Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV03054, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV03054    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: G

Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Respondent: Enrique Cisneros

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants are ordered to file an Answer in ten (10) days.

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful termination action. Plaintiff Enrique Cisneros (Plaintiff) alleges the following. In 2003, Plaintiff joined Teamsters Local 396 TCWH (Teamsters) as a business representative. In August 2022, the Teamsters’ Executive Board selected Victor Mineros (Mineros) as the new secretary-treasurer. During this time, Plaintiff’s responsibilities included documenting campaign contributions for the Vairma/Herrera Power Slate leading up to the 2021 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) general election.

Following Mineros’ appointment, Plaintiff went to President of Teamsters Local 396 Jay Phillips (Phillips) and reported that Mineros had been embezzling, accepting cash from outside vendors in violation of union election rules, and making campaign contributions in excess of the allowed amounts. Plaintiff also alleges Mineros directed him to keep $1,000 of the cash entrusted to Mineros for the Vairma/Herrera Power Slate. Plaintiff refused to take the cash.

Upon learning this, Phillips advised Plaintiff to make a report with the IBT or the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards. Instead, Plaintiff informed Mineros that he had reported him to Phillips. In response, Mineros told Plaintiff to keep his mouth shut and go on his scheduled vacation. Upon his return, Mineros terminated Plaintiff’s employment with the Teamsters for allegedly shredding member grievances and having a poor attitude.

On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Teamsters, Mineros, (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1-25, alleging the following causes of action: (1) whistleblower retaliation and (2) disability harassment.

On January 22, 2025, Defendants filed the present demurrer. On December 12, 2024, the Defendants’ counsel met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiff’s counsel and were unable to reach a resolution. (Moorhead Decl., ¶ 3.)

A hearing on the demurrer is set for March 13, 2025, along with a case management conference.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants’ request for the Court to take judicial notice of its own records is GRANTED.

Plaintiff requests the court to take judicial notice of the same document. For this reason, the Court deems Plaintiff’s request MOOT.

OBJECTION BY DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF’S SURREPLY

On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a surreply to Defendants’ reply brief, which Defendants filed on March 5, 2025.  Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s surreply asserting that Plaintiff did not seek leave of court to file a surreply and failed to provide the court with any statutory authority which permits its filing.

The objection by Defendants is SUSTAINED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §1005.  Plaintiff’s surreply will not be considered by the court.

ANALYSIS

Defendants’ demur to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Whistleblower Retaliation on grounds that it is preempted by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). For the following reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend.

Legal Standard

Demurrer

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)

Preemption

“A state action is preempted wherever it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (Screen Extras Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1017, 1022 (Screen Extras Guild), quoting Brown v. Hotel Employees (1984) 468 U.S. 491, 501.) Substantive preemption applies when a “state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law” and “[i]n such cases, state action is preempted, without balancing state and federal interests, by direct operation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.” (Id., at p. 1023.)

In Screen Extras Guild, the California Supreme Court held a former union business agent’s action for wrongful termination against the agent’s union-employer was preempted by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). (Screen Extras Guild, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1032.) In finding substantive preemption applied, the court noted the LMRDA was enacted by Congress “to ensure that unions are democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships.” (Id., at p. 1024.) Because the LMRDA allows elected union officials to fire management or policymaking employees, allowing wrongful termination claims “to proceed in the California courts would ‘restrict the exercise of the right to terminate which Finnegan [v. Leu (1982) 456 U.S. 431, 441] found [to be] an integral part of ensuring a union administration’s responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.’” (Id., at p. 1028, quoting Tyra v. Kearney (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 921, 927.)

In Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, Office & Food Warehouse Union, Local 952 (9th Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 1356 (Bloom), the Ninth Circuit held a wrongful discharge action against a union was not preempted by the LMRDA where the employee alleged the termination occurred after the employee refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. (Id., at p. 1362.) The Ninth Circuit determined the state’s interests in preventing wrongful discharge for refusing to commit a crime was greater than the federal interest and that “[p]rotecting such a discharge by preempting a state cause of action based on it does nothing to serve union democracy or the rights of union members.” (Ibid.)

Discussion

Here, Defendants argue the LMRDA substantively preempts Plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation cause of action. (Demurrer, p. 3:8-6:17.) In opposition, Plaintiff first argues the law does not create an actual conflict with the LMDRA, so the LMDRA does not preempt a whistleblowing retaliation cause of action. (Opp., p. 10:2-24.) Plaintiff additionally contends the Court should apply the analysis found in Bloom to find no preemption where union employees had refused to participate in criminal conduct or had reported such conduct. (Opp., p. 10:27-15:4.)

In Screen Extras Guild, the California Supreme Court did not explicitly reject or adopt Bloom and refused to “speculate as to whether the Bloom court reached the right conclusion regarding LMRDA preemption.” (Screen Extras Guild, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1025, fn. 5.) However, the Supreme Court described Bloom’s use of the balancing approach as inappropriate for substantive preemption; a balancing approach is only appropriate in the cases of jurisdictional preemption. (Ibid.) Since the California Supreme Court rejected the balancing approach for substantive preemption, this court will find substantive preemption when the “state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law.” (Id. at p. 1023.)

In Screen Extras Guild, the Court applied this analysis to a business agent suing her former union employer for wrongful discharge in an action which alleged causes of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. (Screen Extras Guild, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1021-1022.) There, the Court reasoned:  “Permitting former union employees who held management or policymaking positions to bring state actions against the unions which employed them, or against the officials of such unions, premised on their discharge, would undermine the ability of elected union leaders to effectuate the will and policies of the union membership they represent. Thus, the strong federal policy favoring union democracy, embodied in the LMRDA, preempts state causes of action for wrongful discharge or related torts when brought against a union-employer by its former management or policymaking employee.” (Screen Extras Guild, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1020-1021.)

Here, the court finds that Plaintiff, a business agent, falls into the category of “former union employees who held management or policymaking positions.” (See Finnegan v. Leu (1982) 456 U.S. 431, 441-442.) Further, Plaintiff brought this action against the union that employed him as an official of such union. Finally, Plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts Defendants (the Teamsters Local 396 and Mineros) wrongfully discharged him in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5, whistleblower retaliation. As such, the court finds that the LMRDA preempts Plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation cause of action.

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the facts of this case by arguing that Screen Extras Guild and similar cases are not “true whistleblower cases” and did not involve unlawful acts. (Opp., pp. 15:22-18:1.) Although Screen Extras Guild and the other related cases did not involve illegal acts, the court notes that legality of the subject act is not determinative.  Instead, courts are required to determine whether “state actions … would undermine the ability of elected union leaders to effectuate the will and policies of the union membership they represent” and, if so,  must find that state causes of action for wrongful discharge or related torts would undermine elected union leaders’ ability to effectuate the will and policies of union membership. (Screen Extras Guild, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1020-1021.) The illegality of an act does not bear on the analysis. In addition, Plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation cause of action falls within “the wrongful discharge” group, because Plaintiff is alleging Defendants wrongfully terminated him in retaliation for reporting Mineros’ allegedly illegal activities.

Accordingly, the court determines that the Bloom analysis is inapplicable here and that Plaintiff’s Whistleblower Retaliation claim attempts to regulate conduct protected by the LMRDA.  As such, the court finds LMRDA preempts Plaintiff’s first cause of action and SUSTAINS the Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants are ordered to file an Answer in ten (10) days.