Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV01706, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV01706, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV01706 Hearing Date: March 5, 2025 Dept: G

Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff and Request for Sanctions

Respondent: Plaintiff Adolfo Rojas

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff is GRANTED.

Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law action. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff Adolfo Rojas filed a complaint against Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Mercedes-Benz) and Does 1-10, alleging causes of action for (1) breach of express warranty and (2) breach of implied warranty.

On December 9, 2024, Mercedes-Benz filed the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for March 5, 2025, with a post-mediation status conference/trial setting conference on May 21, 2025.

ANALYSIS

Mercedes-Benz moves to compel Rojas’s attendance at a deposition they have previously noticed and also requests sanctions on Rojas and Rojas’s counsel.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (a) provides:

“If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” ¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).)

The motion to compel must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production of the requested documents in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1).) Good cause is construed liberally and has been found where documents are necessary for trial preparation. (See Associated Brewers Distributing Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 587.) The motion must also “be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce document . . . by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).)

If the motion to compel is granted, “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).) However, “absent exceptional circumstances, the court shall not impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (i)(1).)

Discussion

Mercedes-Benz initially noticed Rojas’s deposition for May 7, 2024. (Karchemsky Decl., ¶ 1, Ex. A.) Mercedez-Benz then served an amended notice that set Rojas’s deposition for November 26, 2024. (Karchemsky Decl., ¶ 2, Ex B.) On November 19, 2024, Rojas served objections to the noticed deposition that included the unavailability of counsel. (Karchemsky Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. C.) On the same day, Mercedes-Benz’s counsel emailed Rojas’s counsel and requested Rojas’s counsel provides dates for counsel’s availability by November 22, 2024 (Karchemsky Decl., ¶ 4.) Rojas’s counsel did not respond by the time the present motion was filed on December 9, 2024 (at 7:44 pm), approximately two and one-half weeks later. (Karchemsky Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D.)

In opposition, Rojas argues Mercedes-Benz failed to adequately meet and confer. On December 6, 2024, Rojas’s counsel emailed Mercedes-Benz’s counsel and promised to provide deposition dates by December 9, 2024. (Serrano Decl., ¶ 14.) On December 9, 2024, Rojas’s counsel emailed Mercedes-Benz’s counsel, stating counsel was available on May 28, 2025. (Serrano Decl., ¶ 16.) Mercedes-Benz’s counsel has not provided a declaration in reply that challenges the statements of Rojas’s counsel or suggests Mercedes-Benz engaged in any further meet and confer efforts to secure a deposition date for Plaintiff.

Based on these facts and circumstances, the court GRANTS Mercedes-Benz’s motion. At the hearing on this motion, the court intends to give the parties a date by which Plaintiff’s deposition must be completed.

The court DENIES the request for sanctions by Mercedes-Benz, as the court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel acted with substantial justification and attempted to meet and confer with counsel for Mercedes-Benz prior to the motion’s filing on December 9, 2024. Thus, the court determines the imposition of a sanction is unjust under these circumstances.