Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV02181, Date: 2024-09-24 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Defendant Claremont Unified School District’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Defendant Claremont Unified School District’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action and without leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action.

This action arises from the sexual abuse of a high school student by school staff. Defendant David Jason Williams was an English teacher and sports coach employed by Defendant Claremont Unified School District (CUSD) at Claremont High School. Plaintiff Jane Doe was a student at Claremont High School. During the 2002/2003 school year, Doe alleges Williams sexually abused Doe on school premises.

On July 9, 2024, Doe filed a complaint against CUSD, Williams, and Does 1-60, alleging the following causes of action: (1) sexual abuse/sexual battery of a minor, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of an unfit employee, (4) breach of mandatory duty to report suspected child abuse, (5) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate, (6) negligent supervision of a minor, and (7) negligence.

On August 21, 2024, CUSD filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing on August 16, 2024, CUSD’s counsel met and conferred telephonically with Doe’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Santana Decl., ¶ 5.) On the same day, CUSD also filed a motion for a stay of proceedings.

A hearing on the demurrer is set for September 24, 2024, along with a motion for stay of proceedings on October 3, 2024, and a case management conference on November 14, 2024.

CUSD demurs to Doe’s entire Complaint on the grounds that AB 218 violates article 16, section 6 of the California Constitution. CUSD also demurs to Doe’s fourth cause of action (breach of mandatory duty to report suspected child abuse) and fifth cause of action (negligent failure to warn, train, or educate). For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS CUSD’s demurrer in part as to Doe’s fourth cause of action with leave to amend and fifth cause of action without leave to amend. The court OVERRULES CUSD’s demurrer on all other grounds.

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

CUSD argues Doe’s Complaint fails because AB 218 violates article 16, section 6 of the California Constitution. The court disagrees.

In 2019, the California Legislature passed AB 218 and it was signed into law. (Stats. 2019, ch. 861.) As relevant here, it amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to add a subdivision (q) which allows a childhood sexual assault claim that would have been time-barred as of January 1, 2020, to be brought within three years of January 1, 2020. (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) AB 218 also amended Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), which excludes childhood sexual assault claims from notice of claim requirements, by removing language that made the statute only applicable “to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009” and making such changes retroactive. (Compare Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 3, with Stats. 2012, ch. 776, § 2.)

CUSD argues this amendment violates article 16, section 6 of the California Constitution^{^[1]} which provides in relevant part: “The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending . . . in any manner whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever . . . .”

But in a recent decision, the First District Court of Appeal explicitly rejected this argument and held this amendment does not violate California’s gift clause. (West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 904, 908-909] (WCCUSD), petn. for review pending, petn. filed September 9, 2024.) In an attempt to avoid application of this case, CUSD points to the fact that a petition for review is pending and also notes a similar case is being considered by the Second District Court of Appeal. (Reply, p. 2:13-21.)

In the absence of a decision in either cases, however, the court is bound by First District’s opinion in WCCUSD. Further, even if no binding authority existed, the court would have rejected CUSD’s arguments as it has done in previous cases where the same constitutional challenge was made. (T.C. v. Doe 1 School (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 22STCV10734), 01/17/2024 Ruling; Doe v. Baldwin Park Unified School District (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 22PSCV03039), 10/26/2023 Ruling.)

Breach of Mandatory Duty to Report Suspected Child Abuse (Fourth Cause of Action)

CUSD contends Doe’s fourth cause of action for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected child abuse fails as a matter of law and is insufficiently pled. The court disagrees as to the first contention, but agrees as to the second contention that it is insufficiently pled.

The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA) requires mandated reporters, including teachers and public school employees, to report known or reasonably suspected instances of child abuse or neglect to the authorities. (Pen. Code, §§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(1), (4)); 11166.) As defined pursuant to Penal Code section 11165.6, “child abuse” includes “physical injury or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by another person . . . .” Civil liability can be imposed for failure to report abuse. (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015), 62 Cal.4th 168, 198, fn.6 (B.H.).)

In this case, CUSD first contends Government Code section 815.6 is not a valid basis for civil liability against CUSD. (Demurrer, p. 4:17-6:14.) Pursuant to Government Code section 815.6, “[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”

CUSD contends CANRA does not impose a mandatory duty on CUSD as its definition of mandated reporters does not include public schools. (See Pen. Code, § 11165.7, subd. (a).) But even if CUSD cannot be held directly liable, the Complaint also alleges CUSD is vicariously liable for the violations of CANRA committed by CUSD’s employees. (Complaint, ¶ 42.) Because a demurrer may not “lie to a part of a cause of action,” CUSD must establish that both theories of liability fail. (Cornejo v. Lightbourne (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 932, 944.)

In opposition, Doe contends CUSD may be held vicariously liable pursuant to Government Code section 815.2. (Opp., p. 5:27-6:11.) Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a) states “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Doe also points to Kassey S. v. City of Turlock (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1276 (Kassey S.) where the court noted a police officer’s breach of duties imposed by CANRA subjects the police officer and the police officer’s municipal employer to liability for injuries caused by the breach. (Id., at p. 1280.) CUSD attempts to distinguish Kassey S. on the grounds that the section discussing a municipal employer’s liability is dicta. (Reply, p. 3:14-24.) But CUSD fails to address the applicability of Government Code section 815.2. Thus, CUSD has not established that both of Doe’s theories of liability fail as a matter of law.

