Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 19STCV43081, Date: 2023-01-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV43081 Hearing Date: January 25, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant City of Monrovia’s motion for summary judgment
is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s complaint, but GRANTED as to the cross-complaint
filed by D.J. Development Corp.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to
grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is
always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no
triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant
moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden
of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one
or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that
there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff
cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi
v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the
court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except
evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi,
159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)
Discussion
Government Claims Act
First,
Defendant City moves for summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff failed to
substantially comply with the Government Claims Act, because Plaintiff’s description of place of
incident was too vague to enable City to make an early investigation of the
facts on which her claim is based, and to defend itself against an unjust claim
and/or to correct the conditions which gives rise to the claim.
In general, under the Government Claims Act, “no suit for
money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action
for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim
therefor has been presented to the public entity” and either acted upon or
deemed rejected. (Gov’t Code § 945.4.) The
claim must state the “‘date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence
or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted’ and provide ‘[a] general
description of the . . . injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be
known at the time of presentation of the claim.’” (Stockett v.
Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance Authority
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 445; see Gov. Code, § 910.) “[A] claim need not
contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only
‘fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.’” (Stockett,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at 446 (quoting Shoemaker v. Myers (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 1407, 1426).) Courts have found the complaint barred “[o]nly
where there has been a ‘complete shift in allegations, usually involving an
effort to premise civil liability on acts or omissions committed at different
times or by different persons than those described in the claim.’” (Id.
at 447.) “Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds further detail to
a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act
by the defendants, court have generally found the claim fairly reflects the
facts pled in the complaint.” (Id.) The purpose of this requirement “is to provide the public
entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and
to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” (City of
San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 454.)
“Under the
doctrine of substantial compliance, the court may conclude a claim is valid if
it substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements for a valid
claim even though it is technically deficient in one or more particulars.” (Santee
v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.) It must be noted that California courts have taken a
liberal view of claims statutes where a reasonable attempt has been made to
comply with the law in good faith. (Johnson v. City of Oakland
(1961) 188 Cal. App. 2d 181, 183.) However, the doctrine of substantial
compliance “cannot cure total omission of an essential element from the claim
or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute.” (Loehr
v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071,
1083.) “The cases involving omissions
recognize that they are distinct from those involving defective compliance.”
(Johnson v. City of Oakland, 188 Cal. App. 2d at 183.)
Here,
to support its argument that Plaintiff did not substantially comply with the
Government Claims Act, Defendant presents the following evidence. Plaintiff
presented a claim for damages to the City on June 17, 2019. Therein, she states
the place of the incident was "City of Monrovia near W. Duarte and 10th
Street.” (Fact No. 2.) On June 18, 2019, the City sent Plaintiff, through her
counsel, a "notice of insufficiency" of claim. The notice of
insufficiency stated, "Please file an amended claim with the City Clerk
setting forth the location of the alleged sidewalk defect in sufficient detail
to allow City staff to locate and examine the defect. We cannot evaluate the
City's liability exposure without analyzing the alleged dangerous condition
involved in this accident. Do you have any photographs?" (Fact No. 4.) It
was not until two years later on May 13, 2021, that Plaintiff served City with
her Complaint in which she states the incident place was "at or near 709
West Duarte Road, Monrovia, California." (Fact No. 6.)
In
Johnson v. City of Oakland, 188 Cal. App. 2d 181, the plaintiff sued the
City of Oakland for injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of a defective
sidewalk in Oakland. The fall occurred on the sidewalk in front of 1819 34th
Avenue, Oakland. In the claim submitted to the City, she incorrectly stated
the location of the accident as 1819 35th Avenue. The City moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff had failed to file a claim that
complied with the applicable Government Code sections. The trial court granted
summary judgment, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The Court of Appeal ruled
that in ascertaining the validity of a government claim, substantial compliance
is all that is required. (Id. at 183.) It found that the plaintiff substantially
complied with the statute, and she was thereby permitted to maintain her
action. (Id. at 184.) The City, however, had the right to show that the
defect came about because of a lack of good faith and with the intent to
mislead and conceal, with the result that it was misled and prejudiced thereby.
(Id.)
Defendant has not met its initial burden on summary
judgment to show there is no triable issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff
has substantially complied with the Government Claims Act. The Court finds the
facts at hand are similar to Johnson v. City of Oakland, supra, 188 Cal.
App. 2d 181, where there was merely a defect in the location of plaintiff’s
claim. The City cites to no authority which states that the exact address of
the location must be presented, or that if a notice of insufficiency is sent,
and not responded to, then it is fatal to Plaintiff’s action. Defendant’s
burden on summary judgment is to show there are no triable issues of material
fact, and under the rationale of Johnson, whether Plaintiff’s
description of the location of the fall substantially complies with the
Government Claims Act is a triable issue of material fact. As such, Defendant
was required to show that the defect came about because of a lack of good faith
and with the intent to mislead and conceal, with the result that it was misled
and prejudiced thereby. (Id.) But Defendant simply argues that
because Plaintiff failed to substantially comply, it is not required to show
prejudice. However, this argument fails for the reason discussed above.
As such, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff. Summary judgment is denied as
to Plaintiff’s complaint.
Defendant also moves for summary judgment as to the
cross-complaint filed by D.J. Development Corp. on the ground that D.J.
Development did not present its claim to the City.
“A claim relating to a cause of
action for . . . injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than
six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Govt. Code,
§¿911.2.) For purposes of
calculating time limits for a government claim, the date of action accrual is
the same date of accrual pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. (Loehr
v. Ventura County Cmty. College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1078.)
“For the
purpose of computing the time limits prescribed by Sections 911.2,
911.4,¿945.6, and¿946.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which
a claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to
have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be
applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to
and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced
thereon.” (Gov. Code § 901.) However, Government Code section 901
additionally states, “the date upon
which a cause of action for equitable indemnity or partial equitable indemnity
accrues shall be the date upon which a defendant is served with the complaint
giving rise to the defendant's claim for equitable indemnity or partial
equitable indemnity against the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 901.)
D.J. Development
Corp was served with Bluitt's Complaint prior to June 17, 2021, which is when
it filed its Answer to Bluitt's Complaint. (Fact No. 12.) Therefore, the
six-month deadline for claim presentation was prior to December 17, 2021.
The City presents
evidence that it has no record of D.J. Development Corp presenting a government
claim for indemnity related to Bluitt's "trip and fall" incident of
January 3, 2019, nor does it have a record of D.J. Development Corp applying
for late claim relief. (Atkins Decl., ¶ 7.) The deadline for D.J. Development
Corp to apply for leave to present a late claim was June 17, 2022, one year
after its cross-complaint accrued.
Defendant has met its initial burden to show that Plaintiff
did not comply with the claim presentation requirement. The burden therefore
shifts to Cross-Complainant to show a triable issue of material fact as to this
requirement. However, Cross-Complainant has not filed an opposition
demonstrating triable issues of material fact exist as to whether its claims
are barred by Government Code section 945.6(a)(1). As such,
the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the cross-complaint is granted.
Conclusion
Based on
the foregoing, Defendant City of Monrovia’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED as to Plaintiff’s complaint, but GRANTED as to the cross-complaint filed
by D.J. Development Corp.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice.