Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV00950, Date: 2025-05-06 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Respondent: Defendants Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and SAI Auto Group, LLC d/b/a Covina Volkswagen

Plaintiff Anna E. Calderon’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses is GRANTED. The court awards attorneys’ fees of $12,776.50 and costs of $854.10.

This is a Song-Beverly action. On March 26, 2024, plaintiff Anna E. Calderon (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against defendants Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., SAI Auto Group, LLC d/b/a Covina Volkswagen (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 10, alleging the following causes of action for (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair.

On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for May 6, 2025.

Plaintiff moves the court for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $29,881.50 and costs in the amount of $938.60. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion in the reduced amount of $8,305 in attorney fees and $854.10 in costs.

Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) They have “the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) In granting their motion, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (Morris), quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Calculation of attorney fees begins with the lodestar approach in which the court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004, quoting Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 891.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

“It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on “inefficient or duplicative efforts” in the billing record. (Id. at p. 38.) But the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) And in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel argues they should receive $21,921 in attorney fees with a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 for total fees of $29,881.50. While Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees, Defendants argue the requested attorney fees should be reduced to $7,078.50.

Plaintiff’s counsel requests hourly rates as laid out in the following table. (Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 2-18.) In opposition, Defendants argue the court should reduce the $525 per hour rates for partners to $400 per hour, and the $395 hour rate for associates to $300 per hour, respectively. (Opp., pp. 10:28-11:2.) The court agrees in part, and disagrees in part.

Name	Position	Years of Experience	2024 Hourly Rate	2025 Hourly Rate
Kevin Jacobson	Co-founder	Not stated	$500	$525
Gregory Sogoyan	Not stated	Not stated	$525	N/A
Donald Mahnke	Attorney	4	$400	$425
Roy Enav	Attorney	4	$395	$395
Stephanie Argent	Associate Attorney	1	N/A	$395

To determine if an hourly rate is reasonable, courts consider the rates of similar attorneys in the community as well as “the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Here, the declaration of Kevin Jacobson provides an overview of the experience and credentials for Donald Mahnke, Roy Enav, and Stephanie Argent. (Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 13-18.) Based on these declarations and the court’s own experience with the billing rates of Los Angeles-area counsel in similar Song-Beverly cases, the court finds the rates for these attorneys are reasonable given their experience. The declines to reduces their rates to the hourly rate of $300. Instead, the court finds reasonable an hourly rate of $395 for work completed by Donald Mahnke, Roy Enav, and Stephanie Argent.

As for Kevin Jacobson, Jacobson’s declaration does not indicate when he was first admitted to practice law. (Jacobson Decl., ¶ 3.) Nevertheless, Jacobson states he founded Quill & Arrow, LLP in 2019 and worked at Hackler Daghighian Martino & Novak as a paralegal and associate attorney from 2013 to 2019. (Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) Based on Jacobson’s experience, the court declines to reduce his hourly rate to $400.

Regarding Gregory Sogoyan, Jacobson’s declaration does not mention Sogoyan’s position or when he was admitted to practice law. Jacobson only provides Sogoyan’s hourly rates for 2021 to 2023. (Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 7-8, 14, 18.) Because Sogoyan’s position and experience are unclear, the court will reduce his hourly rate to $395.

Plaintiff requests attorney fees for 39.5 hours spent by counsel on the present action and $6,000 in anticipated fees. (Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 46-48, Exh. 7, p. 11.) In opposition, Defendants challenge this request as unreasonable and excessive. Although a verified fee bill is “prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred,” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of the charges. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) The court reviewed Plaintiff’s fee bills and Defendants’ proposed reductions and addresses the parties’ contentions below.

Plaintiff’s counsel requests $1,440 for 3.6 hours spent by Mahnke on propounding discovery on April 30, 2024. (Jacobson Decl., Exh. 7, pp. 2-3.) Defendants contend that this request should be reduced by 2.3 hours because Plaintiff’s counsel utilized templates. (Opp., p. 14:15-22.) Upon review of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, which included form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admission, the court notes that they appear to be standard Song-Beverly Act discovery questions with minimal edits tailored to the subject vehicle. (Konrad Decl., Exhs. E-F.) Given the experience of Plaintiff’s counsel with lemon law cases, the court finds a request of 3.6 hours is unreasonable and reduces the time requested by 1.0 hour for a total of 2.6 hours. For this reason, the court reduces the award of fees for these billing entries by $395 for a total of $1,045.00.

