Judge: Sandy N. Leal, Case: 2022-01240952, Date: 2023-07-27 Tentative Ruling
Motion for Summary Judgement and/or Adjudication
Pretium Packaging, LLC, Steve Hernandez and Enrique Rico’s (Defendants) Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(f)(1): “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”
Defendants move for summary adjudication on Plaintiff, Bernardo Sanchez’s Complaint as follows:
1. Issue 1: There are no triable disputes of material facts as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination and second cause of action for age discrimination.
2. Issue 2: The third cause of action fails as a matter of law.
3. Issue 3: There are no triable disputes of material facts as to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for retaliation.
4. Issue 4: There are no triable disputes of material facts as to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation.
5. Issue 5: There are no triable disputes of material facts as to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of FEHA and ninth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
6. Issue 6: Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim fails because he cannot put forth any evidence that Defendants engaged in oppression, fraud, or malice with regard to their treatment of Plaintiff.
Compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(f)(1)
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Defendants’ Notice of Motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(f)(1) because issues 1 and 9 both pertain to multiple causes of action and the Court is only permitted to grant summary adjudication if the issue complete disposes of “a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”
Therefore, the Court will treat this motion as one seeking summary adjudication for the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth causes of action and the Complaint’s prayer for punitive damages.
First Cause of Action: Disability Discrimination
“In analyzing an employee’s claim for unlawful discrimination under the FEHA, California courts have adopted the three-stage, burden-shifting test the United States Supreme Court established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [Citations.]” (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 964 (Swanson).) “This so-called McDonnell Douglas test reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” (Swanson, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 964.)
California Courts have recognized that the McDonnell Douglas test was originally developed for use at trial, not in summary judgment proceedings. (Swanson, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 965.) “California’s summary judgment law places the initial burden on a moving party defendant to either negate an element of the plaintiff’s claim or establish a complete defense to the claim.” (Id. at 965-966.) “The burdens and order of proof therefore shift under the McDonnell Douglas test when an employer defendant seeks summary judgment. [Citations.] An employer defendant may meet its initial burden on summary judgment and require the employee plaintiff to present evidence establishing a triable issue of material fact, by presenting evidence that either negates an element of the employee's prima facie case, or establishes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action against the employee.” (Id. at 966.) “[T]o avoid summary judgment [on the second of these two grounds], an employee claiming discrimination must offer substantial evidence that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.” (Ibid.)
To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [he] was a member of a protected class, (2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] sought or was performing competently in the position [he] held, (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)
Defendants contend that the first cause of action fails because Defendants had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff because he committed a Cardinal III Unsafe Behavior. (Motion, 6:27-8:6; Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF), Nos. 16-20.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff was properly suspended and removed after operating a forklift on 5-13-21 while sitting on top of the seatbelt, which constitutes a violation of its Cardinal Rule Policy that is strictly enforced. (SUMF, Nos. 39-50). Defendants point to the declaration of Defendant Pretium’s Human Resources Director, Paula Robinson, for the argument that the Cardinal Rule Policy is strictly enforced.
Ms. Robinson attests that a Class III Safety violation includes “bypassing, disabling, or removal of a safety device[ ]” and “reckless operation of industrial powered equipment.” (Robinson Decl., ¶ 7.) Furter, Ms. Robinson attests: “Pretium strictly enforces the Cardinal Rule Policy. In recent years, Pretium has terminated a number of employees for violating the Cardinal Rule Policy. Several of these employees worked at the Anaheim facility, while other worked at various plants around the country. In fact, on March 26, 2021, a Pretium employee at the Anaheim facility was terminated for a Class III Cardinal Rule violation. The employee failed to use his LOTO lock to properly lock out the door safety mechanism from entering the KUKA robot machine. The employee sustained a workplace injury that resulted in significant and serious physical injuries to the employee.” (Robinson Decl. (ROA 70), ¶9.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant Pretium had a Cardinal Rule Policy and that it carries consequences that include suspension and termination of employment. Plaintiff also does not dispute that he operated the forklift on 5-13-21 while sitting on top of the seatbelt. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the Cardinal Safety Rule policies were improperly applied to him because he never received proper training on the Cardinal Safety Rule, others who had violated the Cardinal III Rules were neither suspended nor terminated, and he was operating the forklift as directed by other employees, including those who were supervisors.
First, Plaintiff testified as follows regarding discipline of other people who allegedly violated the Cardinal Safety Rules:
Q: Okay. Did other people drive – did other people operate the forklift sitting on top of the seat belt while the seat belt was engaged?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Can you tell me who those people were?
A: It was Alberto. Alberto.
Q: And Fernando?
A: Alberto, Fernando, and another one named Jesus
Q: So you think all of those people have operated the forklift sitting on top of the seat belt?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say it was common to leave the seat belt engaged like that and sit on top of it?
