Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV02259, Date: 2025-05-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24PSCV02259 Hearing Date: May 7, 2025 Dept: G
Plaintiffs Tommy Ming Tak Li and Jennifer Li’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint
Respondent: Defendant General Motors, LLC
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs Tommy Ming Tak Li and Jennifer Li’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are ordered to file the proposed First Amended Complaint separately with the court forthwith.
BACKGROUND
This is a Song-Beverly action. On May 11, 2024, plaintiffs Tommy Ming Tak Li and Jennifer Li (Plaintiffs) acquired a 2021 Chevrolet Bolt. Subsequently, Plaintiffs allege the vehicle presented defects, malfunctions, and nonconformities and General Motors, LLC (General Motors) repeatedly failed to make the necessary repairs and provide restitution to Plaintiffs.
On July 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant General Motors and Does 1 through 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of express warranty and (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of implied warranty.
On March 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this present motion. A hearing on the present motion is set for May 7, 2025. A post-mediation status conference/trial setting conference is scheduled for August 6, 2025.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs seek leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC) that replaces the Song-Beverly causes of action with a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim. (Motion, p. 3:8-12.) For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.
Legal Standard
“A court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) The court’s discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendments of the pleadings. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) “A motion to amend a pleading before trial must . . . [s]tate what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and [s]tate what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a).) The declaration must also specify the amendment’s effect, why it is necessary and proper, when the facts supporting the amended allegations were discovered, and why the request was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)
If the party seeking the amendment has needlessly delayed, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the court has the discretion to deny leave to amend. (See Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Solit v. Tokai Bank, Ltd. New York Branch (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)
Discussion
Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel provides the effect of the proposed FAC is to replace the Song-Beverly causes of action with a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim due to “recent legal developments that limit the scope of the Song-Beverly” claims. (Morrow Decl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs’ counsel also states the new cause of action provides an appropriate remedy and accurately reflects Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the warranty and vehicle. (Morrow Decl., ¶ 7.) Although Plaintiffs’ counsel does not explicitly state why these amendments are necessary and proper and when the supporting facts were first discovered, it appears counsel proposed this amendment based upon the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez) on October 31, 2024. (Morrow Decl., ¶ 7.)
In its opposition, General Motors argues Plaintiffs unjustifiably delayed in seeking leave to add this new cause of action since Plaintiffs could have alleged the additional cause of action in the original complaint. (Opp., pp. 3:15-5:18.) But the fact that Plaintiffs could have brought this cause of action in the initial complaint does not render the delay to do so unreasonable or needless on its own. In fact, Plaintiffs had a legitimate reason to delay considering the pending decision in the Rodriguez case. Further, the court finds such a delay does not unfairly prejudice General Motors.
While General Motors argues such prejudice exists because the proposed amendments will require additional discovery, expand the scope of the case, and may delay trial, General Motors fails to quantify the costs of such additional discovery, explain how the amendments will expand the scope of the case when the underlying facts are the same, and delay trial when trial has not been set by the court. (Opp., pp. 5:20-7:7.) To the extent General Motors also challenges the legal viability of the proposed FAC, General Motors should raise these arguments in a separate motion. (Opp., pp. 7:8-9:6.)
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file FAC is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs are ordered to file the proposed FAC separately with the court forthwith.