Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 19STCV04161, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV04161¿ Hearing Date: September 5, 2023 Dept: 31
TENTATIVE
Defendants Las Aguilas Properties LLC, Irma Verduzco, Power
Property Management, Inc., and Management and Leasing Services’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is granted without leave to
amend as to the second cause of action for Breach of Statutory Warranty of Habitability. The motion is granted with
20 days leave to amend the sixth cause of action for nuisance. The motion is
denied as to the cause of action for negligence, and denied on the basis of
untimely Doe Amendments.
Legal Standard
A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause
of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., §
438 subd. (c)(1)(B).) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the
pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) “Such motion may
be made on the same ground as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e., that
the pleading at issue fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally
cognizable claim or defense.” (Ibid.)
“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of
determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a
view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
452; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “When a
court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable inferences
from the facts pled.” (Duval v. Board of Tr. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.) “In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings,
all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts
that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” (Fire
Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) A motion for
judgment on the pleadings normally does not lie as to a portion of a cause of
action. (Ibid.) “In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of
action.” (Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendants
request the Court to take judicial notice of: (1) this
Court’s 5/15/2023 Order granting summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of
action for violation of Civil Code § 1942.4; (2) Plaintiffs’ Request for
Dismissal of Defendants Irma Verduzco, Management & Leasing Services, Inc., and Power Property Management, Inc.; (3) the 4/30/2020
Amendment to Complaint substituting Management & Leasing Services, Inc. as
“DOE 1 and having discovered the true name of the defendant”; and (4) the 1/26/2022
Amendment to Complaint Order substituting Power Property Management, Inc. as “DOE 5 and having discovered the
true name of the defendant.”
Defendants’
requests for judicial notice of are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section
452(d). However, the Court will not take judicial notice of the truth of the
matters asserted.
Meet and Confer
The motion is accompanied by the
declaration of Paul D. Hesse, which satisfies the meet and confer requirements.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 439(a)(2).)
Discussion
A.
Second Cause of Action for Breach of
Statutory Warranty of Habitability
Defendant Aguilas
moves for judgment on the pleadings and argues that there is no private right
of action for alleged violation of the statutory warranty of habitability under
Civil Code section 1941 – the second cause of action.
Under the second cause of action, the
complaint alleges that defendant has breached the warranty of habitability
established by Section 1941 of the Civil Code by failing to ensure that the
buildings, and each of them, are in a condition that meets the requirements of
Section 1941.1 of the Civil Code and Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety
Code. (Complaint, ¶ 15.)
“A violation of a state statute does not necessarily give rise
to a private cause of action. [Citation.] Instead, whether a party has a right
to sue depends on whether the Legislature has ‘manifested an intent to create
such a private cause of action’ under the statute. [Citations.]” (Lu v.
Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 596.) “A statute
creates a private right of action only if the enacting body so intended.” (Farmers
Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 842, 849-50, quoting
Moradi–Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287,
305.)
Civil Code § 1941
states, “The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings
must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition
fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which
render it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen
hundred and twenty-nine.” Civil Code § 1941.1(a) lists the “affirmative
standard characteristics” that if a dwelling is substantially lacking will
cause it to be deemed untenantable. (Civ. Code §
1941.1(a)(1)-(9).) Civil Code § 1941 does not contain any language
manifesting an intent to create a private cause of action for violation of this
statute. On the other hand, Civil Code § 1942.4 allows a tenant who is evicted
due to substandard conditions in the leased premises to file an action. (Civ.
Code § 1942.4(e) [“Any action under this section may be maintained in small
claims court if the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of that
court”].)
The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the second
cause of action is therefore GRANTED without leave to amend.
B.
Claim
for Attorney Fees and Treble Damages Within Second Cause of Action
Defendant also moves for judgment on the
pleadings as to paragraph 18 of the second cause of action. However, a motion for
judgment on the pleadings normally does not lie as to a portion of a cause of
action. (Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)
Defendants were therefore required to file a motion to strike. However, the
argument is moot in any event as the motion at hand is granted as to the second
cause of action.
C.
Fourth
Cause of Action for Negligence and Sixth Cause of Action for Private Nuisance
Defendants
argue that the remaining causes of action against the three property-manager defendants IV, MLS, and PPM for negligence
and nuisance are defective because the complaint does not allege any facts as to these defendants
whatsoever; it merely incorporates by reference the first three causes of action,
all of which are based on covenants in the alleged lease agreement between
plaintiffs and Aguilas as the owner/landlord. Defendants argue that in Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 903, the court held that property managers are merely the owner’s
agents, not parties to the contract, and thus are not liable for breach of any
express or implied covenant or warranty of habitability. Lastly, all Defendants
argue the cause of action for nuisance is duplicative of the cause of action
for negligence.
The
elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due
care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.
(County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th
292, 318.)
The elements of a
cause of action for a private nuisance are: (1) an interference with use and
enjoyment of the property; (2) the invasion of plaintiffs’ interest in the use and
enjoyment of the land is substantial, i.e., that it causes plaintiffs to suffer
substantial actual damage; and (3) the interference is unreasonable, i.e., it
is of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. (Mendez v. Rancho
Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248,
262-263.)