A: Some. Like I said, them, they would do it like that.
Q: Do you agree with me that the seat belt was supposed to be worn over your lap when you operated the forklift?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay.
A: But I was telling you that, rather, the company, they wouldn’t make it so that the rules will be followed.
Q: Okay. What do you mean by that, sir?
A: But if someone – say the supervisor saw somebody without the seat belt on, and they would say, “Hey, the seat belt,” and they would just keep driving.
Q: And so other people did it and just didn’t get in trouble for it. Is that what you’re saying?
A: Yes.
(Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 1, 132:10-133:18.) Further, Plaintiff testified that he did not remember seeing the Cardinal Rule Policy or being trained on it in either English or Spanish. (Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 1, 151:16-153:8.)
Second, Plaintiff’s coworker Rodolfo Duarte testified that other than Plaintiff, he was not aware of any other employees who were given “written warnings for not wearing their seat belts while operating a forklift,” “suspended for not wearing their seat belt while operating a forklift,” or “terminated for not wearing a seat belt while operating a forklift.” (Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 5, 29:8-30:3.) Mr. Duarte has also never reported anyone for not wearing a seat belt as a safety violation and is not aware of any other co-workers who have reported anyone for not wearing a seat belt. (Id.; 30:7-15.)
Third, Plaintiff has introduced evidence that he informed Defendants of his need for continued accommodations immediately prior to the alleged safety violation on 5-13-21. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that when he returned to work on 5-6-21, he continued to have knee pain but was told by “Steve” that “the doctor had already released me, and they needed me outside.” (Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 1, 89:4-90:11.) Further, Plaintiff testified that he went to the doctor on 5-13-21 as he was still having pain at the time. He then allegedly informed Steve, as follows:
Q: And what did Steve Say?
A: To go back to work. But I told him I couldn’t do my job because I had to go up on the ladder to go check the machine.
Q: And you couldn’t climb the ladder because your knee hurt?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So did you ask Steve if you could not climb the ladder or if they could help you somehow?
A: No. Because he said, “You know what? I already told you I want you to do it.”
(Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 1, 95:17-96:9.)
In reply, Defendants contend that the Opposition’s disputes do not constitute substantial evidence that Plaintiff was discriminated against. (Reply, 2:2-4:23.)
Based on the above, the Court first finds that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The parties do not dispute that Defendant Pretium had a Cardinal Rule Policy. Because Plaintiff also does not dispute that he should have operated the forklift with the seat belt buckled, the parties also implicitly do not dispute that Plaintiff’s conduct in failing to do so constitutes a violation of the Cardinal Rule Policy, which states that a violation includes “bypassing, disabling, or removal of a safety device.”
Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue. Based on Plaintiff’s submitted evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Defendants’ termination of Plaintiff was pretextual, or based on discrimination. Specifically, this is because Plaintiff has submitted substantial evidence that the Defendants were aware of his knee injury and continued need for light work, that Defendants did not accommodate those requests and that the Cardinal Rule Policy may not have been uniformly applied, such that Plaintiff may have been the only at his workplace suspended or terminated due to conduct for which other employees received no discipline and were not terminated.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied as to the first cause of action.
Second Cause of Action: Age Discrimination
Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Plaintiff’s termination based on the 5-13-21 alleged safety violation also constituted age discrimination because Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was about to turn 50 years of age. (Complaint, ¶¶ 61-65.)
Plaintiff testified as follows regarding Defendants’ knowledge of his age:
Q: Did Cynthia ever say anything to you about your age?
A: Not to me, but it was interpreted that my work was more, like, slower.
Q: Interpreted from what?
A: Not to me, but it was interpreted that my work was more, like, slower.
Q: Interpreted from what?
A: Like, she would say to Kai, “You know what? Send Kai to go work outside because he works slower.”
Q: Do you know how old Kai was?
A: To the comments that they would make, I think he said once that he was around 27 or 28 years old.
Q: Did anyone ever make jokes about your age, comments about your age, call you old, tease you about your age?
A: Between – amongst the coworkers, yeah, there was – they would tell me, yeah, you are already old.
Q: Well, let me – who treated you – who do you allege treated you differently based on your age?
A: From what I saw, it was Cynthia Melendez because she would just look at me with an angry face…It was just like an angry face toward me all the time.”
(Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 1, 163:5-165:9.)
Based on the above testimony regarding Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s age and the above discussion regarding Defendants’ application of their Cardinal Rule Policy, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact regarding age discrimination. Specifically, the Court makes this finding because Plaintiff has submitted substantial evidence demonstrating that the Cardinal Rule Policy may have been unequally applied and because Plaintiff has also submitted evidence demonstrating that Defendants were aware of his age and certain of Defendants’ employees treated him unequally due to this age.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied as to the second cause of action.
