Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV03503, Date: 2023-02-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV03503 Hearing Date: February 8, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant Costco’s motion to disqualify Downtown L.A. Law Group is
GRANTED.
Downtown L.A. Law Group is disqualified from representing Plaintiff
Maria Velasco Rodas in this action.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff’s
Objections to Defendant’s Evidence
·
The following
objections are overruled: 1-11.
·
The following
objections are sustained: n/a
Request for Judicial Notice
Evidence Code section 452
provides: “[j]udicial notice may be taken of the following matters: (d) Record
of (1) any court of this state…” (Evidence Code section 452(d)(1).)
In its reply to Plaintiff’s
opposition, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of this
Court’s ruling granting a motion to disqualify involving the same parties, in
its 10/25/2021 minute order, in the following case: Alba Cocrhan v. Costco, BC708124.
The request is GRANTED. The Court
notes that Plaintiff’s opposition has also addressed this case, and thus,
although the evidence is presented in the reply, there is no prejudice because
this evidence is not new.
Legal Standard
“‘A trial court’s authority to
disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in every court ‘[t]o
control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and
of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before
it, in every matter pertaining thereto.’’” (Ontiveros v. Constable
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 686, 694 (quoting People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations
v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145 (quoting
Code Civ. Proc., § 128(a)(5))).) “‘[D]isqualification motions involve a conflict
between the clients’ right to counsel of their choice and the need to maintain
ethical standards of professional responsibility.’” (Id. at
694-95.) “‘The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the
scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.’” (Id.
at 695.) “‘The important right to counsel of one’s choice must yield to
ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial
process.’” (Id.) In exercising its discretion to disqualify
an attorney, the Court is required to make a reasoned judgment which complies
with the legal principles and policies applicable to the issue at hand. ¿(Henriksen
v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 113.) ¿
In ruling on a motion to
disqualify, the court should weigh: (1) the party's right to counsel of choice;
(2) the attorney's interest in representing a client; (3) the financial burden
on a client of change of counsel; (4) any tactical abuse underlying a
disqualification motion; and (5) the principal that the fair resolution of
disputes requires vigorous representation of parties by independent
counsel. (Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co.
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 116, 126.) Whether an attorney should be
disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. (Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 109, 113.)
Discussion
Defendant Costco moves for a court
order disqualifying Plaintiff’s counsel, Downtown L.A. Law Group (“DTLA Law
Group”), from representing Plaintiff in this case. Defendant Costco
argues DTLA Law Group attorney Anthony Werbin (“Werbin”) was counsel for Costco
prior to joining DTLA Law Group and possesses confidential and proprietary
information regarding Costco that constitute a conflict, which is imputed on
DTLA Law Group.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues
disqualification is not warranted because Werbin is not assigned counsel on
this case, Werbin does not have any confidential or protected information
directly related to this matter, and a substantial relationship does not exist.
“A former client may seek to
disqualify a former attorney from representing an adverse party by showing the
former attorney actually possesses confidential information adverse to the
former client.” (H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Brothers, Inc.
(1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1452.) Additionally, a former client need not
establish that the attorney actually possesses confidential information to
disqualify the former attorney. (H.F. Ahmanson & Co., supra,
229 Cal.App.3d at 1452.) “It is enough to show a ‘substantial
relationship’ between the former and current representation.” (Id.)
“It is the possibility of the breach of confidence, not the fact of an actual
breach that triggers disqualification.” (In re Marriage of Zimmerman
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 556, 563; H.F. Ahmanson & Co., supra, 229
Cal.App.3d at 1452.)
“[T]he attorney’s possession of
confidential information will be presumed only when ‘a substantial relationship
has been shown to exist between the former representation and the current
representation, and when it appears by virtue of the nature of the former
representation or the relationship of the attorney to his former client
confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have
been imparted to the attorney . . . .’” (H.F. Ahmanson &
Co., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at 1454.) Disqualification of the attorney
from representing the second client is mandatory where the substantial
relationship test is met and access to confidential information is
presumed. (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283.)
“[A] ‘substantial relationship’
exists whenever the ‘subjects’ of the prior and the current representations are
linked in some rational manner.” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711 (citing Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
283).) The “subject” of a representation includes “information material
to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the litigation
or transaction given its specific legal and factual issues.” (Id.
at 712-13.) “[S]uccessive representations will be ‘substantially related’ when the
evidence before the trial court supports a rational conclusion that information
material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the
former representation given its factual and legal issues is also material to
the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the current
representation given its factual and legal issues.” (Id. at
713.)
