Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24PSCV03638, Date: 2025-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV03638    Hearing Date: April 14, 2025    Dept: G

Amended Demurrer to First Amended Complaint by County of Los Angeles and Deputy Del Rio

Respondent: Plaintiffs Julie Slattery-Miller and Daniel Gonzalez

TENTATIVE RULING

Amended Demurrer to First Amended Complaint by County of Los Angeles and Deputy Del Rio is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful death action. On October 28, 2024, plaintiffs Julie Slattery-Miller and Daniel Gonzalez (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against defendants Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LACSD), the County of Los Angeles (the County), Deputy Antonio Del Rio, and Does 1 through 50. On December 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (FAC), alleging (1) wrongful death, (2) negligence, and (3) negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Plaintiffs allege the following.

On March 24, 2024 at 7:25 p.m., Joanna Gonzalez (Decedent) was experiencing a mental health crisis at her home in La Puente. Decedent’s foster parent called 911 to report the family disturbance. The police responded but Decedent had left by the time of their arrival. At 7:40 p.m., Decedent arrived at the LACSD’s Industry Station where she knocked on the unlocked door to be let in. Deputy Antonio Del Rio (Deputy) opened the door. Less than four seconds later, Decedent disarmed Deputy, retained possession of Deputy’s firearm, and shot herself in the head.

On February 13, 2025, the County and Deputy (collectively, Defendants) filed this amended demurrer. Prior to filing the demurrer, the Defendants’ counsel met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiffs’ counsel on December 30, 2024. (Teixeira Decl., ¶ 5.) The parties were unable to reach a resolution. (Teixeira Decl., ¶ 5.)

A hearing on this motion is set for April 15, 2025, along with a motion to quash and a case management conference.

ANALYSIS

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ FAC. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)

Discussion

The court finds Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants owed a duty to Decedent.

“[A]lthough law enforcement officers, like other members of the public, generally do not have a legal duty to come to the aid of a person, in carrying out routine traffic enforcement duties or investigations, a duty of care does arise when an officer engages in ‘an affirmative act which places the person in peril or increases the risk of harm[.]’” (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 717, quoting Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 24.)

Further, it is well established in California that “one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct. Such a duty may arise, however, if ‘(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.’” (Jackson v. Clements (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 983, 986–987.)

A special relationship will be found: (1) where there was a voluntary assumption by the public official of a duty toward the injured party; (2) where the police had induced the victim’s reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would protect him, or (3) where the victim was dependent upon the police or other public official for protection because the official either created the peril or increased or changed the risk which would have otherwise existed by lulling the victim into a false sense of security and perhaps preventing other assistance from being sought. (See, Zuniga v. Housing Authority (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 82, 95, citing Jackson v. Clements, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 988; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 206–208.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are premised on the legal analysis of negligence. (Dem., p. 5:18.) The court agrees since Plaintiffs assert (1) wrongful death based on negligence, (2) negligence, and (3) negligent hiring, training, and supervising. (FAC, ¶¶ 35, 39, 42, 44-45, 49-51, 53.) (See Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1192-1193, 1201-1203 [applying same “duty” analysis to separate claims for negligence and negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention]; Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139 [elements of negligent hiring are the same as a basic negligence claim]; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263 [“[t]he elements of the cause of action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs].) 

As such, Plaintiffs’ causes of action can only survive if Plaintiffs sufficiently allege Defendants owed a duty.

Wrongful Death (First Cause of Action)

Plaintiffs first assert that Deputy Del Rio, as a public employee, and the County and LACSD, via vicarious liability under Government Code, section 815.2, “owed a duty of care to Johanna Gonzalez to protect her from foreseeable harm[,] … to provide appropriate assistance during her mental health crisis[,] … to carry out their law enforcement duties in a reasonable manner[,] … to take appropriate precautions when responding to a call involving a minor in mental health distress, [and to] … have appropriate situational awareness.” (FAC, ¶¶ 37-39, 44.) The court disagrees.

Here, the allegations pled by Plaintiffs, however, do not demonstrate that Defendants created the peril or increased the risk of peril to Decedent. Rather, the allegations show that Decedent’s own actions created the peril. Decedent allegedly knocked on the door to the sheriff’s station so that an LACSD employee would open the door. (FAC, ¶ 20.) Deputy Del Rio allegedly opened the door, exposing his right hip and holstered weapon. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-23.) Within four seconds, Decedent disarmed Deputy Del Rio and ended her life. (FAC, ¶¶ 24, 26.) The allegations only allege that Deputy Del Rio opened the door to a citizen and that Deputy Del Rio attempted to regain the weapon after Decedent had managed to gain possession of it. (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 25.) The court finds these facts insufficient to show that Deputy Del Rio acted in a manner that created or increased the peril to Decedent.

