SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT 

DEPARTMENT V 

 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Sevan Safyani  

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed      

Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint  

The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with Defendant’s motion to strike. No opposition papers were filed.   

BACKGROUND 

On September 14, 2023, Plaintiff Sergio Corona (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Sevan Safyani (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, alleging a single cause of action for negligence. The Complaint arises from Plaintiff being struck by a motor vehicle on July 2, 2023.  

On January 12, 2024, after hearing oral argument, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages allegations from the Complaint with 20 days leave to amend. (01/12/24 Minute Order.)  

On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant alleging a cause of action for negligence.  

On February 14, 2024, after hearing, the Court granted the motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff filed by Frank J. Perez. (02/14/24 Minute Order.)  

On February 20, 2024, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint.  

On February 27, 2024, Defendant filed and served the instant unopposed Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC by electronic mail.  

LEGAL STANDARD 

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) A court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)  A court may “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Civ. Code § 3294 authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Malice is defined as either “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff,” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331.)  Fraud under Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3) “means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2) defines oppression as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”  Specific facts must be alleged in support of punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) Facts must be pled to show that a defendant “act[ed] with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” (Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 452, 462.)  Conduct that is merely negligent will not support a claim for punitive damages.  (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1288.)  

 

DISCUSSION  

A. Meet and Confer   

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) 

Counsel for Defendant, Gina Y. Kandarian-Stein (“Kandarian-Stein”), declares that the parties have met and conferred concerning the issue with the prayer for punitive damages to be stricken. (Kandarian-Stein Decl., ¶¶ 4-5; Exhs. A and B.)   

The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has not been met as the parties did not meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The Court will nevertheless consider the merits of the motion to strike.  

B. Sufficiency of the Punitive Damages Allegations 

The FAC alleges that at some point on July 2, 2023, Defendant began to consume drugs and alcohol knowingly and with the full intention of becoming intoxicated and intending to operate his motor vehicle while impaired. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Due to Defendant’s prior criminal record that includes intentional criminal acts, Defendant was prone to intentionally violate the law and to consume alcohol to the point of becoming intentionally impaired. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had a tendency to intentionally operate a vehicle while impaired on drugs and alcohol and that Defendant “did so reckless [sic], out of pleasure, for fun, to create havoc, to be a menace to society, and to generally drive in the streets impaired with the intention to cause harm and/or get into trouble. Such can be seen by his long criminal history in the County of Los Angeles, among others.” (FAC, ¶ 7.) On July 2, 2023, Plaintiff was legally standing at the sidewalk directly in front of 8012 Laurel Canyon Boulevard, North Hollywood, CA 91605 and Defendant, with the intent to cause harm to Plaintiff and others, veered onto the opposite lanes of northbound traffic and crashed into the sidewalk. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant crashed into the sidewalk and directly into Plaintiff “intentionally and/or consciously disregarding all laws, without concern for anyone’s safety.” (FAC, ¶ 8.) Defendant was in an intoxicated state and willfully exercised despicable conduct and conscious disregard for the safety of such persons and of Plaintiff by knowingly driving a vehicle in an intoxicated condition in the public streets of the City of Los Angeles. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant operated his vehicle in violation of the California Vehicle Code and intended to cause Plaintiff and/or the public harm at the time of the incident. (FAC, ¶ 13.)  

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts showing malice, fraud, or oppression to warrant the imposition of punitive damages. The FAC is rooted in negligence, and negligent conduct will not support a claim for punitive damages under Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1288. “[A]llegations of intoxication, excessive speed, driving with defective equipment or the running of a stop signal, without more, do not state a cause of action for punitive damages.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90.) Plaintiff’s allegations of intoxication, without more, do not rise to the level of punitive damages.  

C. Improper Service of the Motion 

While the FAC does not state sufficient facts to warrant punitive damages, the Court find that the motion was not properly served.  

“Electronic service shall be permitted pursuant to Section 1010.6 and the rules on electronic service in the California Rules of Court.” (CCP § 1013(g).) An unrepresented person in a civil action must consent to receive electronic service. (CCP § 1010.6(c)(1)-(3).)  

Here, Plaintiff’s prior counsel was relieved as counsel on February 14, 2024. (02/14/24 Minute Order) and since that date Plaintiff has been unrepresented by counsel. Defendant served the motion on Plaintiff in pro per via electronic mail on February 27, 2024, without indication that Plaintiff consented to electronic service.  

As such, service of the motion was not properly effectuated on Plaintiff pursuant to CCP § 1010.6.  

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE due to the improper service of the motion.