The substantial relationship test
requires comparison not only of the legal issues involved in successive representations,
but also of evidence bearing on the materiality of the information the attorney
received during the earlier representation. (Khani v. Ford Motor Co.
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 916, 921-22.) The evidence must show that the
attorney acquired confidential information and not merely general information
about the former client. (Id.)
The Court finds Defendant Costco
has demonstrated the existence of a substantial relationship between
representation of Plaintiff in this action and Werbin’s representation of
Costco in prior actions. Defendant has presented the following evidence. Werbin’s
representation of Costco involved matters relating to personal injuries
substantially similar to the claims made by the Plaintiff in the instant case.
(Ruijters Decl. ¶ 3.) Werbin also served as one of Costco’s trial counsel in
the case of Guo Jun Chen v. Costco Wholesale Corporation (Case No.
BC654699), which went to trial on May 29, 2019, and in which a verdict was
rendered on June 4, 2019. (Id., ¶ 4.) Most notably, Werbin was counsel for
Costco on at least six cases involving the Inglewood, California Costco
warehouse. (Id., ¶ 2.) These six cases are all based on similar slip and
fall/premises liability claims as the subject slip and fall in this matter.
|
Plaintiff
|
WH |
Court
|
Case
# |
|
Flores,
Daisy |
769
Inglewood |
Federal
Court |
2:17-CV-5336
|
|
Cueva,
Felipe |
769
Inglewood |
LA |
BC687097
|
|
Sorto,
Gloria |
769
Inglewood |
LA |
BC692936
|
|
Restrepo,
Gladis |
769
Inglewood |
Federal
Court |
2:18-CV-06752
|
|
Gharevba,
Judith |
769
Inglewood |
LA |
18STLC10282
|
|
Howard,
Mae |
769
Inglewood |
LA |
BC717875
|
While
serving as Costco’s attorney, Werbin was lead counsel and handled virtually
every aspect of Costco’s file, which included, but was but not limited to,
developing strategy, communicating with Costco employees as well as its claims
administrator Gallagher Bassett, reviewing confidential and privileged
documents, preparing responses to discovery, preparing witnesses to testify at
depositions, defending numerous depositions of Costco employees, and developing
litigation strategy. (Id. at ¶5-7.) Moreover, in March 2019, Werbin was
an active participant in a day-long California Defense Counsel Conference that
Costco held for its panel of defense attorneys in California in order to
discuss California litigation, convey information, and share defense tools and
strategies among its defense counsel. The group in attendance at the Conference
was not every attorney who represents Costco on California cases but was,
instead, a select group – a subset of attorneys - who worked on California
cases for Costco. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Lastly, it is Costco’s usual practice to
seek protective orders relative to documents it produces in discovery. If
Werbin produced documents that he represented were subject to a protective
order, it shows that Werbin was aware of confidential and proprietary
information and he would have seen this information -- and more -- during his
client representation.
From this
evidence, especially that Werbin has handled six slip and fall cases involving
the same Inglewood store location, it can be presumed that Werbin gained
confidential information involving the Inglewood location from his prior
representations that would be material to litigating the current matter and
would provide an unfair advantage to Plaintiff, despite Werbin’s declaration
indicating he has no recollection of ever working on a Costco matter involving
the Inglewood warehouse or anything about the Inglewood warehouse. Werbin
would thus be disqualified from representing Plaintiff had he been involved in
this matter.
Given Werbin would be disqualified
from representing Plaintiff in this matter had he been involved, the issue is
thus whether DTLA Law Group should be disqualified from representing Plaintiff
in this matter.
“[W]hether disqualification of the entire
firm is automatic is an open question.” (California Self-Insurers’
Security Fund v. Superior Court (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1077.) As
was noted by the Court of Appeal in Kirk v. First American Title Ins. Co.
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 776 and discussed in California Self-Insurers’
Security Fund, the case law regarding whether vicarious disqualification is
automatic and absolute is mixed. (California
Self-Insurers’ Security Fund, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 1075; Kirk,
supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 799.) The Kirk Court summarized
the history of the law of vicarious disqualification and found that Flatt
did not create an absolute rule of vicarious disqualification and that “the
state of the law is as initially expressed by the appellate courts: (1) a
case-by-case analysis based on the circumstances present in, and the policy
interests implicated by, the case; (2) tempered by the Henriksen [v.
Great American Savings & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109] rule that
vicarious disqualification should be automatic in cases of a tainted attorney
possessing actual confidential information from a representation, who switches
sides in the same case.” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 800; California
Self-Insurers’ Security Fund, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 1076 (quoting Kirk).)
