Judge: Salvatore Sirna, Case: 25PSCV00308, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25PSCV00308    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: G

Defendant Wylie Chung’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Quash Service of Summons; For Monetary Sanctions Under CCP Section 573(c)

Respondent: NO OPPOSITION

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Wylie Chung’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is GRANTED.  Defendant is ordered to file separately, forthwith, the proposed Answer attached to the motion.

Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Request for Monetary Sanctions is DEEMED MOOT.

BACKGROUND

This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff Lakeview Village Corporation (Plaintiff) alleges the following. On August 1, 2022, Plaintiff and defendant Wylie Chung (Defendant), an individual dba Little Friends Play, entered into a written contract where Defendant agreed to pay $8,000 per month to rent 21076 Golden Springs Dr., #C1, Diamond Bar, CA 91789 (Subject Premises). Rent has since increased to $11,900 a month. On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff brought this unlawful detainer action against Defendant.

On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff’s registered process server claimed to have personally served Defendant.

On March 13, 2025, the court entered default against Defendant. On March 19, 2025, the clerk granted default judgment.

On March 27, 2025, Defendant filed an ex parte to set aside the default judgment and associated writ of possession, or in the alternative, an order staying the writ pending the hearing and an order shorting the time to hear the motion to set aside the default judgment. The court granted Defendant’s request to stay the writ of possession and shorten the time to hear the motion.

On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of the entire action against all parties. The clerk did not enter the request because judgment must be vacated before dismissal can be entered.

On April 1, 2025, Defendant filed this instant motion. A hearing on this motion is set for April 11, 2025. A case management conference and an order to show cause re: failure to file a proof of service are set June 24, 2025.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE

Defendant moves to set aside the default judgment from March 19, 2025 under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivisions (b) and (d). Additionally, Defendant requests $1,000 in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (c)(1)(A). For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion, but denies the request for sanctions.

Legal Standard

Whenever an application for relief from default judgment is made no more than six months after the default judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by the moving party’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the court may vacate any entry of default entered against the moving party. (Code Civ. Proc., §473, subd. (b).) The court shall grant relief if the moving party’s counsel provides a “sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect” unless the court finds that the default judgment was not in fact caused by the counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorney's affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “The six-month time limit for granting statutory relief is jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief made after that period has elapsed.” (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42.)  

“The ‘surprise’ mentioned in section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, from the effect of which it is within the power of the courts upon satisfactory showing to relieve a party, is sometimes defined to be some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.)

“Inadvertence is defined as lack of heedfulness or attentiveness, inattention, fault from negligence.” (Baratti v. Baratti (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 917, 921.)

Discussion

The court exercises its discretion and GRANTS Defendant’s the motion to set aside the default judgment due to the mistake, inadvertence, and surprise of David Yoshida, Esq., Defendant’s counsel, which led to the default judgment against Defendant.

Here, Yoshida states that “the lack of communication from Mr. Richter[, Plaintiff’s counsel,] and the surreptitious manner in which he obtained the default judgment contributed to my surprise and inadvertence in failing to address the Request for Entry of Default in a timely manner.” (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 3.) The court agrees since Richter, knowing that Yoshida represented Defendant, failed to notify Yoshida of the entry of default or default judgment.

On February 13, 2025, Yoshida emailed Richter to inform Richter of Defendant’s representation and to object to the service of the summons and complaint. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 1.) Richter did not respond to the email. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 3.) On March 4, 2025, Yoshida called Richter and spoke with Fernando, a non-attorney employee. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 2.) Yoshida asked to speak with Richter, but Richter was unavailable. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 2.) Yoshida sent the February 13 email to Fernando and asked Fernando to relay the email to Richter. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 2.) Yoshida did not hear from Richter. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 2.) On March 21, 2025, Yoshida was browsing the court’s docket when Yoshida noticed Plaintiff had obtained a default judgment and a writ of possession against Defendant. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 3.) Richter knew Yoshida represented Defendant but chose not to inform Yoshida of the entry of default or default judgment. Instead, Richter mailed the request for entry of default to the Subject Premises on March 13, 2025. (03/13/2025 Req. Entry Default, p. 2.) Moreover, Richter did not inform Yoshida or Defendant of the default judgment. As a result, Yoshida failed to oppose the entry of default or default judgment in a timely manner. (Decl. Yoshida, ¶ 3.)

Because Richter did not inform Yoshida of the entry of default or default judgment, even though he knew Yoshida represented Defendant, the court finds that Yoshida’s surprise is excusable.

Defendant attaches a copy of their proposed Answer to the motion. (Motion, pp. 9-10.)

Accordingly, the motion to set aside the default judgment is GRANTED.  Defendant is ordered to file separately, forthwith, the proposed Answer attached to the motion.

As for Defendant’s request for sanctions, the court declines to award sanctions to Defendant. 

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE

Defendant moves to quash service of the summons under Code of Civil Procedure sections 418.10 subdivision (a)(1) and 415.20, subd. (b) is DEEMED MOOT based on the ruling above. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to file separately, forthwith, the proposed Answer attached to the motion.

Furthermore, Defendant’s motion to quash services of summons is DEEMED MOOT.¿