Judge: Sarah J. Heidel, Case: 24NNCV04327, Date: 2025-05-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV04327    Hearing Date: May 28, 2025    Dept: V

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – NORTHEAST District

Department V

MOVING PARTIES:         Defendant JOHN K. STUMPUS

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff CHERYL L. RANER

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

This is a partition action. Plaintiff Cheryl L. Raner filed the complaint against defendant John K. Stumpus on September 16, 2024. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) partition; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) constructive fraud; (4) conversion; (5) gross mismanagement; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) accounting. Plaintiff alleges that she and defendant are cousins.

Plaintiff alleges the following: She has a one-fourth (25%) ownership interest in a multifamily apartment house located at 1155 S Orange Grove Blvd, Pasadena, CA 91105 (Property). Defendant acquired a three-fourth (75%) ownership interest in the Property and on March 27, 2023, defendant, as Trustee of the Achilles Stumpus and Geraldine Miller Stumpus Family Trust, transferred his 75% interest in the Property to himself as an individual, “as his sole and separate property,” through a Grant Deed recorded on May 24, 2024. Plaintiff entrusted defendant with management of the Property, but defendant repeatedly failed to properly manage it. Defendant failed to collect rents at fair market value for several units and neglected to accurately record the Property’s income and expenses. Plaintiff has tried to obtain information on accounting related to the Property, but defendant has not provided the requested information, including the leases. The lack of proper management has resulted in a loss of revenue and value of the Property and defendant diverted not less than $100,000 in rent. Plaintiff requests a partition by sale and alleges it is the more equitable remedy as a physical partition would diminish the overall value of the Property and result in substantial losses to the parties.

Defenant filed the motion to quash service of summons on February 7, 2025. Plaintiff filed her opposition on May 14, 2025. Defendant filed his reply on May 20, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:  (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).)

“[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]”  (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.)  “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.”  (Id. at 1441-1442.)  When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. (State of Oregon v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.) If the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.)

DISCUSSION

                Specially appearing defendant moves to quash the service of the summons on the grounds that defendant has never been served with a summons and complaint in this matter, therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction over defendant.

                Defendant argues that the proof of service shows plaintiff served King Chen Miller & Jin, LLP, instead of defendant. A review of the proof of service in the court record shows that plaintiff served King Chen Miller & Jin, LLP on October 2, 2024, by substitute service. King Chen Miller & Jin, LLP is not a party to this action, thus service to the firm does not constitute service to defendant.

                Plaintiff argues that counsel represented defendant in the directly related prior civil action, counsel was served with this action during the period when counsel’s memorandum of costs was pending in the prior action, and counsel admitted in court that defendant was are of the complaint via the service at counsel’s office.

Although counsel was plaintiff’s counsel in the prior related action, service to plaintiff’s counsel in the new action, does not conform to the statutory requirements for service. Furthermore, plaintiff’s argument that defendant was aware of the instant action does not mean that defendant has been properly served. The court in Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 103 held that “[t]he notice requirement is not satisfied by actual knowledge of the action without service conforming to the statutory requirements, which are to be strictly construed.” (Id. at 111, reh'g denied and opinion modified (Feb. 8, 1990).) Without proper service of the action, the court does not have jurisdiction over defendant. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.)  Accordingly, the court grants defendant’s motion to quash service of summons.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS the motion to quash service of summons.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  May 28, 2025

_____________________________

Sarah J. Heidel

Judge of the Superior Court