Judge Sarah J. Heidel, Case Number: 23BBCV00655, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Sarah J. Heidel, Case: 23BBCV00655, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV00655 Hearing Date: March 20, 2025 Dept: V

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT V

SHAHRZAD ALVANDIAN; MASOUD ANSARI,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SELECT PRODUCE PROPERTIES, LLC.; SPI, LLC; DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24GDCV00222

Hearing Date: March 20, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant SELECT PRODUCE PROPERTIES, LLC
RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs SHAHRZAD ALVANDIAN and MASOUD ANSARI

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Shahrzad Alvandian and Masoud Ansari filed the complaint against defendants Select Produce Properties, LLC (Select Produce) and SPI, LLC on March 22, 2023. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on June 5, 2023. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on January 16, 2024. Plaintiffs bring the following causes of action: (1) nuisance; (2) breach of lease; (3) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) intentional infliction of severe emotional distress; and (5) negligence.

Plaintiffs allege the following: Plaintiffs leased the residential property 4526 Coldwater Canyon Avenue, #205, Los Angeles, CA 91604 (subject property) on July 18, 2013. Defendants created a nuisance by allowing the apartment building to be used by others with excessive noise and sounds. Despite plaintiffs notifying defendants of the excessive noise, defendants have failed to take reasonable actions to stop or reduce the noise.

On March 14, 2024, the court sustained the demurer to the third cause of action without leave to amend, the fourth cause of action with leave to amend, and granted the motion to strike punitive damages with leave to amend. Plaintiffs did not file a third amended complaint, thus, the second amended complaint is the operative complaint. Defendant SPI, LLC was dismissed on March 20, 2024.

Defendant Select Produce (defendant) filed the instant motion on December 31, 2024. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on March 4, 2025. Defendant Select Produce filed its reply on March 14, 2025.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The undisputed facts are as follows: Plaintiffs leased the subject premises on July 18, 2013. (UMF no. 1.) Plaintiffs became delinquent during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic in their rental payments in an amount of $21,142.68. (UMF nos. 2, 3.) On March 22, 2023, plaintiff filed the instant action and in their second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege defendant created a nuisance by allowing its property to be used in such a manner that excessive noise and sounds are being made at all times of the day and night at the property, and defendants have failed to stop or reduce the noise. (UMF nos.10, 17-19.)

On February 7, 2024, Defendant served plaintiffs with a three day notice to pay rent or quit the premises. (UMF no. 4.) Defendant filed an unlawful detainer complaint against plaintiff Alvandian on February 22, 2024, and plaintiff Alvandian asserted the affirmative defense stating “Plaintiff has breached the warranty to provide habitable premises” in the Answer on March 15, 2024. (UMF nos. 5-7; Exh. D.) At the bench trial for the UD action on August 8, 2024, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings which court granted it, issuing a judgment in favor of defendant for possession of the real property at issue, for forfeiture of the lease for $21,142.68 in rent, for $15,758.82 holdover reduced to $13,857.32 to remain in the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, with costs to be proven by a cost bill and attorney’s fees, if lawful, by motion. (UMF nos. 8, 9.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant seeks judicial notice of the following documents:

1. March 16, 2020 Executive Order

2. Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit served on February 7, 2024

3. Unlawful Detainer filed on February 22, 2024, case no. 24PDUD00643

4. Plaintiffs’ Answer to the UD action filed on March 15, 2024

5. August 9, 2024 Minute Order wherein the court granted defendant Select Produce’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

6. Court’s Judgment filed on August 9, 2024 The court takes judicial notice of document 1 pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c) and documents 2-6 pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d)(1).

The court takes judicial notice of document 1 pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c) and documents 2-6 pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d)(1).

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.)

A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153.) The moving party must make an affirmative showing that he/she is entitled to judgment irrespective of whether or not the opposing party files an opposition. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733.) The moving party may support its motion by “affidavits, declarations, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters upon which judicial notice shall or may be taken." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(b)(l).)

The opposing party on a motion for summary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence until the moving party meets his or her initial movant’s burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832.) Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).) The opposing party may not simply rely on his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts that are substantial in nature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151.)

As a general rule, in reviewing the evidence presented on summary judgment, the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed, and the opposing party’s evidence is liberally construed. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832; Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591.) The court is to consider all evidence submitted by the parties, direct and circumstantial, except that to which a proper objection has been sustained. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).) The court must also consider all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

A. 75-Day Notice

At the time this motion was filed, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c required that notice of a motion for summary judgment and supporting papers be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the hearing, with an additional five days for service by mail and two court days for service by fax, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a)(2).) Electronic service also requires an additional two court days. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6(a)(3)(A)-(B).) Defendant served the motion on December 31, 2024, by email, thus, notice is sufficient.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant brings this motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs’ claims have no merit as they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel in connection with an unlawful detainer action that was fully decided on its merits.

“A defendant or cross-defendant has met that party's burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)

In Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors the court explained:

The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect. First, it precludes parties or their privies from relitigating the same cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, although a second suit between the same parties on a different cause of action is not precluded by a prior judgment, the first judgment operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action. This second aspect of res judicata is commonly referred to as collateral estoppel.

(Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1299, internal citations omitted.) “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment on the merits is a bar to a subsequent action by the parties or their privies on the same cause of action.” (Shine v. Williams[1]Sonoma, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1076, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.

“Collateral estoppel is an equitable concept based on fundamental principles of fairness. Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. The threshold requirements for issue preclusion are: (1) the issue is identical to that decided in the former proceeding, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding, (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding, (4) the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits, and (5) preclusion is sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the former proceeding.” (Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 398– 399, as modified on denial of reh'g (July 22, 2008), internal citations omitted.)

The prior action decided in defendant’s favor is an unlawful detainer action (UD action). “The statutory scheme [of Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 et seq., which governs unlawful detainer actions,] is intended and designed to provide an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property. Unlawful detainer actions are, accordingly, of limited scope, generally dealing only with the issue of right to possession and not other claims between the parties, even if related to the property.” (Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 805, as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 28, 2018), internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)

Plaintiff Alvandian raised a breach of the warranty to provide habitable premises as a defense in the UD action. In a UD action such a defense functions to absolve the tenant of paying rent if the landlord’s breach of warranty is total or if the breach is partial, to justify a partial reduction in rent, and tenant must pay the remaining portion of back rent in order to maintain possession of the premises. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 639.) Thus, the defense in the UD action also only considered the issue of possession.

The UD action did not litigate the causes of action of nuisance, breach of lease or negligence, and claim preclusion does not apply. Second, the causes of action of nuisance, breach of lease, or negligence do not deal with the issue of right to possession. Rather, they deal with the alleged injuries sustained by plaintiffs, loss of use and enjoyment of their apartment and overpayment of rent, caused by the alleged excessive noise permitted by defendant. As the only issue litigated in the UD action was the issue of possession of the premises, defendant fails to show that the possession issue decided in the UD action is identical to the issues raised in the instant action. Accordingly, the instant action is not precluded by the UD action under a theory of claim or issue preclusion.

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES the motion for summary judgment.