Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 19STCV08742, Date: 2023-01-17 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 

IMPORTANT:  In light of the COVID-19 emergency, the Court encourages all parties to appear remotely.  The capacity in the courtroom is extremely limited.  The Court appreciates the cooperation of counsel and the litigants. 

ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case Number: 19STCV08742    Hearing Date: January 17, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendant City of Santa Clarita’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Id.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

Discussion

Government Code¿section¿835 states:¿“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either:¿ 

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿¿ 

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”¿¿ 

“Generally speaking a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property created by a negligent or wrongful act or omission of its employee acting within the course and scope of his employment.” (Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 323 [citing Gov. Code § 835(a)].) 

Here, the City argues it did not create Sierra Highway, the gutter, or the accumulation of water and algae in the gutter. Sierra Highway and the gutter were created by Caltrans and relinquished to Los Angeles County in 1982. The City was not incorporated until 1987 and therefore, the City did not create Sierra Highway or the gutter. (UMF 13.) Further, it appears that any accumulation of water in the gutter was caused by run-off from Eternal Valley. (UMF 12.) Thus, the City argues, there is no evidence that the City negligently created the alleged dangerous condition.

The City also contends it did not have actual notice of any alleged dangerous condition. Notice, in the context of Section 835 liability, is defined in Government Code § 835.2 as follows:  

“(a) A public entity had actual notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.

(b) A public entity had constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.” On the issue of due care, admissible evidence includes but is not limited to evidence as to: 

(1) Whether the existence of the condition and its dangerous character would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate (considering the practicability and cost of inspection weighed against the likelihood and magnitude of the potential danger to which failure to inspect would give rise) to inform the public entity whether the property was safe for the use or uses for which the public entity used or intended others to use the public property and for uses that the public entity actually knew others were making of the public property or adjacent property. 

(2) Whether the public entity maintained and operated such an inspection system with due care and did not discover the condition.” 

(Gov. Code, § 835.2(a)-(b).)  

“Constructive notice may be imputed if it can be shown that an obvious danger existed for an adequate period of time before the accident to have permitted the state employees, in the exercise of due care, to discover and remedy the situation had they been operating under a reasonable plan of inspection.” (State v. Superior Court for San Mateo County (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 396, 400.) The primary and indispensable element of constructive notice is a showing that the obvious condition existed a sufficient period of time before the accident, and the secondary element is the method of inspection. (Ibid.) 

In Strongman v. Kern County (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 308, the court held that the critical test for constructive notice is whether “the condition has existed long enough that it may be inferred that a reasonable inspection would have ascertained its existence.” (Id. at p. 313.) A plaintiff can meet this burden with circumstantial evidence. (Id.)

The City sets forth evidence that it does not have any records of complaints about the subject gutter, curb, or catch basin. (UMF 15.) The City has no record of any complaints or requests for repair related to “accumulated slime, debris and mud in the roadway” prior to the date of Incident. (UMF 16.) The City was not aware of hazards at the subject location. (UMF 17.) The City has no record of any prior vehicle collisions or accidents at the Location from April 15, 2008 through April 15, 2018. (UMF 18.) Moreover, the City has a contract with street sweeping company Clean Sweep Environmental (“Clean Sweep”) to maintain the gutter by providing street sweeping services to sweep debris out of the gutter with street sweepers. (UMF 19.) Despite cleaning the location monthly, Clean Sweep did not report any accumulated slime, debris and mud in the roadway.” (UMF 19-23.) Defendant presents evidence that Clean Sweep cleaned the street at the Incident Location just days before the accident and did not report any accumulation of slime, mud or debris (UMF 22, 23.)

The Court finds Defendant has met its burden on summary judgment to show there are no triable issues of material facts regarding whether it created the alleged dangerous condition as Sierra Highway and the gutter were created by Caltrans and any accumulation of water in the gutter was caused by run-off from Eternal Valley. Further, Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to show there are no triable issues of fact as to whether it had actual or constructive notice, as it did not receive any complaints, and it had a reasonable inspection system in place. Further, just days prior to the incident, the location was cleaned, and no reports of slime, mud or debris were made. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence of triable issues of material fact.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to meet his own burden to show triable issues of fact. As a result, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.