Judge Sarah J. Heidel, Case Number: 21STCV15616, Date: 2024-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Sarah J. Heidel, Case: 21STCV15616, Date: 2024-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV15616 Hearing Date: March 28, 2024 Dept: V

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT V

MIGUEL MORA, Plaintiff, vs. HERC RENTALS, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV15616 Hearing Date: March 28, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT PAET REAL ESTATE LLC’S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

MOVING PARTIES: Defendant Paet Real Estate, LLC (“Paet”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed

Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this motion. No opposition papers were filed.

BACKGROUND

On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff Miguel Mora (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants 5547 Cleon Avenue, LLC (“Cleon”), Herc Rentals, Inc. (“Herc”), and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, which arises from Plaintiff allegedly falling off a boom lift/cherry picker.

On August 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Cleon, IPSUM, Inc. (“Ipsum”), Paet Real Estate, LLC (“Paet”), Herc, and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) General Negligence, (2) Products Liability, and (3) Premises Liability.

On October 13, 2022, Defendant Cleon was dismissed from this action without prejudice pursuant to Plaintiff’s October 12, 2022 Request for Dismissal.

On November 28, 2022, Herc filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Cleon, Ipsum, and Paet, alleging causes of action for: (1) Equitable Indemnity, (2) Partial or Comparative Indemnity, and (3) Declaratory Relief.

On January 31, 2023, Ipsum filed a Cross-Complaint against Herc and Ricardo Guzman Villanueva, alleging causes of action for: (1) Equitable Indemnity, (2) Comparative Indemnity, and (3) Declaratory Relief.

On January 22, 2024, this case was reassigned from the Honorable Ralph C. Hofer to the Honorable Sarah J. Heidel sitting in Department V at Alhambra Courthouse, which became effective on February 5, 2024.

On February 15, 2024, Defendant Paet filed and served the instant Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. Defendant Paet seeks a determination that its settlement entered into with Plaintiff is in good faith and in accord with CCP § 877.6.

Non-jury trial is set to begin on September 30, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in the manner provided by subdivision (d) of Section 1005.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “In the alternative, a settling party may give notice of settlement to all parties and to the court, together with an application for determination of good faith settlement and a proposed order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(2).) “The application shall indicate the settling parties, and the basis, terms, and amount of the settlement.” (Ibid.) “The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court on the basis of the affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counteraffidavits filed in response, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence at the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (b).) “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any

other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)

When determining whether a settlement was made in good faith, the following factors are considered: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)

“The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor’s liability to be.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262, citation omitted.) “[A] good faith settlement does not call for perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability.” (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 875, internal quotations omitted.) “[O]nly when the good faith nature of a settlement is disputed, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) “That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.” (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

A. The Good Faith of the Settlement

In support of the motion, Defendant Paet presents the declaration of its counsel, Patrick DiFilippo (“DiFilippo”). Counsel declares the following: this litigation arises from injuries Plaintiff alleges he suffered when he fell from a malfunctioning “boom lift/cherrypicker” while performing construction work on a property being leased by Defendant Paet. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 2.) Defendant Paet alleges that it played no role in the construction, did not oversee the

construction, did not provide the boom lift, and was not responsible for ensuring it was safe to operate. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no specific facts indicating why Defendant Paet is liable for the alleged malfunction of the boom lift or the alleged failure to properly train Plaintiff on how to use the boom lift. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 3.)

On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant Paet reached a settlement that considers the allegations, defenses, Defendant Paet’s legal exposure, and Defendant Paet’s expected costs to continue defending this litigation. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 4.) The key terms and conditions of the settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Paet are as follows: payment of $5,000.00 to Plaintiff; no admission of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing; waiver and release of all claims including a waiver of Civ. Code § 1542 by Plaintiff; Plaintiff will dismiss the operative complaint with prejudice against Defendant Paet; and each party will bear their own fees and costs. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 4(a)-(e).) The settlement is not conditioned upon a determination of good faith settlement. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 5.) Liability as a general matter is highly contested and all Defendants allege there is no evidence that the boom lift was defective or malfunctioned. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 6.) Defendant Paet contends that it had absolutely no control over the boom lift or how Plaintiff operated the boom lift. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant Paet’s agreement to pay $5,000.00 in exchange for a dismissal is a fair approximation of Defendant Paet’s proportionate liability, and Defendant Paet reasonably believes its liability to be zero. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 8.) Defendant Paet is completely uninsured for this claim and is financing its defense costs as well as this settlement out-of-pocket. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 9.) The parties to the settlement at issue are each represented by counsel and the settlement was the result of lengthy arms-length negotiations. (DiFilippo Decl., ¶ 10.)

Because the motion is uncontested, Defendant Paet is not required to show the existence of each of the Tech-Bilt factors. The motion sets forth the ground of good faith and is accompanied by the declaration of counsel setting forth a brief background of the case. That is sufficient under City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261. In the absence of opposition to the motion, there is an inference that the motion is meritorious. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant Paet’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement.