Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV35892, Date: 2023-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV35892    Hearing Date: March 20, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, is GRANTED.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Id.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).) 

Discussion

Motor Vehicle Negligence

To plead a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: “(1)¿a¿legal¿duty¿of¿care¿toward¿the¿plaintiff; (2)¿a¿breach¿of that¿duty; (3)¿legal¿causation; and (4)¿damages.” (Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Insurance, Inc.¿(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 116, 127.) However, the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury's determination. [Citation.] Nevertheless, causation may be a question of law if on undisputed facts there can be no reasonable difference of opinion on causal nexus.” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1139.)

When operating a motor vehicle, a driver is “required to act as a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Watkins v. Ohman (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 501, 502-503.) “All drivers of vehicles on a public highway are required by law to keep a vigilant lookout ahead so as to avoid, if reasonably possible, a collision with any other vehicle or person lawfully upon such highway. Failure to keep such lookout, or failure to see that which may be readily seen, if the driver is looking, would constitute negligence as a matter of law.” (Huetter v. Andrews (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 142, 146.) However, “[n]o suggestion of negligence arises from the mere happening of an accident.” (Edwards v. California Sports, Inc. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1284, 1287.)

Government Code section 815.2, subd. (a), states that a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.  (Government Code section 815.2(a).)

“A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”  (Civ. Code section 2100.)  A public rapid transit bus is a common carrier under Civil Code Section 2100.  (See Acosta v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 19, 27; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District (1985) 40 Cal.3d 19.)  

Defendant argues that there are no triable issues of fact as to the MTA bus operator’s alleged negligence, as the collision was unavoidable for the bus operator, and caused solely by Defendant Williams' action of pulling out from a parked position by the curb and directly entering the path travel of the moving MTA bus.

Plaintiff was a passenger on the Defendant's MTA bus. Defendant Williams was the driver of an R.V. vehicle, also involved in the incident. (Undisputed Material Fact ("UMF") Nos. 1, 2.) At the time of the incident, the MTA bus operator was engaged in the course and scope of his employment. (UMF Nos. 2, 3.) Defendant Williams' R.V. was stopped along the right curb of southbound Avalon Blvd., south of the intersection of Avalon Blvd with 111th St. (UMF No. 6.) Immediately before the incident, the MTA bus was traveling no more than 27 mph on southbound Avalon Blvd. (UMF No. 7.) Consistent with the Plaintiff’s own discovery and testimony, the SmartDrive footage shows that between timestamp 7:20:24:08 through 7:20:25:53 p.m., Williams' R.V. suddenly leaves the curb, with the R.V. turning left directly into the number 2 lane of southbound Avalon Blvd., directly into the path of the moving bus. (UMF No. 8.)

The SmartDrive video shows that at timestamps 7:20:24:08 to 7:20:25:53 p.m., the bus operator applied the brakes in response to seeing Williams' vehicle drive away from the right curb and make a left turn directly into the path of the bus. (UMF No. 9.) At or near the same time, the SmartDrive video shows that the bus operator turned his steering wheel to the left in response to the Williams' vehicle suddenly pulling into the MTA bus's direct path of travel. (UMF No. 10.) The SmartDrive footage (windshield camera), at approximately 7:20:24:08 to 7:20:25:53 p.m., shows when Williams pulled his R.V. from the right curb there was less than two seconds before the bus and the R.V. collided. (UMF No. 11.)

Upon viewing the SmartDrive video footage during his deposition, Plaintiff agreed that co- defendant, Williams left the right curb parking lane to the left into the number 2 lane of southbound Avalon Blvd., and directly into the path of the bus's lane of travel. He also agreed that accident occurred within two seconds after Williams began turning left into the bus's lane of travel. (Brooks Depo, Exh. B, 37:25, 38:1-4, 14-16, 40:7-17, 41: 2-17.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has alleged in his Complaint only that the MTA bus struck the Williams R.V. while it was parked on the right curb. This is clearly contrary to the uncontroverted evidence in the case, and Plaintiffs admissions under oath. (UMF No. 8.)

The Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden on summary judgment to show that there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s employee operated the bus negligently, as the evidence presented shows that Defendant Williams pulled his R.V. out from a parked spot and directly in the bus operator’s path of travel, when the bus was traveling very close to the parked R.V. This occurred within a two-second time span, and while the operator did brake and attempt to avoid the collision, he was not able to avoid the collision as there was not sufficient time. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to present triable issues of fact. However, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition, and as a result, has failed to carry his burden to present triable issues of fact. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.