Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV13422, Date: 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV13422 Hearing Date: January 20, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Plaintiffs Noorvan Wartanyan and Vera Setrakyan’s Motion to Quash
Subpoena for Business Records and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED. Defendants Charles Scott, David Scott, and
their attorney of record, Jennifer Tseng, Esq., at Tseng & Associates, are
ordered to pay $761.45 in sanctions, jointly and severally, within 30 days of
this order.
Legal Standard
When a subpoena has been issued requiring the attendance of a
witness or the production of documents, electronically stored information, or
other things before a court or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon
motion “reasonably made” by the party, the witness, or any consumer whose
personal records are sought, or upon the court's own motion after giving
counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the
subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those
terms and conditions as the court may specify. (See Code Civ. Proc. §
1987.1; Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15
Cal.2d 206.)
The
court can make an order quashing or modifying a subpoena as necessary to
protect a person from “unreasonable or oppressive demands, including
unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the
person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might
reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating
settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Generally, all unprivileged information that is relevant to the
subject matter of the action is discoverable if it would itself be admissible
evidence at trial or if it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 2017.010; Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.)
Discussion
Plaintiffs
move to quash or modify Defendants’ deposition subpoena for insurance records
on the grounds that records are protected under the right to privacy,
privileged under the Insurance Code and attorney-client privilege, and the
subpoenas are overbroad.
Defendants
issued a deposition subpoena on Plaintiff’s insurance carrier, Progressive
Casualty Insurance Company, seeking:
“Any and all documents and records pertaining
to the insurance and claim file of [Plaintiff], including, but not limited to,
all payments, policy information, listing of providers, correspondence, all log
notes, declaration of coverage, medical records, property damages, repair
estimates and repairs, color photographs….”
(Heidari
Decl., Exh. C.)
Plaintiffs
contend that the subpoenas violate the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine by seeking “all documents” relating to Plaintiff’s insurance
and claim file. The court agrees. Included within “all documents”
would be any accident reports made by insureds to their insurance
carriers. These may be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
(Travelers Insurance v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 436,
448-450.)
Additionally,
Plaintiffs argue the subpoena is overbroad and invasive of their right to
privacy. The right of privacy of individuals is
protected by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1.) The
framework for evaluating invasions of privacy in discovery have been clarified
in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531. There, the
California Supreme Court held that, generally, “[t]he party asserting a privacy
right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened
intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in
response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure
serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives
that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the
loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing
considerations.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 533,
citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1,
35.) The court rejected the cases which held that the party seeking
protected information must always show a compelling need or interest. (Id.
at p. 557.) Instead, the court held, “[o]nly obvious invasions of
interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling
interest.” (Id.)
Here, Plaintiff has raised an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in his insurance records and history under the given
circumstances. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
557.) However, as previously discussed, Plaintiff’s privacy interests
must be balanced against Defendants’ right to obtain discovery of the existence
and contents of a plaintiff’s liability insurance coverage. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 2017.210.) Nevertheless, the Court agrees that Defendants’
request in the subpoenas are both overbroad and will contain documents invasive
of Plaintiff’s right to privacy. In opposition, Defendants do not
articulate any facts establishing a legitimate or important countervailing
interest such disclosure would serve. While Defendant broadly argues that
they are entitled to this discovery because they are entitled to prove or
disprove Plaintiff’s claims and Plaintiff was involved in subsequent accidents, Defendants point to no facts or evidence
to show that Plaintiff was involved in other accidents. Further, Defendants do
not point to any facts or evidence to show that Plaintiff’s claim file is
probative as to any issue regarding the subject incident. Accordingly,
the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the subpoena should be quashed.
As the subpoena is quashed, the remaining arguments need not
be addressed.
Sanctions
“Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant
to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1,
the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s
fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without
substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the
subpoena was oppressive.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd.
(a).
The Court finds that the motion was
opposed without substantial justification as the subpoena is overbroad,
violates Plaintiffs’ privacy rights and violates the attorney-client privilege.
Thus, monetary sanctions in the amount of $761.45 ($350 an hour, for two hours,
plus $61.45 in filing fees) are imposed against Defendants Charles Scott, David
Scott, and their attorney of record, Jennifer Tseng, Esq., at Tseng &
Associates, jointly and severally, to be paid within 30 days of this order.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to quash the subpoena is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is GRANTED.
Defendants Charles Scott,
David Scott, and their attorney of record, Jennifer Tseng, Esq., at Tseng &
Associates, are ordered to pay $761.45 in sanctions, jointly and severally,
within 30 days of this order.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.