Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV35380, Date: 2022-12-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV35380    Hearing Date: December 5, 2022    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

The Motion to Strike Punitive Damages filed by Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Meet and Confer 

The motion to strike is accompanied by the declaration of Colin Walshok, which satisfies the meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5.)  

Legal Standard 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

Discussion

Defendant moves to strike allegations of punitive damages against it in the complaint.

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)  

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)  

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.) 

“An employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages ..., based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct.... With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, [or] ratification ... must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civil Code § 3294.) The California Supreme Court interpreted the “latter statement as requiring the officer, director, or managing agent to be someone who ‘exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant drove her SUV at an excessive speed, and was using her cell phone, including other electronic wireless communications devices required to perform her duties owed to Uber, when she failed to stop at a red light and rear-ended Plaintiff. Further, the complaint alleges that Defendant Pacheco was acting in her capacity as an employee, contractor, and or agent of Uber, and with Uber’s express and/or implied authority and permission to act in such manner.

The Court finds insufficient facts have been alleged to pray for punitive damages.  In essence, Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages for the failure to properly operate an automobile. Plaintiff’s summary allegation tracking the language of Civil Code section 3294 is insufficient and the causing of negligent harm through operating an automobile does not suffice as a prima facie case for punitive damages.  

Further, as to a corporate Defendant, Plaintiff has not made any allegations that Defendant Uber’s officers, directors, and managing agents had advanced knowledge that its employee was unfit and that the directors, officers, and managing agents employed her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or they somehow ratified the wrongful conduct. Moreover, the basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) As such, even if these allegations were made, they would need factual assertions as well.

Therefore, the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages for oppression and malice against a corporate defendant. 

Plaintiff argues that it is widely accepted that distracted driving (including driving while operating a cell phone) is at least as dangerous as driving under the influence of alcohol, if not more so. Plaintiff argues that California has long recognized that drunk driving can subject a defendant to punitive damages. (Taylor v. Sup. Ct., 24 Cal.3d 890, 896-97.)

Even assuming for the sake of argument that this assertion is true, Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under § 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at p. 892.) 

Further, Taylor was decided prior to 1987, at which time the Legislature added the requirement to Civil Code Section 3294 that conduct be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages under a malice/willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others standard.  “[T]he statute's reference to ‘despicable’ conduct seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.¿Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.)¿As amended to include this word,¿the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  (Coll. Hosp., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [emphasis added].) 

As such, driving while using a cell phone at a speed over the posted speed limit can hardly be described as “vile” or “contemptible.” To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to strike is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.  

Conclusion 

Defendant Uber’s motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.