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s counsel overbilled on entries relating to depositions. (Opp., pp. 14:23-15:19.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel requests $1,440 in fees that include $240 for 0.6 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing the PMQ’s deposition subpoena on May 30, 2024; $160 for 0.4 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing the PMQ’s deposition notice on May 30, 2024; $120 for 0.3 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing a meet and confer letter regarding the PMK’s deposition on May 30, 2024; $240 for 0.6 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing the PMK’s deposition notice on May 30, 2024; and $680 for 1.7 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ objections to the PMQ’s deposition on June 18, 2024. (Jacobson Decl., Exh. 7, pp. 3-5.)

Defendants argue the court should reduce these requests because Plaintiff’s counsel utilized templates and Defendants’ counsel raised similar objections to both depositions. (Opp., pp. 14:23-15:19.) Upon reviewing Plaintiff’s deposition notices and Defendants’ objections, the court observes that they appear nearly identical with minimal edits tailored to each case. (Konrad Decl., Exhs. G-J.) Given counsel’s experience with Song-Beverly cases, the court finds the request of 3.6 hours is unreasonable and reduces the time requested to 2.0 hours at an hourly rate of $395 for a total of $790.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s requests involve excessive and unreasonable work. (Opp., pp. 15:20-17:7.) These entries include $480 for 1.2 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ answers on April 29, 2024; $360 for 0.9 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Plaintiff’s documents, repair orders, and other relevant documents on March 22, 2024; and $680 for 1.7 hours spent by Mahnke on drafting the repair order summary and case information on April 2, 2024. (Jacobson Decl., Exh. 7, pp. 1-2.) The court agrees in part and disagrees in part.

The court finds that the 1.2 hours spent on reviewing Defendants’ answers is unreasonable due to their similar nature and reduces the time billed to 1.0 hours. (Konrad Decl., Exhs. K-L.) However, the court does not find the other entries excessive or unreasonable. For this reason, the court awards 3.6 hours at an hourly rate of $395 for a total of $1,422.00.

Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff’s requests include excessive and unreasonable entries for work related to the order to show cause (OSC) re: dismissal. (Opp., pp. 15:20-17:7.) These entries include $480 for 1.2 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ 998 offer on June 19, 2024; $120 for 0.3 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing the notice of settlement on July 3, 2024; $40 for 0.1 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing the court’s OSC notice on July 5, 2024; $120 for 0.3 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing Plaintiff’s OSC notice on August 5, 2024; $160 for 0.4 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing the joint stipulation to continue the OSC on September 25, 2024; $160 for 0.4 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing a declaration in response to the OSC on September 27, 2024; $80 for 0.2 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing the appearance attorney’s hearing summary on October 2, 2024; $40 for 0.1 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing the court’s minute order on October 2, 2024; $160 for 0.4 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing a declaration in response to the OSC on November 27, 2024; $120 for 0.3 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing Plaintiff’s OSC notice on December 2, 2024; $40 for 0.1 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing the court’s minute order on December 5, 2024; $80 for 0.2 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing the appearance attorney’s hearing summary on December 5, 2024; $255 for 0.6 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Konrad’s declaration on January 22, 2025; $127.50 for 0.3 hours spent by Mahnke on preparing a declaration in response the OSC on January 23, 2025; and $42.50 for 0.1 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing the court’s minute order on January 30, 2025; for a total of 5.0 hours. (Jacobson Decl., Exh. 7, pp. 5, 7-9.) The court agrees in part and disagrees in part.

On December 4, 2024, the parties notified the court that the motion for attorney fees remained the only unresolved issue. (12/04/2025 Min. Order, p. 1.) Because Plaintiff’s counsel delayed in filing this instant motion, the court held the January 29, 2025 OSC and Plaintiff’s counsel billed for this time (a total of 1.0 hours). The court does not find the other entries excessive or unreasonable. For this reason, awards a total of 4.0 hours at an hourly rate of $395 for a total of $1,580.00.

