Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV01911, Date: 2025-05-29 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 24PSCV01911    Hearing Date: May 29, 2025    Dept: G

Plaintiff Janine Montague’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred

Respondent: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.  

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Janine Montague’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time Actually Expended and Reasonably Incurred is GRANTED IN PART. The court AWARDS Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs in the sum of $34,771.54. Such an amount represents $33,771.50 in attorneys’ fees (representing 88.7 hours of work) plus $1,000.04 in costs. 

BACKGROUND

This is an action arising from the purchase of an allegedly defective 2022 Honda Civic (the “Subject Vehicle”). (Compl., ¶ 11.) On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff Janine Montague (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) and DOES 1-50, alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act—breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Act—breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b).

On July 15, 2024, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint.

On November 21, 2024, a Case Management Conference was held. (11/21/24 Minute Order.)

On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement, which indicated that this action had conditionally settled. (2/21/25 Notice of Settlement.)

On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff seeks “a judgment against Defendant[] . . . and in favor of Plaintiff for the aggregate amount of attorney’s fees based on actual time expended and reasonably incurred, in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this case on behalf of Plaintiff pursuant to Civil Code § 1794(d).” (Not. of Mot. at p. i:25-ii:1.) Pursuant to the motion, Plaintiff requests that “the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees under the ‘lodestar’ method in the amount of $36,658.50 are awarded. Plaintiff additionally requests costs in the amount of $1,000.04.” (Not. of Mot. at p. ii:12-14.)

Also, on April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed and served a memorandum of costs in which Plaintiff seeks costs of $1,000.04.

On April 17, 2025, the court held an OSC re: Dismissal (Settlement) and continued the OSC re: Dismissal to May 29, 2025. (4/17/25 Minute Order.) The court noted that Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees. (4/17/25 Minute Order.)

On May 15, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees.

On May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $36,658.50 and costs in the amount of $1,000.04. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART the motion for attorney’s fees filed by Plaintiff. The court AWARDS Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs in the sum of $34,771.54. Such an amount represents $33,771.50 in attorneys’ fees (representing 88.7 hours of work) plus $1,000.04 in costs. 

Legal Standards

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) “[T]he negotiation of a possible settlement does not excuse the failure to proceed with due diligence in the filing of pleadings, absent some understanding that pleadings need not be filed while negotiations are in process.” (Turley v. Turley (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 169, 173.) In the context of an award of attorneys’ fees “the time expended by attorneys in obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in the attorneys’ fee application, and in the court’s fee award.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 631.) “[I]t is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing buyer/plaintiff’s damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act action.” (Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493, 510.)

In assessing attorney’s fees under the Song-Beverly Act, a trial court must make an “initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended is not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) “Under the lodestar method, a party who qualifies for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 446.)

“[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com., supra, 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271 [citation omitted].) “[T]he burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) “[A]n award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “[P]aralegal fees may be awarded as attorney’s fees if the trial court deems it appropriate . . . .” (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312.)

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must “attack the itemized billing[] with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate, or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.) “[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence and arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id. at p. 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Ibid.)

A “court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to the tasks completed in an action because he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1111.) A losing party cannot litigate tenaciously then be heard to complain about the time spent or tasks performed by the prevailing party in response. (City of Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561, 580, fn.11.) Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates, the court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate as reasonable. (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473.)

Discussion

Initially, the court notes Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recover all costs and expenses reasonably incurred in the amount of $1,000.04. (Mot. at p. 17.) Defendant failed to rebut such argument in the opposition. Defendant has conceded to such argument as “[c]ontentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)

A.    Evidence in Support of the Motion

In support of the motion, counsel for Plaintiff, Michael Saeedian (“Saeedian”), provides a declaration. Mr. Saeedian declares, inter alia, that he is the lead attorney in this action and is partner at The Lemon Pros, LLP. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 1.) Counsel received his juris doctorate from Loyola Law School and has practiced law since 2009 in the State of California. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Saeedian has served as lead trial counsel to numerous clients in California. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel states that “[i]n the litigation billing on each case, to the extent [his] office is able to do so, [he] [has] instructed the attorneys to make use of paralegal assistance where it is practice to do so to have tasks performed at a lower billing rate.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 2.) “However, it is not always possible or feasible to do so at all times/tasks due to workload balancing issues and the availability of a qualified staff member to assist the attorney.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Saeedian indicates that he has received numerous awards and is a member of various bar associations in the Los Angeles area. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 3.) Mr. Saeedian has an hourly rate of $695.00 per hour. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 3.)

Mr. Saeedian further states the following: Attorney Christopher Urner (“Urner”) joined his firm in May 2022 as the managing attorney. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Urner graduated from Southwestern Law School in 2016 and was directly involved in hundreds of lemon law cases prior to joining The Lemon Pros, LLP. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Urner’s time is billed at the rate of $525.00 per hour for all contingency lemon law work. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 4.)