CUSD next contends CANRA does not provide a private right of action. (Demurrer, p. 6:16-8:18.) As the court noted in All Angels Preschool/Daycare v. County of Merced (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 394, “the test is not whether the enactment manifests the intent to create a private cause of action, but whether it created a mandatory duty to protect against a particular type of harm.” (Id., at p. 405, fn. 13.) Courts have “permitted a civil suit for injury to a child where there was a breach of the mandated reporter’s duty to report child abuse” and the Legislature has expressly avoided abrogation of this remedy. (Id., at p. 405.)

Last, CUSD contends the Complaint fails to plead facts showing CUSD’s staff knew or had reason to suspect Williams was engaging in child abuse. (Demurrer, p. 8:21-9:25.) The Complaint alleges Williams’ grooming and isolation of Doe occurred on Claremont High School’s campus in front of other CUSD employees and students. (Complaint, ¶ 14.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges “CUSD students, administrators and personnel witnessed inappropriate ‘red flag’ behavior by Williams towards Jane Doe, including but not limited to Williams and Jane Doe spending one on one time alone together on the CHS campus, and Williams making improper, harassing statements to Jane Doe on the CHS campus.” (Complaint, ¶ 17.) The Complaint also alleges “CUSD administrators and personnel had notice that Williams had previously and contemporaneously engaged in the same ‘grooming’ and ‘sexually abusive’ type behavior with other minor female CUSD students.” (Complaint, ¶ 18.)

“[T]o state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.” (Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 819.) For example, “a pleading that did no more than assert boilerplate allegations that defendants knew or were on notice of the perpetrator's past unlawful sexual conduct would not be sufficient nor would allegations of information and belief that merely asserted the facts so alleged without alleging such information that ‘lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.’” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [determining whether defendants had actual or constructive notice for purposes of extending statute of limitations], quoting Pridonoff v. Balokovich (1951) 36 Cal.2d 788, 792.)

Here, the court finds the above allegations are insufficient. While the Complaint alleges CUSD staff witnessed Doe and Williams spending one-on-one time alone together on campus, the Complaint fails to establish how this fact would cause one to reasonably suspect child abuse may be occurring. In Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13 (Roe), the court noted it was objectively reasonable for school staff to suspect child abuse when a janitor was escorting children to empty rooms. (Id., at p. 32.) But unlike the janitor in Roe who was not required or allowed to be spending one-on-one time with students (see id., at p. 29), there are no allegations here that establish it was inappropriate for Williams, an English teacher and coach, to be spending time alone with Doe. As to the allegation that Williams made improper and harassment statements on campus on Doe, there are no specific allegations establishing what these statements were, when they were made, how they were made, and who actually heard them.

Finally, to the extent the Complaint alleges CUSD staff had notice of other grooming or sexually abusive conduct committed by Williams, they are no specific facts to support this general and conclusory allegation.

Accordingly, CUSD’s demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

CUSD maintains Doe’s fifth cause of action for negligent failure to warn, train, or educate fails as a matter of law. The court agrees.

The basic elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) The existence of a special relationship can give rise to a duty to warn or educate about certain dangers, including sexual abuse. (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1129 (Doe).) “[A] special relationship is typically where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff's welfare.” (Kockelman v. Segal (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 491, 499.)

In this case, CUSD maintains the case which first recognized a duty to educate, train, and warn of the risks of sexual abuse—Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377 (Juarez), overruled on other grounds in Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 (Brown)—has not been applied to any entity other than the Boy Scouts of America. (Demurrer, p. 10:1-15.) CUSD also points to language in Juarez that states “the reach of this opinion is only intended to extend as far as the record before us today.” (Id., at p. 409.) And Juarez goes on to state “[i]f we have not yet made it abundantly clear, deciding the question of duty mandates a case-by-case fact and policy analysis.” (Ibid.)

In opposition, Doe fails to point the court to any authority that applies Juarez to a school district. While Doe maintains CUSD has failed to explain why Juarez would not be applicable to school districts (Opp., p. 8:28-9:3), CUSD has done so by noting Juarez’s holding was limited to the facts of that case. Furthermore, CUSD pointed the court to cases in which courts have declined to extend Juarez. In Doe, the court held a national youth soccer association had a special relationship with the children participating in its programs. (Doe, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131.) The court also held there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of sexual abuse to children participating in the programs. (Id., at p. 1135.) But despite this risk and the existence of a special relationship, the court held requiring the national youth soccer association to implement a sexual abuse education program was extraordinarily burdensome in comparison to the risk of abuse and declined to impose a duty to educate, train, and warn. (Id., at p. 1139.)

In the present case, CUSD has a special relationship with its students that arises from “the compulsory nature of education.” (M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 517.) But even if there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of sexual abuse in the school environment, Doe fails to establish how the conclusion of Doe is inapplicable here. Like the national youth soccer association in Doe, the implementation of a sexual abuse education program would be extraordinarily burdensome in comparison to the risk of abuse. In absence of any authority extending Juarez to school districts, the court finds this cause of action fails as a matter of law.

Accordingly, CUSD’s demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, CUSD’s demurrer to Doe’s Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action and without leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action.

[1] This provision is also known as the “gift clause” and the court will herein refer to it as such. (See State of California ex rel. State Lands Com. v. County of Orange (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 20, 28.)