The Kirk Court further indicated that vicarious disqualification is the
general rule and that courts should presume knowledge is imputed to all members
of a tainted attorney’s law firm, but that, “in the proper circumstances, the
presumption is a rebuttable one, which can be refuted by evidence that ethical
screening will effectively prevent the sharing of confidences in a particular
case.’” (Kirk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 801; California
Self-Insurers’ Security Fund, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 1076 (quoting Kirk).)
As such, the presumption that
Werbin’s knowledge is imputed to all members of his firm and the general rule
of vicarious disqualification of the firm would generally apply.
Plaintiff
argues that vicarious disqualification is rebuttable by evidence of ethical
screening and that DTLA Law Group has a firm policy where Werbin’s team is not
assigned any cases involving Costco. According to Plaintiff’s counsel,
Nina Sargsyan, DTLA Law Group attorneys are divided into teams, which consist
of their own set of attorneys, paralegals, and office staff. (Sargsyan
Decl., ¶ 7.) Further, Sargsyan states do not share team members or case
files. (Id.) Sargsyan attests that it is firm policy that
all Costco cases are assigned to one of the other litigation teams and that
Werbin’s team is not assigned any cases involving Costco. (Id., ¶¶
8-9.) Sargsyan states that the firm stores all case information,
documents, and files electronically and that Werbin does not access any case
files or information involving Costco cases. (Id., ¶ 10.)
Both Sargsyan and Werbin declare that Werbin has never been consulted by any
member of DTLA Law Group as to how to handle a Costco case. (Id., ¶ 14; Werbin Decl., ¶ 21.) Further, in
December of 202l, DTLA Law Group made a software switch from Abacuslaw and
introduced a new software system named FileVine. Prior to using FileVine
software, all client files were viewable by all DTLA Law employees. Upon
shifting to the use of FileVine, only those with administrative roles at the
firm and those who have been assigned to a case will be able to view files
associated with a case. (Sargsyan Decl., ¶ 12; Rezkallah Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)
The Court
finds DTLA Law Group’s evidence of their policy concerning Werbin and Costco
cases is insufficient to rebut the presumption. “The
typical elements of an ethical wall are: (1) physical, geographic, and
departmental separation of attorneys; (2) prohibitions against and sanctions
for discussing confidential matters; (3) established rules and procedures
preventing access to confidential information and files; (4) procedures
preventing a disqualified attorney from sharing in the profits from the
representation; and (5) continuing education in professional responsibility.”
(Henriksen, supra, 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 116 n.6.) While DTLA Law Group may have made an
effort to keep
cases involving Costco away from Werbin by implementing a policy not to assign
such cases to Werbin’s team, there is no evidence of physical or geographical
separation of attorneys, or evidence of sanctions or continuing education in
professional responsibly, to name a few. “[A]n effective wall involves
the imposition of preventive measures to guarantee that information will
not be conveyed.” (Nat'l Grange of Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal.
Guild (2019) 38 Cal. App. 5th 706, 715.) Moreover, although DTLA Law Group has
indicated the electronic files are now protected, DTLA’s new
software system was only implemented in December of 2021. “[T]he screen must be timely
imposed; a firm must impose screening measures when the conflict first
arises....” (Id., at 715.) Plaintiff admits she has been conscious of
Werbin’s former representation of Costco from the beginning of his employment
(Opposition, 13:18-19), however, this new policy was implemented in December of
2021, meaning the screening measure was not imposed when the conflict first
arose. The Court notes that in Plaintiff’s list of cases wherein Defendant
Costco has filed these motions to disqualify due to Werbin’s employment, the
hearing dates on those matters were as early as February of 2021. (Sargsyan
Decl., ¶ 16.) This shows that Werbin was employed by DTLA Law before February
of 2021, DTLA knew of the conflict of interest since before that time, and thus,
this new measure, which was implemented in December of 2021, was not timely.
As such, the
Court finds the measure taken in this case is not sufficient to guarantee that
information will not be conveyed and therefore, insufficient to show there was
an effective ethical wall. The “paramount concern” in evaluating a motion to
disqualify counsel “must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.” (Jarvis v.
Jarvis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113, 139.) Thus, under these
circumstances and in light of the paramount concern to preserve public trust in the
scrupulous administration of justice and integrity of the bar, the Court finds
DTLA Law Group should be disqualified from representing Plaintiff in this action.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Costco’s motion to disqualify
Downtown L.A. Law Group is GRANTED.
Downtown L.A. Law Group is disqualified from representing Plaintiff
Maria Velasco Rodas in this action.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.