Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 19STCV14805, Date: 2023-04-14 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 

IMPORTANT:  In light of the COVID-19 emergency, the Court encourages all parties to appear remotely.  The capacity in the courtroom is extremely limited.  The Court appreciates the cooperation of counsel and the litigants. 

ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case Number: 19STCV14805    Hearing Date: April 14, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Plaintiff Aaron James Stone’s unopposed motion to quash the subpoena is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is GRANTED. Defendant Violette So Mirhan and her attorney of record, Amy Powers, are ordered to pay $761.65 in sanctions, jointly and severally, within 30 days of this order.

Legal Standard

When a subpoena has been issued requiring the attendance of a witness or the production of documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion “reasonably made” by the party, the witness, or any consumer whose personal records are sought, or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms and conditions as the court may specify.  (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1; Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 206.) 

The court can make an order quashing or modifying a subpoena as necessary to protect a person from “unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)  Generally, all unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the action is discoverable if it would itself be admissible evidence at trial or if it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010; Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.)   

Discussion

Plaintiff moves to quash Defendant’s deposition subpoena for insurance records on the grounds that it violates the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and constitutes a serious invasion of his constitutional right to privacy.

Defendant issued a deposition subpoena to Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, seeking:

“THE RECORDS REQUESTED ARE regardless of date FOR THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF RECORDS: ANY AND ALL INSURANCE RECORDS, DOCUMENTS, REPORTS, CLAIMS, APPLICATIONS, ENROLLMENT RECORDS, MEMBERSHIP RECORDS, POLICIES, MEDICAL RECORDS, BENEFITS, EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS, BILLINGS, DENIALS, PAYMENTS, PAYMENT HISTORY AND ANY OTHER RECORDS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY RECORDS / DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE STORED DIGITALLY AND/OR ELECTRONICALLY RELATING TO AARON JAMES STONE…”

(Yenikomshuyan Decl., Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff argues the subpoena is invasive of his right to privacy. The right of privacy of individuals is protected by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1.) The framework for evaluating invasions of privacy in discovery have been clarified in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.  There, the California Supreme Court held that, generally, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 533, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  The court rejected the cases which held that the party seeking protected information must always show a compelling need or interest.  (Id. at p. 557.)  Instead, the court held, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.”  (Id.)   

Here, Plaintiff has raised an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his insurance records and history under the given circumstances.  (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.)  However, as previously discussed, Plaintiff’s privacy interests must be balanced against Defendant’s right to obtain discovery of the existence and contents of a plaintiff’s liability insurance coverage.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.210.)  Nevertheless, the Court agrees that Defendant’s request in the subpoena is both overbroad and will contain documents invasive of Plaintiff’s right to privacy.  Defendant does not articulate any legitimate or important countervailing interest such disclosure would serve, as she has not opposed the motion.  Accordingly, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the subpoena should be quashed.   

As the subpoena is quashed, the remaining arguments need not be addressed.

              Sanctions

“Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).  

The Court finds that the subpoena was oppressive as the subpoena is overbroad, and violates Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Thus, monetary sanctions in the amount of $761.65 ($350 an hour, for two hours, plus $61.65 in filing fees) are imposed against Defendant Violette So Mirhan and her attorney of record, Amy Powers, jointly and severally, to be paid within 30 days of this order.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoena is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is GRANTED. Defendant Violette So Mirhan and her attorney of record, Amy Powers, are ordered to pay $761.65 in sanctions, jointly and severally, within 30 days of this order.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.