” (McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 299-300.) Here, while driving a truck without the proper commercial license and making an unsafe lane change could constitute negligent conduct and creates a risk of danger or injury, it does not involve a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result.

Notably, while the FAC alleges Hernandez lacked the proper commercial license, it does not allege Hernandez lacked any training or had no experience in operating trucks. The allegation that Hernandez was operating a truck that was heavier than the type of truck Hernandez was licensed or allowed to operate does not create the same substantial risk of harm that would exist if Hernandez had no qualifications or experience to operate any type of truck. Similarly, the conclusory allegation that Hernandez made an “unsafe” lane change without any additional facts does not establish if Hernandez’s lane change created a high probability of substantial harm. While Garcia Castro may plead negligence generally, specificity is required if Garcia Castro seeks to impose punitive damages.

Accordingly, Hernandez and L.A. Specialty Produce’s motions are GRANTED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Hernandez and L.A. Specialty Produce’s demurrers to Garcia Castro’s FAC are OVERRULED.

Furthermore, Hernandez and L.A. Specialty Produce’s motions to strike portions of Garcia Castro’s FAC are GRANTED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.