Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV01203, Date: 2024-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV01203, Date: 2024-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV01203 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: G

Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for an Order for Prejudgment Possession and Certification of Tax Information

Respondent: Defendants Russell L. Fox and Linda K. Fox

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for an Order for Prejudgment Possession and Certification of Tax Information is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is an eminent domain action. Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) seeks to acquire a property in the City of Industry near Valley Boulevard and Interstate 605 for the purposes of constructing a maintenance road. LACMTA alleges the City of Industry property is owned by Defendants Russell L. Fox and Linda K. Fox, trustees of the Fox Family Trust dated July 12, 2001 (Fox Trust).

On April 16, 2024, LACMTA filed a complaint for eminent domain against the Foxes, all persons unknown, and Does 1-50.

On May 13, 2024, LACMTA filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for August 21, 2024, along with a case management conference on September 5, 2024.

ANALYSIS

LACMTA moves for an order granting them prejudgment possession of the City of Industry property. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS LACMTA’s motion.

Legal Standard

“In the standard eminent domain proceeding, the condemning entity does not take possession and title until after judgment and full payment of just compensation. [Citation.] As an alternative to the standard proceeding, the California Constitution authorized the Legislature to ‘provide for possession by the condemnor following commencement of eminent domain proceedings upon deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of money determined by the court to be the probable amount of just compensation.’ (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 19, subd. (a).) The Legislature exercised this authority by enacting section 1255.410 and related provisions that create the ‘quick-take’ procedure.” (Robinson v. Superior Court of Kern County (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1163-1164 (Robinson).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410, subdivision (a) states “[a]t the time of filing the complaint or at any time after filing the complaint and prior to entry of judgment, the plaintiff may move the court for an order for possession under this article, demonstrating that the plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain and has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”

“If the motion is not opposed within 30 days of service on each defendant and occupant of the property, the court shall make an order for possession of the property if the court finds each of the following: (A) [t]he plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain[, and] (B) [t]he plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410, subd. (d)(1).) “If the motion is opposed by a defendant or occupant within 30 days of service, the court may make an order for possession of the property upon consideration of the relevant facts and any opposition, and upon completion of a hearing on the motion, if the court finds each of the following: (A) [t]he plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain[;] (B) [t]he plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article[;] (C) [t]here is an overriding need for the plaintiff to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited[; and] (D) [t]he hardship that the plaintiff will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the defendant or occupant that would be caused by the granting of the order of possession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410, subd. (d)(2).)

Discussion

In this case, LACMTA served the Foxes with the present motion by mail on May 10, 2024. On July 25, 2024, the parties stipulated to continuing a hearing on the present motion and imposing a new briefing schedule with an opposition due on August 5, 2024. On August 7, 2024, the Foxes filed an opposition. Because the Foxes failed to file a timely opposition within thirty days of being served with the present motion and by the additional stipulated deadline of August 5, 2024, the court’s consideration is limited to the factors discussed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410, subdivision (d)(1). (See id., at p. 1164 [“The timely filing of an opposition affects the trial court's review of the motion.”].)

LACMTA’s Entitlement to Taking to the City of Industry Property

A party is entitled to exercise the power of eminent domain if it has the statutory authority to do so, and if the proposed project for which the property is sought meets certain statutory requirements. (Id., at p. 1166-1167; Code Civ. Proc., § 1240.020, 1240.030.) Those statutory requirements are, “(a) [t]he public interest and necessity require the project[,] (b) [t]he project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury[, and] (c) [t]he property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1240.030.) “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to this article conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.250, subd. (a).)

In this case, LACMTA has established that it has the statutory authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. Specifically, LACMTA is authorized to take the City of Industry property by eminent domain pursuant to the statutory authority provided by article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, which authorizes local governments (including any city, county, city and county, school district, special district, authority, regional entity, redevelopment agency, or any other political subdivision within the state) to exercise the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring private property for a public work or improvement. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.) Additional statutory authority is provided by Public Utilities Code sections 30503, 30600, 130051.13, and 130220.5, as well as Government Code section 25350.5 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 1240.510 and 1240.610. Furthermore, by providing a copy of a resolution of necessity that was adopted on March 28, 2024, by LACMTA’s board of directors, LACMTA has conclusively established the necessary findings required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1240.030. (Justesen Decl., Ex. 1.)

Accordingly, the court finds LACMTA established its entitlement to the taking of the City of Industry property.

LACMTA’s Satisfaction of Deposit Requirements

With respect to the deposit requirements, Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.010, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]t any time before entry of judgment, the plaintiff may deposit with the State Treasury the probable amount of compensation, based on an appraisal, that will be awarded in the proceeding.” Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.010, subdivision (b), “[b]efore making a deposit under this section, the plaintiff shall have an expert qualified to express an opinion as to the value of the property (1) make an appraisal of the property and (2) prepare a written statement of, or summary of the basis for, the appraisal.” The appraisal must include “(A) [t]he date of valuation, highest and best use, and applicable zoning of the property[;] (B) [t]he principal transactions, reproduction or replacement cost analysis, or capitalization analysis, supporting the appraisal[; and] (C) [i]f the appraisal includes compensation for damages to the remainder, the compensation for the property and for damages to the remainder separately stated, and the calculations and a narrative explanation supporting the compensation, including any offsetting benefits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.010, subd. (b).)

In this case, LACMTA provided a notice confirming the deposit of $65,000.00 with the State Treasurer’s Condemnation Deposit Fund. (Notice of Deposit, Ex. A.) The amount was determined by independent professional real estate appraiser Michael E. Lahodny. (Lahodny Decl.) In the declaration, Lahodny provided a summary of the appraisal setting forth the requisite information and stated the values in the summary accurately reflect the fair market value of the property. (Lahodny Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Accordingly, because the court finds LACMTA has met the deposit requirements and is entitled to prejudgment possession of the City of Industry property, LACMTA’s motion is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS LACMTA’s motion for prejudgment possession of the City of Industry property and certification of tax information.