Defendants argue that the court should not award Plaintiff for the 7.1 hours spent reviewing discovery responses after Defendants’ 998 offer. (Opp., pp. 12:19-14:8.) These entries include $240 for 0.6 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ responses to form interrogatories on June 25, 2024; $280 for 0.7 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ responses to requests for admission on June 25, 2024; $520 for 1.3 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ responses to requests for production on June 25, 2024; $680 for 1.7 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ responses to special interrogatories on June 25, 2024; $200 for 0.5 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ stipulation and protective order on June 25, 2024; and $920 for 2.3 hours spent by Mahnke on reviewing Defendants’ document production on June 26, 2024. (Jacobson Decl., Exh. 7, p. 6.)

Defendants assert Plaintiff’s counsel should not receive attorney fees for these entries because the work was unnecessary and unreasonable due to the proposed settlement offer. (Opp., p. 13:12-14.) The court disagrees. Defendants fail to cite any case law or statute directing the court to deny attorney fees while resolution is pending. Rather, Civil Code of Procedure section 998 directs the court to deny attorney fees incurred after a 998 offer when plaintiff rejects an offer and subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1).) This is not the case here. As such, the court declines Defendants’ requested reductions. For this reason, awards fees for 7.1 hours at $395 for a total of $2,804.50.

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s counsel overbilled for the present motion. (Opp., pp. 11:23-12:18.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel requests $10,356.50 in fees that includes $276.50 for 0.7 hours spent by Argent on reviewing the case on February 11, 2025; $79 for 0.2 hours spent by Argent on discussing strategy with Jacobson on February 11, 2025; $869 for 2.2 hours spent by Argent on drafting this motion on February 11, 2025; $434.50 for 1.1 hours spent by Argent on drafting this motion’s declaration on February 12, 2025; $632 for 1.6 hours spent by Argent on drafting this motion on February 12, 2025; $262.50 for 0.5 hours spent by Jacobson on reviewing this motion on February 12, 2025; $948 for 2.4 hours spent by Argent on drafting this motion on February 13, 2025; $262.50 for 0.5 hours spent by Jacobson on reviewing this motion on February 13, 2025; $79 for 0.2 hours spent by Argent on drafting this motion on February 13, 2025; $513 for 1.3 hours spent by Argent on implementing Jacobson’s edits on February 13, 2025; and $6,000 for an 15.18 hours spent by Argent on reviewing the opposition, drafting the reply, and attending the hearing. (Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 47-48, Exh. 7, p. 14.)

The court understands how time consuming the present motion can be to draft. Nevertheless, the court agrees that a reduction is in order and reduces the request to 7.5 hours for drafting the present motion at an hourly rate of $395, 4.5 hours for drafting the reply at an hourly rate of $395, and 1.0 hours for attending the hearing at an hourly rate of $395 for a total of $5,135.00.

Plaintiff’s counsel maintains that they are entitled to a multiplier of 1.5. (Motion, pp. 10:11-12:3.) They believe such a multiplier is appropriate based on the settlement amount and contingent risks inherent in pursuing this case. (Motion, pp. 10:11-12:3.)

The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132).

Here, while Plaintiff’s counsel points to the contingent nature of the present fee award, they fail to establish how any of the other factors in Ketchum v. Moses support the award of a multiplier. Thus, the court declines to award a multiplier.

In opposition, Defendants assert a negative multiplier of 0.5 is warranted because Plaintiff’s counsel over-litigated the case. (Opp., p. 21:14-19.) The court disagrees. Defendants reference any relevant authority that discusses negative multipliers. Instead, Defendants cite two cases that address the reduction attorney fees when the time expended or charges incurred were unreasonable. (See Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 152; Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.)

Following the reductions listed above and reductions to the hourly rates of all attorneys, the court awards attorney fees to Plaintiff in the total amount of $12,776.50.

Plaintiff also requests an award of $938.60 in costs, including $70.80 in fees for electronic filing or service; $463.30 in fees for filing the complaint and other motions; $130 in fees for Court Appearance Professionals; $84.50 in fees for a courtesy copy of Mahnke’s declaration; and $190 in fees for service of process. (Jacobson Decl., Exh. 7, p. 14.) The court finds the $84.50 courtesy copy unreasonable and declines to award $84.50 in costs for this request.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $854.10.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the total amount of $12,776.50 in attorney fees and costs of $854.10.