Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV01870, Date: 2025-03-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV01870, Date: 2025-03-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV01870 Hearing Date: March 26, 2025 Dept: G

Plaintiff Miriam Verduzco’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

Respondent: Defendant General Motors LLC

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Miriam Verduzco’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff Miriam Verduzco is ordered to file the proposed First Amended Complaint separately with the Court forthwith.

BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action. On June 3, 2024, plaintiff Miriam Verduzco (Plaintiff) acquired a 2020 Chevrolet Bolt. Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges the vehicle presented defects, malfunctions, and nonconformities and General Motors, LLC repeatedly failed to make the necessary repairs and provide compensation to Plaintiff.

On June 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant General Motors, LLC (General Motors) and Does 1-10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and (2) breach of implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

On February 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed this present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for March 26, 2025, along with a post-mediation status conference/trial setting conference.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC) that replaces the Song-Beverly causes of action with a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.

Legal Standard

“A court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) The court’s discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendments of the pleadings. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.)¿“A motion to amend a pleading before trial must . . . [s]tate what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and [s]tate what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.”¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a).)¿ The declaration must also specify the amendment’s effect, why it is necessary and proper, when the facts supporting the amended allegations were discovered, and why the request was not made earlier.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)

If the party seeking the amendment has needlessly delayed, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the court has the discretion to deny leave to amend. (See Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Solit v. Tokai Bank, Ltd. New York Branch (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)

Discussion

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel provides the effect of the proposed FAC is to replace the Song-Beverly causes of action with a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim due to “recent legal developments that limit the scope of Song-Beverly” claims. (Morrow Decl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel also states the new cause of action provides an appropriate remedy and accurately reflects Plaintiff’s claims regarding the warranty and vehicle. (Morrow Decl., ¶ 7.) Although Plaintiff’s counsel does not explicitly state why these amendments are necessary and proper and when the supporting facts were first discovered, it appears counsel proposed this amendment based on the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez) on October 31, 2024. (Morrow Decl., ¶ 7.)

In opposition, General Motors argues Plaintiff unjustifiably delayed in seeking leave to add this new cause of action since Plaintiff could have alleged the additional cause of action in the original complaint. (Opp., pp. 3:15-5:18.) But the fact that Plaintiff could have brought these causes of action in the initial complaint does not render the delay to do so unreasonable or needless on its own. In fact, Plaintiff did have a legitimate reason to delay considering the pending decision in the Rodriguez case. Further, the court finds such a delay does not unfairly prejudice General Motors.

While General Motors argues such prejudice exists because the proposed amendments will require additional discovery, expand the scope of the case, and may delay trial, General Motors fails to quantify the costs of such additional discovery, explain how the amendments will expand the scope of the case when the underlying facts are the same, and delay trial when trial has not been not set by the court. (Opp., p. 5:19-7:3.) To the extent General Motors also challenges the legal viability of the proposed FAC, Defendant may raise these arguments in a separate, properly noticed motion. (Opp., pp. 7:4-8:10.)

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file FAC is GRANTED.

Plaintiff is ordered to file the proposed FAC separately with the court forthwith.