Third Cause of Action: Harassment
The FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer to harass an employee on account of a protected characteristic. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).) “[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer’s business or performance of the supervisory employee’s job.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 63 (Janken).) “[C]ommonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the provision of support, the assignment or non-assignment of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not attend meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not come within the meaning of harassment. These actions may retrospectively be found discriminatory if based on improper motives, but in that event the remedies provided by the FEHA are those for discrimination, not harassment.” (Id. at pp. 64-65.) “This significant distinction underlies the differential treatment of harassment and discrimination in the FEHA.” (Id. at p. 65.) However, because harassment is generally concerned with the message conveyed to an employee, “in analyzing the sufficiency of evidence in support of a harassment claim, there is no basis for excluding evidence of biased personnel management actions so long as that evidence is relevant to prove the communication of a hostile message.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 708 (Roby).)
“The existence of a hostile work environment depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an employment decision or uttered by a non-decisionmaker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” (Government Code § 12923, subd. (c).)
Defendants contend that summary adjudication on the third cause of action is warranted for the following reasons: (1) the third cause of action is based on non-actionable statements, which are not severe or pervasive enough to find a hostile work environment, and (2) the third cause of action is based on non-actionable conduct that constitute “personnel management.” (Motion, 8:9-15.)
Defendants did not submit additional evidence specific to this cause of action.
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that the third cause of action does not fail because Defendants did not submit any evidence in support of the MSA on this cause of action. (Opposition, 13:5-18.) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that any doubts regarding the existence of a triable issue must be resolved in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving party. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the “delegable authority” argument does not bar his harassment claim because a “wide range” of activities can give rise to actionable harassment, including acts of discrimination. (Opposition, 13:23-14:16.)
In reply, Defendants contend that they do not need to submit evidence as to the third cause of action because the MSA as to this cause of action may be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Reply, 4:26-5:9.) Defendants’ cited case law is not applicable, as Montevalli v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 97, 114 involves a case where the moving party moved solely for summary judgment. The Montevalli court considered whether the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication on moving party’s Tameny claim was proper as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Here, Defendants do not move for summary judgment and there is no Tameny claim at issue.
Therefore, Defendants were required to submit evidence in support of their argument that summary adjudication on the third cause of action is warranted. Having not submitted any evidence, the Court finds that Defendants do not meet their burden as the moving party on the third cause of action. For this reason, Defendants’ motion as to the third cause of action is denied.
Fourth Cause of Action: Retaliation for Engaging in Protected Activity
Courts employ the same burden-shifting analysis for claims of retaliation under the FEHA as they do for claims of discrimination. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) Thus, once the employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action. If the employer sustains its burden, the presumption of retaliation disappears, and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation. (Ibid.) A prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA consists of the following elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. (Ibid.) Protected conduct can take many forms and it is unlawful to discharge an employee who has “opposed any practices forbidden under [section 12940] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” (Gov’t Code, § 12940, subd. (h); see also Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1042.) Finally, an “adverse employment action” is one that “materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1051.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action fails because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a causal link between his allegedly reporting an injury and his termination. (Motion, 11:22-12:18.) As discussed above, Defendants contend that their reasons for terminating Plaintiff are legitimate and not pretextual. (Id.)
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that the fourth cause of action does not fails because Plaintiff’s termination was not legitimate for the reasons previously discussed and a “clear inference of retaliation” can be made based on the timing of Plaintiff’s termination in relation to his work injuries and request for accommodation. (Opposition, 16:6-22.)
The Opposition cites to Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals (9th Circ. 2004) 389 F.3d 840 (Pardi), a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, for the argument that retaliatory intent can be inferred when adverse employment action closely follows an employee’s request for accommodation. However, the retaliation claim at issue in Pardi arose under the Americans with Disabilities Act, rather than FEHA. Therefore, Pardi is not applicable.
In reply, Defendants contend that summary adjudication on the fourth cause of action is warranted because temporal proximity, without more, is insufficient to establish retaliatory intent. Further, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that Cloward, who reported the violation, or Rico, who investigated it, had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s injury or need for accommodation. (Reply,6:15-7:8.)
Defendants are correct that temporal proximity, without more, “does not, without more, suffice also to satisfy the secondary burden borne by the employee to show a triable issue of fact on whether the employer's articulated reason was untrue and pretextual.” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente International (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1112.) However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has introduced evidence demonstrating that Defendants may not have evenly applied their Cardinal Rule Policy and that Plaintiff was terminated shortly after he reported his continued need for workplace accommodation on or about 5-13-23. Therefore, liberally construing the evidence submitted in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that such evidence is also sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue on the fourth cause of action.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion is denied as to the fourth cause of action.
Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment or Retaliation
As discussed above, the Court has denied Defendants’ Motion as to the first, second, third and fourth causes of action. Therefore, because Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, retaliation and harassment do not fail, the Court also denies Defendants’ motion as to the fifth cause of action.
Eighth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination in Violation of the FEHA
Defendants contend that summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claims is warranted because Defendants had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, as discussed above. (Motion, 13:8-18.)
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that summary adjudication on the wrongful termination claims should be denied because Plaintiff has established that his termination was pretextual for the reasons discussed above. (Opposition, 18:6-19.)
As discussed above, the Court has found the existence of triable issue with regard to Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, and retaliation. Defendants’ motion as to the harassment claim was denied because Defendants failed to meet their burden as the moving party. It is additionally undisputed that Plaintiff was terminated on 5-20-21. (SUMF No. 54.)
Based above, the Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue with regard to the eighth cause of action for wrongful termination because Plaintiff was terminated on 5-20-21, shortly after Defendants concluded their investigation on the alleged 5-13-21 safety incident discussed above.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied as to the eighth cause of action.
Ninth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
“The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154.)
The Court denies the motion as to this cause of action for the same reasons as to the eighth cause of action.
Claim for Punitive Damages
Plaintiff may recover damages “in an action from breach “not arising from contract” if Plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) “Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)
Obtaining punitive damages from a corporate employer requires a showing that “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civil Code § 3294(b).) “Managing agent” under Civil Code section 3294(b) is defined to “include only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy. The scope of a corporate employee's discretion and authority under our test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566-567 (White).)
Defendants contend that summary adjudication on the Complaint’s prayer for punitive damages is warranted because Plaintiff has no evidence of malice, oppression or fraud by Defendants. (Motion, 13:20-14:9.) Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impute the actions of Cynthia Melendez (Melendez), Veronica Garcia (Garcia), Enrique Rico (Rico), or Steve Hernandez (Hernandez) to Defendant Petrium, Defendants contend that these employees are not managing agents such that their actions may be imputed. (Motion, 14:15-15:1.) Defendants cite to the Robinson Declaration for the argument that Melendez, Garcia, Rico and Hernandez are not managing agents (SUMF, Nos. 55, 56.)
Robinson attests as follows regarding these employees: “The decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was made by Plant Manager Cynthia Melendez, Human Resources Manager Veronica Garcia, and Maintenance Manager Steve Hernandez. Ms. Melendez, Ms. Garcia, and Mr. Hernandez were all employed by Pretium at the Anaheim facility; none of them were ever employed by Pretium as a corporate officer, director, or managing agent, nor was Production Manager Enrique Rico. Further, neither Ms. Melendez, Ms. Garcia, Mr. Rico, nor Mr. Hernandez ever had authority over decisions that ultimately determined the general principles which guided Pretium, to set corporate policy, or to enact rules that were intended to be followed consistently over time in Pretium’s operations.” (Robinson Decl., ¶ 17.)
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that the actions of Melendez, Rico, Hernandez and Garcia may be imputed on Defendant Petrium because whether these individuals acted in a managerial capacity is a question of fact and Plaintiff has substantial evidence that these individuals made and ratified wrongful decisions that constituted violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the FEHA. (Opposition, 18:25-20:8.)
The Opposition cites to testimony from Defendant Pretium’s Person Most Knowledgeable for the argument that Melendez, Rico, Hernandez and Garcia had authority over decisions that may have affected corporate policy.
First, Pretium’s PMK testified that both Rico and Hernandez had the authority to discipline employees at the plant where Plaintiff also worked. (Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 2, 81:19-21, 82:2, 82:7-8, 82:14.)
Second, Pretium’s PMK testified as follows regarding Melendez’s role:
Q: And what did your job duties as plan manager entail?
A: I manage the plant in its entirety.
Q: And as a plant manager did you have the ability to discipline employees at the Anaheim plant?
A: Yes. Like I said, along with HR, yes.
Q: And as a plant manager did you have the ability to terminate employees at the Anaheim plant?
A: Yes, along with HR, like I said.
(Bigogner Decl., Exhibit 2, 39:19-23, 42:22-43:6.)
Pursuant to White, the scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority is a question of fact. Based on the above, Plaintiff has submitted evidence demonstrating that Melendez had authority to hire, fire and discipline employees. Plaintiff has submitted evidence demonstrating that Rico and Hernandez also had the authority to discipline employees.
As discussed above, the Court has found that there are triable issues regarding Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation and wrongful termination. The parties do not dispute that Melendez, Rico, Garcia, and Hernandez were the individuals involved in reviewing Plaintiff’s alleged 5-13-21 safety violation and terminating Plaintiff. Therefore, because the Court also finds that whether these individuals are “managing agents” is a question of fact, the Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion as to the claim for punitive damages.
Plaintiff is to give notice.