Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 20STCV39647, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV39647 Hearing Date: April 6, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant Julia McDonough’s motion
for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is DENIED.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is
to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in
order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact
necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the
moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of
material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log
Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or
summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of
action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the
cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant
. . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary
judgment should be granted.” (Avivi
v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider
all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court
has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159
Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)
Discussion
Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication,
on the ground that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant at the time of the
incident, and the Workers’ Compensation Act bars her claim.
The Workers Compensation Act (“WCA”) governs compensation to employees
for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. (Cal.
Const., art. XIV, § 4; Cal. Labor Code, § 3201; Charles J. Vacanti, M.D.,
Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810.)
Compensation under the WCA is an employee’s exclusive remedy against an
employer for injuries sustained out of and in the course of employment. (Cal.
Labor Code, §§ 3600(a), 3602(a).) Whether exclusivity bars a cause of action
against an employer depends on whether the alleged injury falls within the
scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. (See Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at
811.) The exclusive remedy provisions apply only in cases of industrial
personal injury or death. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52
Cal.3d 1, 16.) “The purpose of this exclusivity provision is to give efficacy
to the theoretical ‘compensation bargain’ between the employer and employee.” (Privette
v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 697 [quotation marks and
citation omitted].) However, the statutory restriction does not affect an
employee’s rights to damages in tort from entities that the employee has no
employment relationship. (Caso v. Nimrod Productions, Inc. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 881, 888.)
Defendant presents evidence that
Defendant carried homeowner's insurance which included workers' compensation
coverage of residence employees. (DUMF No. 10.) Plaintiff was Defendant’s
employee for approximately five years and was working three days a week. (DUMF
No. 11.) Plaintiff was paid $16.75 per hour. (DUMF No. 12.) Plaintiff provided
housekeeping and caregiving services to Defendant's mother at Defendant's home.
(DUMF No. 2.) On or around the morning of November 16, 2018, Plaintiff arrived
at Defendant's house to provide housekeeping services. (DUMF No. 3.) Soon after
arriving for work, Plaintiff was in Defendant's backyard playing aggressively
with Defendant's terrier mix, Coconut. (DUMF No. 4.) Coconut was running in
wide circles around the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff was laughing, clapping, and
moving around with Coconut. (DUMF No. 5.) As Plaintiff was playing with
Coconut, the two collided, resulting in Plaintiff's injured knee. (DUMF No. 6.)
The
Court finds that Defendant has not presented sufficient evidence to meet her
burden on summary judgment to show that no triable issues exist as to whether
Plaintiff’s injury arose out of and was in the course of employment. The
evidence presented shows that Plaintiff provided housekeeping and caregiving
services. As such, it appears that playing with the dog was outside of her
duties of employment. There is no evidence, for example, to demonstrate that
playing with the dog was part of Plaintiff’s duties in caring for Defendant’s
mother.
As a result, summary judgment
cannot be granted.
As Defendant has not asserted any independent basis to grant summary
adjudication as to each cause of action, summary adjudication is also denied.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary
adjudication is DENIED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.