Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 24STCV00746, Date: 2024-05-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV00746 Hearing Date: May 29, 2024 Dept: G
Defendant Super Center
Concepts, Inc.’s Demurrer to Complaint
Respondent: Plaintiffs Ma G. Munoz and Celestina Garcia
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Super Center Concepts, Inc.’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED and the present action is STAYED pending the resolution of Peraza v. Super Center Concepts, Inc. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County, No. CIVSB2302012).
BACKGROUND
This is a wage and hour action brought pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Plaintiffs Ma G. Munoz and Celestina Garcia worked for Defendant Super Center Concepts, Inc. (Superior Grocers) as non-exempt employees. On January 10, 2024, Munoz and Garcia filed a PAGA complaint against Superior Grocers and Does 1-100, alleging a single cause of action for civil penalties pursuant to the Labor Code.
On April 22, 2024, Superior Grocers filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing on March 22, 2024, Superior Grocers’ counsel met and conferred telephonically with Munoz and Garcia’s counsel and was unable to reach a resolution. (Nhan Decl., ¶ 7.)
A hearing on the demurrer is set for May 29, 2024. A case management conference and OSC Re: Failure to File Proof of Service is also set for June 10, 2024.
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Superior Grocers requests the Court take judicial notice of two Labor Code violation claims that were submitted to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) by Rosa Umana Peraza, Munoz, and Garcia. Superior Grocers also requests the Court take judicial notice of pleadings filed in cases before the San Bernardino County Superior Court and the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Superior Grocers’ requests are GRANTED as the Court may take judicial notice of the LWDA’s acts and the records of state courts. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c), (d).)
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Munoz and Garcia’s evidentiary objection to the declaration of Superior Grocers’ counsel is OVERRULED. Nonetheless, the Court’s review will be limited to the four corners of the Complaint and any matter which may be properly subjected to judicial notice.
ANALYSIS
Superior Grocers demurs to Munoz and Garica’s PAGA action on the grounds that it is barred by the statutory plea in abatement doctrine and exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. For the following reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Superior Grocers’ demurrer pursuant to the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine.
Legal Standard
Demurrer
A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)
Statutory Plea in Abatement
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c) provides that a demurrer may be brought on grounds that “[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” A plea in abatement requires absolute identity of parties, causes of action, and remedies sought. (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788 (Plant Insulation Co.).) Whether the causes of action are identical “is determined by a comparison of the facts alleged which show the nature of the invasion of plaintiff's primary right.” (Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384.) A plea in abatement may only be maintained “where a judgment in the first action would be a complete bar to the second action.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 787-788.) Because it ignores the merits of an action, a plea in abatement is generally disfavored. (Williams v. State of California (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 960, 964.) And “[w]here a demurrer is sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper order is not a dismissal, but abatement of further proceedings pending termination of the first action.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 788.)
Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction
The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction “provides that when two superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” (California Union Ins. Co. v. Trinity River Land Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 104, 109).) “Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, it has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea of abatement do not exist.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 788.) “If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule. Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Ibid.) If the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applies, then the subsequent matter is stayed until the first action is resolved. (Id., at p. at 791-792.)
Discussion
In this case, Superior Grocers argues the present action should be abated or stayed in favor of a pending PAGA action in Peraza v. Super Center Concepts, Inc. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County, No. CIVSB2302012) (Peraza). In arguing the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine applies, Superior Grocers points to Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245 (Shaw). (Demurrer, p. 13:1-14:8.) In Shaw, the Court of Appeal held the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule was applicable to a PAGA action that arose from the same facts and theories as another PAGA action already pending before the trial court. (Id., at p. 251.)
In the Peraza action, Rosa Umana Peraza filed a complaint on January 9, 2023, that alleged a representative PAGA action on the behalf of the State of California and other non-party aggrieved employees against Superior Grocers and Super Center Concepts Holdings, LLC (Superior Grocers Holdings). (RJN, Ex. C.) Peraza’s Complaint covers all current and former non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked during a period beginning in November 2021 and ending when judgment is entered and appli. (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 1.) In the present action, Munoz and Garcia filed a PAGA representative action against Superior Grocers and defined the “civil penalty period” as beginning in August 2022. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) The present action covers all current and former non-exempt employees working during this time period. (Complaint, ¶ 1.)
The Peraza action and the present action both seek civil penalties for failure to timely pay wages pursuant to Labor Code section 210 (Complaint, ¶ 36-38; RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 104), failure to provide itemized wage statements pursuant to Labor Code section 226.3 (Complaint, ¶ 39-43; RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 100), failure to pay overtime wages pursuant to Labor Code section 558 (Complaint, ¶ 44-46; RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 65, 84, 93), failure to maintain employment records pursuant to Labor Code section 1174.5 (Complaint, ¶ 47-52; RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 100), and failure to pay proper rates of pay pursuant to Labor Code section 2699 (Complaint, ¶ 58; RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 65, 71). In the present action, Munoz and Garcia also seek civil penalties for failure to pay minimum wage pursuant to Labor Code section 1197.1 (Complaint, ¶ 53-55) and miscellaneous civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2699 for violations involving wages, payday designation, failure to provide information or disclosures, and failure to provide sick leave. (Complaint, ¶ 58.) Separately, the Peraza action also seeks civil penalties for unauthorized deductions in violation of Labor Code section 225.5 (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 110, 113), failure to pay wages upon termination in violation of Labor Code section 256 (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 107), and miscellaneous civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2699 for violations involving failure to provide meal periods (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 84), failure to provide rest periods (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 93), failure to provide seating (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 119-120, 126-127), and failure to reimburse expenses (RJN, Ex. C, ¶ 131).
Based on the above, the Peraza action covers the same non-exempt hourly employees who worked during a period of time that includes the period of time at issue in the present action. The Peraza action also involves some of the same alleged violations as the present action, including the failure to timely pay wages, provide itemized wage statements, pay overtime, maintain employment records, and pay proper rates of pay. While Munoz and Garcia’s opposition focuses on the fact that the present action also alleges different violations and theories that were not alleged in the Peraza action, this is not sufficient to defeat application of the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule. (Opp., p. 8:24-9:11.) Instead, application of this rule depends on “whether the first and second actions arise from the ‘same transaction.’” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 789.) The present action and Peraza both arise out of the same transaction which is the employment relationship between Superior Grocers and its employees from August 2022 to present.
Accordingly, Superior Grocers’ demurrer is SUSTAINED on the grounds of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. The Court does not address the statutory plea in abatement grounds as they are narrower and subsumed by the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Superior Grocers’ demurrer to Munoz and Garcia’s Complaint is SUSTAINED and the present action is STAYED pending the resolution of Peraza.
The court will set an OSC re: Status of Stay for a date 6 months out, subject to input from the parties.