Judge Salvatore Sirna, Case Number: 24PSCV02204, Date: 2025-04-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV02204, Date: 2025-04-01 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, counsel are advised to check this website periodically to determine whether any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on a tentative ruling by calling the clerk in Department G at (909) 802-1104 prior to 8:30 a.m. the morning of the hearing.

Case Number: 24PSCV02204 Hearing Date: April 1, 2025 Dept: G

Defendants Y F Trucking Inc. and Rong Xu’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint

Respondent: Plaintiffs Dina Lizeth Ortiz Flores and Edipson Perez-Rodriguez

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Y F Trucking Inc. and Rong Xu’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint is GRANTED and the cross-complaint submitted with the declaration of Defendants Y F Trucking Inc. and Rong Xu’s counsel is deemed filed as of this date.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury and property damage action resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs Dina Lizeth Ortiz Flores, Clivian Karian Zepeda Flores, and Edipson Perez-Rodriguez (collectively, Plaintiffs) allege the following. On October 13, 2023, Defendant Rong Xu was traveling in a freightliner on Railroad St. in the City of Industry and made an unsafe left turn into Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Defendant Y F Trucking Inc. is the registered owner of the freightliner.

On July 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants Rong Xu and YF Trucking Inc. (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 to 20, alleging (1) motor vehicle – negligence, (2) negligence, and (3) loss of consortium.

On November 21, 2024, Defendants filed their answer.

On December 9, 2024, Defendants propounded discovery on Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Clivian Karian Zepeda Flores responded on February 7, 2025.

On February 24, 2025, Defendants filed this present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for April 1, 2025, along with a case management conference.

ANALYSIS

Defendants seek leave to file a cross-complaint. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS their motion.

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (a), a party is entitled to “file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint.” Furthermore, “[a]ny other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50, subd. (b).) If a cross-compliant is not filed within these guidelines, it may only be filed with leave of the court, who may grant it “in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50, subd. (c).)

A cross-complaint is compulsory when a related cause of action existed at the time of serving the defendant’s answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a); see also Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864.) A “‘[r]elated cause of action’ means a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c).) Leave must be granted to file a compulsory cross-complaint when the defendant is acting in good faith. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50.)

“[W]hat constitutes ‘good faith’—or lack of it—under Code of Civil Procedure Section 426.50 must be determined in light of and in conformity with the liberality conferred upon the trial courts by the section and by prior law. … [T]his principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section.” (Foot’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902 (Foot’s Transfer & Storage).) A determination of bad faith may be premised on “substantial injustice or prejudice” to the opposing party. (Id., at p. 903; see also Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 560, fn. 9 [stating leave was properly denied where defendant’s motion “was merely a tactical strategic maneuver to deprive plaintiffs of a right to a jury trial”].)

Discussion

Here, Defendants seek to file a compulsory cross-complaint. (Reply, pp. 2:9-3:7.) Defendants’ proposed cross-complaint alleges the following causes of action against plaintiff Dina Lizeth Ortiz Flores and Roes 1 to 20: (1) negligence, (2) indemnity, and (3) contribution. (Jones Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A.) These causes of action arise from the same occurrence as the complaint, the October 13, 2023 accident. (Motion, p. 5:1-3.) Defendants did not seek leave to file this cross-complaint until February 24, 2025, because Defendants did not learn until February 7, 2025 that Zepeda Flores was an unrestrained passenger in a food truck where Zepeda Flores allegedly received burn injuries from a hot water container. (Jones Decl., ¶ 13, Exh. E, p. P0033.) Defendants learned this information after Defendants filed their answer and when Zepeda Flores responded to Defendants’ discovery requests. (Jones Decl., ¶ 14.) Defendants state that they received the discovery responses on January 15, 2025, but this is incorrect. (Jones Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendants received the responses on February 7, 2025. (Jones Decl., Exh. E.)

Ortiz Flores and Perez-Rodriguez argue Defendants failed to show that granting leave to file a cross-complaint is in the interest of justice and the court should, therefore, deny the motion. (Opp., pp. 3:18-5:16.) The court disagrees.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 426.50, the court must grant leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint unless the moving party acted in bad faith. Ortiz Flores and Perez-Rodriguez do not argue that Defendants acted in bad faith, but claim Defendants unreasonably delayed in bringing the motion. (Opp., pp. 3:15-5:16.) This argument by Ortiz Flores and Perez-Rodriguez is not persuasive. Instead, the fact demonstrate that Defendants filed this motion on February 24, 2025, less than a month after learning of the additional facts that support their cross-complaint. The court finds this passage of time does not constitute unreasonable delay.

Additionally, Ortiz Flores and Perez-Rodriguez argue that the court may deny a cross-complaint as moot when the cross-complaint operates inequitably, and such inequity exists where the defendant can obtain the same relief via an affirmative defense. (Opp., pp. 5:28-26.) As support for this position, Ortiz Flores and Perez-Rodriguez rely upon Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1193 (Jaffe). (Opp., p. 5:26.) However, Plaintiffs inaccurately summarize the holding in Jaffe since Jaffe does not reference affirmative defenses. Therefore, the court is not persuade by Plaintiffs’ argument.

Accordingly, the court finds that neither prejudice nor substantial injustice will result if Defendants are permitted to file a cross-complaint. Therefore, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to file a cross-complaint.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to file a cross-complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are ordered to file separately, forthwith, the cross-complaint attached as Exhibit A to the declaration of Matthew S. Jones.