Attorney Jorge Acosta (“Acosta”) is a partner at The Lemon Pros LLP who graduated from Pacific Coast University School of Law in 2022 and passed the California Bar Exam in February 2023. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 5.) Mr. Acosta joined The Lemon Pros, LLP in July 2021. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 5.) Mr. Saeedian sets forth Mr. Acosta’s experience working on lemon law matters. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 5.) According to Mr. Saeedian, Mr. Acosta’s time for this case was billed “at $350.00 per hour for his work prior to July 2024, and $450.00 per hour for his time thereafter as a partner.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 5.)

Law Clerk Evelyn Ghazarian (“Ghazarian”) joined The Lemon Pros in 2023 as a paralegal while attending Southwestern Law School where she recently received her J.D. degree. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 6.) Ms. Ghazarian is awaiting the results of the bar exam. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 6.) Ms. Ghazarian “handles litigation tasks assigned to her by an attorney including drafting discovery, interacting with clients to respond to discovery, reviewing motions from Defendants and creates summaries for the handling attorney, assists with motions drafts and oppositions, and updating the case file notes and managing client and attorney calendars.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 6.) Due to her skill level and education, Mr. Saeedian bills “the time for her work as a paralegal at $250 per hour.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 6.)

Mary M. Zazueta (“Zazueta”), is a paralegal employed by The Lemon Pros, LLP, who has been working in the legal field for over six years, with substantial experience handling consumer litigation matters including claims brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 7.) Ms. Zazueta’s duties include, among other duties, assisting with case management, calendaring deadlines, drafting routine legal documents, and preparing initial discovery. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 7.) According to counsel, “Ms. Zazueta’s work reduces the need for attorney involvement in routine tasks, resulting in greater efficiency and cost savings.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 7.) Based on her experience, training, and the prevailing market rate for paralegal services in California, Mr. Saeedian states that “a billing rate of $150 per hour is reasonable and consistent with rates awarded by courts in similar cases.” (Saaedian Decl., ¶ 7.)

Further, counsel declares that this case was taken on a contingency basis. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 8.) Mr. Saeedian indicates that Plaintiff had approximately five repair visits for defects present with the Subject Vehicle and he “accepted Plaintiff’s case on a contingency only basis and began litigating it June 12, 2024.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 10.) Prior to filing the lawsuit in this case, Mr. Saeedian “conducted due diligence as [he] do[es] in every lemon law case to meet with Plaintiff and request and review documents to ensure that [he] properly understand[s] the vehicle history and facts.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 10.) Mr. Saeedian provides billing records for the legal work performed in this action. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 10; Exh. A.) Mr. Saeedian attests that it is firm policy that the billing entries are recorded contemporaneously as the work is performed. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 11.) Mr. Saeedian attests to the accuracy of the billing records. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 11.) Mr. Saeedian declares that he has reviewed the time records to remove redundant billing and has removed any billing for non-essential, clerical items. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 12.)

As to the hourly rates charged, counsel declares that the rates are below the contingency rates reflected in the Laffey Matrix. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 15.) Further, counsel declares that Plantiff’s rates have been upheld in full in many Song-Beverly cases. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 16.) Counsel also provides pages from the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report from 2017-2018, which counsel indicates has been cited as evidence of prevailing hourly rates in the community in numerous California opinions. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 14; Exh. C.)

Mr. Saeedian then articulates the procedural history of this action, including Plaintiff’s experience with the Subject Vehicle. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 17.) Relevantly, on July 15, 2024, in addition to serving its answer, Defendant served form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) Also, on such date, Defendant noticed the vehicle inspection of Plaintiff’s vehicle for August 29, 2024. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff also propounded discovery on Defendant on July 15, 2024, and noticed the deposition of Defendant’s PMK for August 30, 2024. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) The parties met and conferred as to the vehicle inspection and Defendant issued an amended notice of deposition for Plaintiff. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.)

Mr. Saeedian additionally declares that Plaintiff was deposed on August 13, 2024. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff served verified responses to Defendant’s discovery requests. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) On September 13, 2024, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff’s discovery. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) Also, on September 13, 2024, Defendant made an informal offer of settlement, which was denied by Plaintiff. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.) The parties met and conferred regarding Plaintiff’s discovery responses, and Plaintiff served supplemental discovery responses on September 27, 2024. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 19.)

Mr. Saeedian also states the following: On October 7, 2024, Defendant made a Section 998 Offer to Compromise in the amount of $30,000, inclusive of attorney’s fees and costs, which was rejected by Plaintiff and Plaintiff made a counteroffer. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 20.) The counteroffer was not accepted by Defendant; however, Defendant made a second Section 998 Offer in the amount of $43,861.19 to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle, with attorney’s fees and costs to be determined by the court. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff accepted such offer on February 11, 2025. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 20.)

