Judge: Sarah J. Heidel, Case: 23GDCV00538, Date: 2024-03-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23GDCV00538 Hearing Date: March 1, 2024 Dept: V
SUPERIOR
COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT
DEPARTMENT V
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¿¿ARNO SEPANOSSIAN¿¿,¿ ¿¿Plaintiff¿, vs. ¿¿ESTAE OF PATRICK AARON LEVINE,
DECEASED¿¿, et al.,¿ ¿¿Defendants¿. |
Case No.: |
23GDCV00538 |
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Hearing Date: |
¿¿March 1, 2024¿ |
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Time: |
¿¿8:30 a.m.¿ |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ ESTATE OF PATRICK AARON
LEVINE AND LEVINE FOOT & ANKLE SURGERY, INC. DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT |
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MOVING PARTIES:
Defendants Estate of Patrick Aaron Levine and Levine Foot & Ankle, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Arno Sepanossian
Demurrer to Complaint
The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply papers
filed in connection with this demurrer.
BACKGROUND
On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff Arno Sepanossian filed the Complaint against
Defendants Estate of Patrick Aaron Levine, Deceased; Levine Foot & Ankle,
Inc.; Elite Foot & Ankle; Providence Health System – Southern California;
Glendale Endoscopy Center, LLC; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, alleging
causes of action for: (1) Medical Malpractice; (2) Medical Battery; and (3)
Negligence. The Complaint alleges Plaintiff suffered ongoing issues with his
foot post-surgery performed by Defendant Estate of Patrick Aaron Levine,
Deceased.
On January 29, 2024, Defendants Estate of Patrick Aaron Levine and Levine
Foot & Ankle, Inc. (“Levine Defendants”). filed this instant Demurrer to
Complaint. On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On February
20, 2024, Levine Defendants filed their reply.
MEET AND CONFER
Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a
demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in
person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to
demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached
that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (CCP §
430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the
date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)
Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing
their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd.
(a)(3).)
The Levine Defendants attach the declaration of Mark R. Gibson discussing
the following meet and confer efforts. The court finds that the Levine
Defendant have satisfied the meet and confer requirement.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so
that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that
otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial
rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203,
240.)¿¿
“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a
complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719,
725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The
Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a
ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their
context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual
allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded
and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra,
56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of
contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿
A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure Section
430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause
of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court
has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the
pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty
under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed
in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of
successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)
The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Id.)¿¿¿
DISCUSSION
Levine Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that the
second and third causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. Plaintiff concedes that the third case of action for
negligence fails. Accordingly, the court only addresses the second cause
of action for medical battery.
Medical Battery
“There are three elements to a claim for medical battery under a
violation of conditional consent: the patient must show his consent was
conditional; the doctor intentionally violated the condition while providing
treatment; and the patient suffered harm as a result of the doctor's violation
of the condition.” (Conte v. Girard Orthopedic Surgeons Medical Group, Inc. (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1269; see also Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.) Essentially, “[a] medical battery occurs where a
doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and
subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was
not obtained....” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.)
The Levine Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that Dr.
Levine failed to obtain his consent to perform the type of procedure performed
or that Dr. Levine performed a substantially different type of procedure than
that for which consent was obtained. Levine Defendants argue Plaintiff merely
alleges that his consent was not fully informed because he was not made aware
of all of the risks associated with that procedure and that those allegations
do not support a cause of action for medical battery but are encompassed by his
claim for professional negligence.
In Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 240-241, the court
held “when the patient consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs
that treatment but an undisclosed inherent complication with a low probability
occurs, no intentional deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the
doctor in obtaining consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to
disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action should be pleaded
in negligence.” (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229,
240-41.) “[W]here a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one
type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment
for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery.” Conte
v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Med. Grp., Inc. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th
1260, 1267).
The Court finds that the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
support a cause of action for medical battery. The complaint contains no
allegations that Plaintiff consented to one type of treatment and Dr. Levine
subsequently performed a substantially different treatment for which consent
was not obtained. Nor does he allege that his consent was conditional. (Piedra
v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1497 [it is well recognized a
person may place conditions on the consent.]) Indeed, the Complaint
alleges that Plaintiff consented to the exostectomy but would not have had he
known the risks associated with doing so simultaneously with another surgery
due to his diabetic history. Essentially, Plaintiff alleges he lacked informed
consent.
The demurrer as to the second cause of action for medical battery is
SUSTAINED without Leave to Amend.
Based on the foregoing, the court SUSTAINS Defendants Estate of Patrick
Aaron Levine and Levine Foot & Ankle Surgery, Inc.’s Demurrer to Complaint
without Leave to Amend as to the second and third causes of
action.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: ¿March 1, 2024¿
_____________________________
Sarah J. Heidel
Judge of the Superior Court