Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV00719, Date: 2024-09-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV00719    Hearing Date: September 5, 2024    Dept: G

Defendants Signature Healthcare Services, LLC and Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiff Lori Keele

TENTATIVE RULING

The Demurrer by Defendants Signature Healthcare Services, LLC and Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from injuries sustained at a psychiatric hospital. From March 9, 2023, to March 13, 2023, Plaintiff Lori Keele was admitted to and received care at a psychiatric hospital operated by Defendants Signature Healthcare Services, LLC (Signature) and Aurora Charter Oak – Los Angeles, LLC (Aurora). During this time, Keele alleges staff sedated Keele without Keele’s consent. Keele also alleges staff used force to restrain Keele which resulted in Keele suffering a concussion and broken nose.

On March 8, 2024, Keele filed a complaint against Signature, Aurora, and Does 1-100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) medical malpractice, (2) assault, and (3) battery.

On July 29, 2024, Keele filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action.

On July 30, 2024, Signature and Aurora filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing, Signature and Aurora’s counsel attempted to met and confer telephonically with Keele’s counsel. (Charles Decl., ¶ 5.)

A hearing on the demurrer is set for September 5, 2024.

ANALYSIS

Signature and Aurora demur to Keele’s entire FAC on the grounds that they are immune from liability pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5278. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS their demurrer with leave to amend.

Legal Standard

Demurrer

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Section 5278 Immunity

Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5278, “[i]ndividuals authorized under this part to detain a person for 72-hour treatment and evaluation pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 5150) or Article 2 (commencing with Section 5200), or to certify a person for intensive treatment pursuant to Article 4 (commencing with Section 5250) or Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 5260) or Article 4.7 (commencing with Section 5270.10) or to file a petition for post-certification treatment for a person pursuant to Article 6 (commencing with Section 5300) shall not be held either criminally or civilly liable for exercising this authority in accordance with the law.”

“The protected conduct is confined to the exercise of statutory authority to detain, evaluate and treat against the patient’s wishes, and does not extend to the manner in which evaluation and treatment are carried out. In other words, liability arising from negligent evaluation or treatment is not liability arising from the ‘exercis[e of] this authority in accordance with the law.’” (Gonzalez v. Paradise Valley Hospital (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 735, 741-742 (Gonzalez), quoting Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5278.) “Thus, immunity under section 5278 does not extend to ‘negligent acts, intentional torts, or criminal wrongs committed during the course of the detention, evaluation, or treatment.’” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 393, quoting Gonzalez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 (Julian).)

Discussion

In this case, Keele’s claims of medical malpractice, assault, and battery are based on the allegations that Signature and Aurora’s staff unnecessarily and forcibly sedated Keele without Keele’s consent. (FAC, ¶ 31, 37, 45-47.) Because these allegations involve Signature and Aurora’s exercise of their authority to detain and treat Keele against Keele’s wishes, they constitute the type of conduct immunized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5278. In opposition, Keele attempts to avoid the application of immunity by noting immunity does not extend to negligent, intentional, or criminal acts committed during detention, evaluation, or treatment. (Opp., p. 8:1-11.) The court finds, however, that the FAC fails to allege any acts of negligence or intentional torts that occurred aside from Signature and Aurora’s decision to detain and forcibly medicate Keele without Keele’s consent. In other words, the mere fact that Signature and Aurora acted without Keele’s consent is insufficient to avoid the application of immunity as Keele failed to allege there was misconduct with regards to the manner in which Keele was treated and restrained.

To the extent Keele categorizes Signature and Aurora’s decision to medicate Keele as medical malpractice, the decision to medicate or not medicate Keele is immunized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5278. (See Cruze v. National Psychiatric Services, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [holding if immunity did not apply to decisions to medicate, every detention could give rise to malpractice claims and immunity would be erased].) And to the extent Keele challenges the underlying decision to detain Keele for treatment and evaluation, the court finds Keele failed to allege facts that establish Signature and Aurora lacked the probable cause to do so. (See Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 69, 79 [noting plaintiff did not dispute that hospital had probable cause for detention].)

Accordingly, Signature and Aurora’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Signature and Aurora’s demurrer to Keele’s FAC is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.