Significantly, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that a special relationship existed between Decedent and Defendants such that a duty to Decedent arose. The allegations do not show that Defendants voluntarily assumed a duty towards Decedent since the FAC does not allege facts that would support a position that Defendants chose to investigate Decedent’s mental health crisis and had awareness of the “foreseeable danger” to Decedent. (See Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 773, 775 [“Once a state traffic officer has chosen to investigate the plight of specific persons on a freeway and informed himself of the foreseeable danger to them from passing traffic, a special relationship requiring him to protect them by readily available means arises, and liability may attach if the officer’s limited duty of protection in such circumstance is not performed.”])

Here, the alleged facts only show that Deputy Del Rio and LACSD responded to Decedent’s request to allow her access to the sheriff’s station, not that Deputy Del Rio and LACSD  were investigating anything related to Decedent, or that they were aware that Decedent posed a risk of harm to herself or to others. (FAC, ¶¶ 16, 18.) Further, the allegations do not show that Defendants induced the Decedent’s reliance on a promise, express or implied, that Defendants would protect Decedent. Instead, the allegations show that Decedent ran away from home before LACSD deputies arrived on the scene and Decedent did not interact with any deputy until the incident involving Deputy Del Rio at the station. (FAC, ¶¶ 18, 23.) Additionally, the allegations do not show that Defendants either created the peril or increased or changed the risk which would have otherwise existed by lulling Decedent into a false sense of security and preventing other assistance from being sought. As noted above, the court finds that Decedent’s interaction with Deputy Del Rio or other deputies was insufficient to create a sense of security that prevented her from seeking assistance from others. (FAC, ¶¶ 18, 23.)

Plaintiffs next assert that Defendants owed Decedent a duty to “properly secure the firearm that was within the possession and/or control of Defendants … such that [Decedent], a minor, was not likely to gain access to the deputy’s firearm without the permission of her legal guardian” under Penal Code section 25100. (FAC, ¶ 44(a).) 

Penal Code section 25105 states “Section 25100 does not apply whenever any of the following occurs: … (c) The firearm is carried on the person or within close enough proximity thereto that the individual can readily retrieve and use the firearm as if carried on the person [and] … (e) The person is a peace officer … and the child obtains the firearm during, or incidental to, the performance of the person's duties.” The court finds that both exceptions apply her. Plaintiffs assert Deputy Del Rio was carrying his weapon on his person while on duty at the sheriff’s station. (FAC, ¶¶ 19-21, 23.) Since the exceptions apply, Plaintiffs claims fail to allege facts that Defendants owed Decedent a duty under Penal Code section 25100.

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants had a duty to “comply with LACSD internal regulations regarding standards for approved holsters” under LACSD’s Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP) 3-03/280.00. (FAC, ¶ 44(c).) As discussed in Lehto v. City of Oxnard (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 285, 295, “[d]epartmental or municipal policy directives may prescribe what conduct is expected of police personnel under particular circumstances but a deviation from those directives … cannot create a duty to individual citizens.” (Lehto v. City of Oxnard (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 285, 295.) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations in this regard do not create a duty by Defendants to Decedent. 

Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to show Defendants owed a duty of care to Decedent.  The court SUSTAINS Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend.

Negligence (Second Cause of Action)

Plaintiffs assert the same duties and allege the same facts under their second cause of action for negligence. (FAC, ¶¶ 16, 18-25, 42-48.) For the reasons discussed above, the court SUSTAINS Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend.

Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervising (Third Cause of Action)

Plaintiffs assert that the County and LACSD had “a duty to the public, including [Decedent], to use reasonable care in the hiring, training, and supervision of their employees, including the deputy involved in this incident.” (FAC, ¶ 50.)

“A direct claim against a governmental entity asserting negligent hiring and supervision, when not grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entity to the injured party, may not be maintained.” (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 255-256.)

Here, Plaintiffs assert a direct claim against governmental entities not grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entities to Decedent. Plaintiffs’ third cause of action does not discuss any statute within its relevant paragraphs. (FAC, ¶¶ 49-53.) For this reason, the court finds Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled this cause of action.

Plaintiffs contend that their third cause of action alleges the County and LACSD are vicariously liable for Deputy Del Rio’s acts under Government Code, section 815.2. (Opp., p. 9:6-7.) However, their third cause of action does not mention Government Code, section 815.2. In Plaintiffs’ first two causes of action, Plaintiffs explicitly state:

“The present cause of action is brought pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2 and 820. … Under § 815.2, the defendant public entities, Defendants COUNTY and LACSD, are vicariously liable for injuries caused by the acts or omissions of its employees, officers, and agents, committed within the course and scope of that employment. This cause of action is not alleging direct liability against Defendants COUNTY or LACSD, only vicarious liability.”(FAC, ¶ 43.)

In Plaintiffs’ third cause of action, Plaintiffs do not make the same statement. (FAC, ¶¶ 49-53.)  Additionally, even if the court found Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged vicarious liability, such a claim would only survive if the County, LACSD, or Deputy Del Rio owed Decedent a duty of care. (de Villers v. County of San Diego, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 249, citing Gov. Code, § 815.2; Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants owed Decedent a duty of care.

Accordingly, the court SUSTAINS Defendants’ demurrer as to this cause of action with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.