Counsel declares that “Defendant’s offer also provided for Plaintiff’s fees, expenses and cost[s] amount shall be calculated as if Plaintiff was found to have prevailed in this action under section 1794, subdivision (d).” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 21.) Counsel further states that “[a]fter the settlement was agreed upon, the parties could not agree on any payment for attorney fees. This fee motion therefore requests the court to decide the fees pursuant to the Settlement Agreement signed between the parties.” (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff is requesting fees for 94.2 hours of time billed by The Lemon Pros, LLP. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 24; Exh. A.) Such amount consists of 2.3 hours of work by Mr. Saeedian at $695 per hour; 19.4 hours of work by Mr. Urner at $525 per hour; 9.2 hours of work by Mr. Acosta at the partner rate of $450 per hour; 50.5 hours of work by Mr. Acosta at the non-partner rate of $350 per hour; 11.4 hours of work by law clerks at the rate of $250 per hour; and 1.4 hours of work by Ms. Zazueta at the rate of $150 per hour. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 24.) Plaintiff incurred total fees of $36,658.50. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 25; Exh. A.) Costs of $1,000.04 were incurred by Plaintiff. (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 25-26; Exh. B.)

B.    Evidence in Opposition to the Motion

In opposition to the motion, Defendant presents the declaration of its counsel, James Werner (“Werner”). Mr. Werner declates, inter alia, that on August 13, 2024, Plaintiff’s deposition occurred. (Werner Decl., ¶ 2.) On November 21, 2024, counsel for all parties appeared at the Case Management Conference. (Werner Decl., ¶ 3.) The parties each exchanged an initial set of discovery, including form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents. (Werner Decl., ¶ 4.) No other discovery was completed, and no motions were filed in this case. (Werner Decl., ¶ 4.) On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff executed Defendant’s Amended CCP § 998 Offer and Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Settlement with the court on February 21, 2025. (Werner Decl., ¶ 5; Exh. A.) Counsel attaches a copy of the 2021 Real Rate Report, and attests that The Lemon Pros, LLP employs less than 50 attorneys. (Werner Decl., ¶¶ 7-8; Exh. B.)

C.    Evidence in Support of the Reply

In support of the reply, Christoper Urner (“Urner”), provides a declaration. Mr. Urner declares, inter alia, that he was involved in this case and reviewed the case to recreate a general timeline of events within the litigation resulting from Defendant claiming nothing happened in the case in its opposition. (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Urner states that “[a]t the start of this litigation, on July 15, 2024, Defendant . . . served a notice of Vehicle Inspection for August 29, 2024, noticed the deposition of Plaintiff for August 13, 2024, and sent a letter indicating it will seek to file motions to compel if Plaintiff objects and does not provide dates . . . .” (Urner Decl., ¶ 2; Exh. A.) Defendant “served [f]orm [i]nterrogatories with 25 boxes checked, 54 [s]pecial [i]nterrogatories, 32 [r]equests for [p]roduction, and 30 [r]equests for [a]dmission on July 15, 2024.” (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Urner then sets forth meet and confer correspondence regarding the vehicle inspection and Plaintiff ultimately serving supplemental responses to Defendant’s discovery. (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.)

Mr. Urner then sets forth settlement discussions with Defendant and indicates that “[t]he parties continued to exchange communication on settlement and discovery through mid-February 2025.” (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff accepted a Section 998 offer from Defendant to repurchase her vehicle. (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel states that “[t]he case required some further communications and logistics to arrange for the vehicle return in April 2025.” (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.) The parties were unable to resolve the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs in April 2025 despite efforts. (Urner Decl., ¶ 2.)

Mr. Urner declares that Plaintiff complained to Defendant regarding the Subject Vehicle and Defendant refused to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle. (Urner Decl., ¶ 3; Exh. B.) Mr. Urner indicates that the same hourly rates requested pursuant to the instant motion have been awarded in full in multiple Song-Beverly cases in Los Angeles. (Urner Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)

Mr. Urner takes issue with Defendant’s reliance on the 2021 Real Rate Report and states that such “report is a summary of client-billed work only. It is not reflective of any contingency based legal work and does not provide any table for adjustments to the rates to properly reflect the risks and loss and the delay in payment from such cases.” (Urner Decl., ¶ 6.)

D.    Analysis

Although not disputed in the opposition brief, the court will address the issue of whether Plaintiff is the prevailing party. A prevailing party is defined as a party “with a net monetary recovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) The court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party as she obtained a net monetary recovery due to the Section 998 Offer. Moreover, the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel in support of the motion states that the parties agreed that fees, expenses, and costs would be calculated as if Plaintiff were the prevailing party under Civ. Code § 1794(d).

