Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV24733, Date: 2023-10-30 Tentative Ruling

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The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.



Case Number: 20STCV24733    Hearing Date: November 3, 2023    Dept: 31

TENTATIVE

 

Defendants/Cross-Complainants Rachel D. Son and Dennis H. Son’s unopposed motion for attorney fees is GRANTED.

 

Legal Standard

 

In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) 

 

For purposes of section 1717, “[t]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.”  (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b).)  Attorney fees awarded under Civil Code, section 1717 are allowable costs under Civil Code, section 1032 and Code of Civil Procedure, section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A).  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(B).)   

 

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, including attorneys’ fees, as a matter of right, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.) A prevailing party is “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Id., § 1032(a)(4).)

 

“The trial court has ‘broad authority’ to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fees.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.” (Ibid.) The party that is seeking attorney's fees as a prevailing party must present evidence of the time spent and the hourly rate of each attorney. (Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) 

 

Discussion

Cross-Complainants Rachel D. Son and Dennis H. Son move for attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 against Cross-Defendants Eva Salinas Luna and Bartolo Millan, arguing that Cross-Complainants are the prevailing party and are entitled to attorney fees under their contract with Cross-Defendants.

The right to attorney fees is provided for in Paragraph 40 of the subject lease. (Keavney Decl., Exh. 1.) It states in relevant part:

"In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, collectively not to exceed $1,000 ..."

The Court finds that Cross-Complainants are the prevailing party as they recovered a monetary amount and dismissal was entered in their favor. Further, the contract provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party. Thus, Cross-Complainants are entitled to attorney fees.

Richard P. Keavney, an attorney with 40 years' experience, states that the matter was fairly simple given Plaintiffs' lack of participation. (Keaveny Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Keavney's hourly rate of $250, which he states is lower than any other comparable attorney. (Id., ¶

4.) Keavney spent 26.5 hours on the matter. (Id.) Defendants request the maximum allowable amount of $1,000, for four hours of work.

The Court finds the hourly rate and the hours expended reasonable. Thus, the motion is granted. In sum, the Court awards attorney fees in favor of Cross-Complainants and against Cross-Defendants Eva Salinas Luna and Bartolo Millan in the amount of $1,000.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the unopposed motion for attorney fees is GRANTED.

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.