An action “for breach of the implied warranty is
essentially a contractual one,” so non-landlord agents are not ordinarily
liable when they act on behalf of a principal.¿¿(Stoiber v. Honeychuck¿(1980)
101 Cal.App.3d 903, 929.)¿¿However, this is a cause of action for negligence,
and not breach of the implied warranty. Among other allegations, the complaint
alleges that Defendants negligently maintained the building in
multiple ways (Complaint, ¶ 16); and owed a duty of care, but breached that
duty of care by mismanaging the building. (Id., ¶¶ 28-30.) As such, the
complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for negligence against
Defendants IV, MLS, and PPM.
As to the cause of
action for nuisance, “[w]here negligence and nuisance causes of
action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a
negligence claim.” (El Esocrial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) “A nuisance may be either a negligence or an
intentional tort.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 921.)
Plaintiffs essentially allege defendant lacked due care in maintaining the
premises, leading to mold, water leaks, sewage issues, and other substandard
conditions. Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to show how the fourth
cause of action is different from the third cause of action. (See id.)
“The statutory definition of nuisance appears to be broad enough the encompass
almost any conceivable type of interference with the enjoyment or use of land
or property.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 919.) Here, plaintiffs
use this broad definition of nuisance to assert a duplicative cause of action. A demurrer can
be sustained due to one cause of action being duplicative of another cause of
action and thus adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or
theory of recovery. (See Palm Springs Villas
II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.) As currently alleged, plaintiffs’ nuisance cause of
action is duplicative of their negligence cause of action.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
as to the fourth cause of action for negligence is OVERRULED, but the motion as
to the sixth cause of action for nuisance is GRANTED with leave to
amend.
Lastly, the Court will note that in the introduction, Aguilas moves for
judgment on the pleadings as to the cause of action for negligence, but no
arguments were made in the motion setting forth the basis for Aguilas’ motion
as to this cause of action. As such, the Court cannot make any determinations
as to the cause of action for negligence as alleged against Defendant Aguilas.
D. Timeliness of the Doe Amendments as to PPM and MLS
In a separate motion, Defendants PPM and MSL also move for
judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the DOE Amendments adding them to this
case are untimely. Because the DOE Amendments are untimely, they argue, the
remaining two causes of action against them – Negligence and Nuisance – are
time-barred by the two and three year statutes of limitation set forth in Code
of Civil Procedure §§ 335.1 and 338.
“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he
must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is
commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or
proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or
proceeding must be amended accordingly . . . .” (CCP §
474.)
Where a complaint is amended after the statute of limitations
has run to identify a fictitiously-named defendant, the amended complaint will
“relate back” to and be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint,
if: (1) the original complaint stated a valid cause of action against the
now-identified Doe defendant; (2) plaintiff was “genuinely ignorant” of the
defendant’s identity; and (3) the amended complaint is based on the same
general set of facts as the original. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-601.)
Relation back effect will be given only when plaintiff was
genuinely ignorant of that person’s identity or liability when the action was
commenced. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 371-372.) The requirement of good faith
ignorance of the true name of a fictitiously designated defendant, as a
prerequisite for amending the complaint to supply a name, after the running of
statute of limitations, is designed to promote the policies supporting the
statute of limitations. (McGee Street Productions v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (App. 2 Dist. 2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 717.) Ignorance of the name
of a defendant has not been interpreted literally. (Optical Surplus,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783.) “Ignorance”
may include situations where the plaintiff knew the identity of the person but
was ignorant of the facts giving him a cause of action or knew the name and all
the facts but was unaware that the law gave him a cause of action. (Ibid.)
Ignorance of the facts is the critical issue. (Ibid.) The
question of the plaintiff's good faith in this regard is for the determination
of the trial court. (Ibid.)
To defeat the amendment, the burden is on Defendant to prove
plaintiff's earlier awareness of Defendant’s identity and facts creating its
liability. (See Fara Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Fara Estates, Ltd. (9th
Cir. 1998) 134 F.3d 377, 377 (applying Calif. law); Breceda v. Gamsby (1968)
267 Cal.App.2d 167, 179.)
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff
knew of their identity as early as 2015 and 2017 and present the following
evidence: this Court’s findings in its May 15, 2023 order granting summary
adjudication; Plaintiffs’ “additional material facts” in opposition to
Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication; and PPM’s three-day Notice to Pay
Rent or Quit on served on DeAndre Vaughns. However, as noted above, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of the truth of contents of the May 15, 2023 minute
order. As to the other pieces of evidence, Defendants have failed to request
judicial notice of these documents. Further, for the purpose of ruling on
a motion for judgment on the pleadings or demurrer, all facts pleading in the
complaint are assumed to be true. (See Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital
Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966.) Plaintiffs alleged that they are
ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued as Does 1 to 100.
(Complaint, ¶ 5.)
Therefore, Defendants have not met their burden to prove that
Plaintiffs knew of their identity and facts creating liability. Further,
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they were ignorant of Defendants’
identity.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. The motion is granted without leave to amend as to the second cause of
action for Breach of Statutory
Warranty of Habitability. The motion is granted with 20 days leave to amend the
sixth cause of action for nuisance. The motion is denied as to the cause of
action for negligence, and denied on the basis of untimely Doe Amendments.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.