Plaintiff Has Substantiated the Hours Spent by Counsel in This Action

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees should be dramatically reduced because they are excessive. (Opp’n at p. 3.) Defendant argues that the claimed hours billed should be reduced because they are unreasonable. (Opp’n at pp. 4-5.) Defendant requests at 40 percent reduction of fees. (Opp’n at p. 5:23-25.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff billed for the instant motion which could and should have been avoided. (Opp’n at p. 4:10-12.) The court is not persuaded since Plaintiff’s counsel has attested that the parties could not agree on any payment for attorney’s fees, thus necessitating the instant motion. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 22.) Moreover, under Serrano v. Unruh, supra, 32 Cal.3d 621, 631, Plaintiff is entitled to recover fees incurred with the instant motion. The billing records show that Plaintiff billed 5.5 hours for the anticipated time reviewing the opposition, preparing the reply, and attending the hearing on the fee motion by Mr. Urner, which amounts to $2,887.00. (Saeedian Decl., Exh. A. at p. 12.) In support of the reply, however, Plaintiff provides no updated billing records or statement in the declaration of Mr. Urner to substantiate the time spent reviewing the opposition, drafting the reply, and attending the hearing. Thus, the court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff seeks “to charge . . . fees for tasks which have not yet been performed, based on estimated time that has not actually been expended” as it concerns some tasks related to the instant motion. (Opp’n at p. 5:16-17.)

Defendant further contends that many of the billed entries are for administrative time, which is improper. (Opp’n at p. 4:10-22.) Defendant cites to non-binding authority to support such argument. (Opp’n at p. 4:18-22.) Defendant cites to Mitchell v. Chavez (E.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109386 at *34 (Mitchell) and Robinson v. Padilla (E.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119330 at *2 (Robinson). Neither Mitchell nor Robinson addressed attorneys’ fees under Civ. Code § 1794(d). Further, unpublished federal district court opinions are merely persuasive and not binding precedent. (Futrell v. Payday California, Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1432, fn. 6.) By presenting the billing records and the declaration of Mr. Saeedian, Plaintiff has shown that even the purported administrative time was reasonable. Under Civ. Code § 1794(d), given that Plaintiff is the prevailing party, Plaintiff has shown that such time was actually expended.

Next, Defendant contends that the hours should be reduced because the case was overstaffed. (Opp’n at p. 5:10-13.) The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden in challenging the reasonableness of the claimed hours. Defendant did not attack Plaintiff’s itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed are not appropriate and Defendant failed to obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed are unreasonable, as required by Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.

The court also finds that Defendant has not met its burden in challenging the tasks performed in this action. Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to her attorneys’ fees for commencing and prosecuting this action. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Defendant seems to contend that because this action was settled and there was no motion practice, Plaintiff’s counsel should not be compensated for all time spent. (Opp’n at p. 7:7-17.) The court, however, is not persuaded by Defendant’s position.

Thus, but for the $2,887.50 for anticipated time related to the instant motion (or 5.5 hours of estimated work as to the instant motion by Mr. Urner), the court finds that Plaintiff has shown the reasonableness of the hours claimed. Plaintiff has shown the reasonableness of 88.7 of the 94.2 hours of time spent on the instant action. (Saeedian Decl., Exh. A.)

The Hourly Rates of Plaintiff’s Counsel are Reasonable

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are excessive. (Opp’n at pp. 6-7.) Defendant contends that the court should use the 2021 Real Rate Report because it provides a reliable benchmark of reasonable hourly rates. (Opp’n at pp. 7-9.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has shown the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates. Plaintiff’s counsel has provided the court with a citation to the current Laffey Matrix (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 15), which the court has reviewed, and the court finds that all of counsel’s hourly rates are below the rates charged by attorneys with their requisite experience. Moreover, according to the Laffey Matrix, the rates of Ms. Ghazarian, who is a law clerk, and Ms. Zazueta, who is a paralegal, are below the prevailing rates for a law clerk and paralegal pursuant to the Laffey Matrix. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable. The burden now shifts to Defendant to show the unreasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates.  

The court finds that Defendant has not met its burden in challenging the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates. Defendant has presented a report from 2021 to argue that the requested hourly rates of counsel are unreasonable. However, the instant action commenced in 2024 and the current year is 2025. The court fails to see how a four-year-old report is relevant to Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates at the present time.

In sum, Plaintiff has shown the reasonableness of $33,771.50 of her claimed $36,658.50 in attorney’s fees. The court, as stated above, will not award the $2,887.50 in anticipated fees associated with reviewing the opposition to the instant motion, drafting a reply, and attending the hearing as such fees were not substantiated on reply.

Also, as stated above, Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s request to recover $1,000.04 in costs pursuant to her filed Memorandum of Costs.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED IN PART and the court AWARDS Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs in the sum of $34,771.54. Such an amount represents $33,771.50 in attorneys’ fees (representing 88.7 hours of work) plus $1,000.04 in costs.