Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV34389, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV34389 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
20STCV34389 Fredi Antonio Perez Gonzalez v. A & R
Villas, LLC
Motion to Set Aside Default filed by Defendant Marcello Baez
is DENIED.
Background
This
action arises from injuries that Plaintiff Fredi Antonio Perez Gonzalez
(“Plaintiff”) sustained by an automatic gate.
On
September 9, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants A & R
Villas, LLC and Ramset Automatic Gate Systems, Inc, alleging the following
causes of action: (1) premises liability; and (2) negligence. On January 3,
2022, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint adding Marcello Baez (“Baez”)
as a named defendant. On May 4, 2022, default was entered against Baez for
failing to answer the complaint.
On
November 18, 2022, Baez filed the instant motion to set aside default.
Plaintiff opposes.
Legal
Standard
Code of Civil
Procedure § 473(b) provides in part: “the court shall, whenever an application
for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in
proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to
his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1)
resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which
will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment
or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the
default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. The court shall, whenever relief is granted
based on an attorney's affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay
reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.”
The discretionary
prong of Code of Civil Procedure, § 473, subdivision (b) requires that an
application for relief must be made no more than six months after entry of the
order from which relief is sought and must be accompanied by an affidavit of
fault attesting to the moving party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); English v. IKON Business
Solutions (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143.)
In either case, the application must be made within a reasonable time,
and in no case exceeding six months after the judgment. (Id.)
Discussion
As a preliminary
matter, it is noted that Baez failed again to comply with the service
requirement set forth in Code of Civil Procedure § 1005. (See Berkley Decl. ¶
13.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff has managed to file an opposition in response to
the merits of the instant motion. Therefore, because of the lack of prejudice,
the Court shall consider the motion.
A. Merits
Baez moves the Court
to set aside default entered against him, arguing that his failure to respond
was due to inadvertence, surprise, mistake or excusable neglect. Baez believed
the person who hired him to work on the gate would have handled his lawsuit,
but when he spoke to attorneys for Defendant Ramcast, he realized he was
responsible to respond to the lawsuit.
While a mistake of
fact can occur when a person understands something to be other than what they
are, the purported mistake here is not reasonable. (Hodge Sheet Metal
Products v. Palm Springs Riviera Hotel (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 653, 656.) The
Court finds that Baez did not exercise reasonable care in determining whether
it was his responsibility to respond to the lawsuit. His declaration fails to
set forth when he spoke with attorneys for Defendant Ramcast or when he became
aware that he was named in this lawsuit. Moreover, as pointed out by Plaintiff,
Baez was notified of Plaintiff’s intention of requesting the Court to enter
default against him on April 11, 2022. (Opposition at pg. 4; Berkeley ¶ 9, Exh.
2.) Even though Baez was notified on May 11, 2022 that a default was ultimately
entered, he waited until November 18, 2022 to file the instant motion.
Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that a five-month delay is not reasonable.
Furthermore, an exercise of ordinary prudence would have guarded against the
entry of default. (Baratti v. Baratti (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 917, 921; Elms
v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513.) Thus, because Baez’s declaration
does not establish that he exercised reasonable diligence, it cannot be found
that the default was entered through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b). Additionally,
the motion is defective because Baez has failed to include a proposed answer as
required by statute.
Accordingly, the Court
denies the motion to set aside default.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Marcello Baez’s Motion to
Set Aside Default is DENIED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.