Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV03254, Date: 2022-09-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV03254 Hearing Date: September 1, 2022 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant Super Center Concepts, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
Objections
Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s
evidence:
The following objections are
overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
The following objections are sustained:
n/a
Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s
evidence:
1. Defendant’s Objections to Declaration
of Brad P. Avrit:
The following objections are
overruled: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20
The following objections are sustained:
1, 2, 3, 17, 19
2. Defendant’s Objections to Declaration
of Eris J. Barillas:
The following objections are
overruled: 1, 2, 3,
The following objections are
sustained: n/a
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary
judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing
party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an
order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP
Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. ) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto.
To establish a triable issue of
material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Discussion
The elements of a cause of action for premises
liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and
damages.¿¿(Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp¿(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994,
998.)¿¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to
exercise ordinary care in managing the property¿to¿avoid exposing others to an
unreasonable risk of harm.¿¿(Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)¿¿The existence and scope of duty are legal questions
for the court.¿¿(Id.¿at¿36.)¿¿If a dangerous condition exists, the
property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the
condition¿reasonably safe for their¿[customers’]¿use or to give a warning
adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.”¿¿(Bridgman v. Safeway Stores,
Inc.¿(1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)¿
“A plaintiff
alleging injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove the
defendant¿either: (1) created the dangerous condition, or (2)¿knew or should
have known of the dangerous condition.”¿ (See¿Peralta v. Vons Companies,
Inc.¿(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036; see also¿Ortega v. Kmart Corp.¿(2001)
26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.)¿¿“[A] defendant¿is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the
dangerous condition existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by
ordinary care and inspection.”¿¿(Ortega,¿supra, 26 Cal.4th
at¿1207.)¿¿“Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a
reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the
jury.” (See id. at 1207.) “The owner must inspect
the premises or take other proper action to ascertain their condition, and if,
by the exercise of reasonable care, the owner would have discovered the
condition, he is liable for failing to correct it.” (See id.) “A
store owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the
portions of the premises open to customers . . . .” (See id. at
1205.) “[A]s to business invitees, the owner should conduct frequent
inspections.” (See id. at 1207.)
Defendant argues that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the
alleged dangerous condition. Defendant presents evidence that during the
time period of 6:00 am through 5:00 p.m., on the date of the incident, no customers informed Defendant’s employees that the
floor where
the incident occurred
at the check-out
station needed
care. (UMF
No. 32.) Additionally, Defendant argues that the surveillance footage shows
that there was no liquid on the floor before Plaintiff entered the checkout
stand (at 4:46 p.m.). According to the video, there was, however, a liquid
substance after Plaintiff moved her shopping cart. The video evidence also
shows that both a bottle of bleach and Plaintiff’s own red-orange water bottle
rested on their sides as they lay in the shopping cart. (UMF Nos. 5 and 8.) As
such, Defendant argues it could not have known about the alleged dangerous
condition.
As to constructive notice, Defendant
presents evidence that on the date of the incident, Defendant conducted a sweep
or cleaning and inspection of the “front end” of the store at 3:21:21 p.m. and
4:48:13 p.m. (UMF No. 30.) Plaintiff fell at 5:00 p.m. (UMF No. 31.) Thus,
Defendant conducted an inspection of the area 12 minutes before Plaintiff fell.
Additionally, the Store Manager walked through the "front end" of the
subject grocery store, which is where the cash registers and check-out stations
are located, several times during that day. (UMF No. 24.) During that
inspection, the Store Manager did not see any liquids, debris, or foreign
substances on the floor. (UMF No. 26.) The Store Manager is always looking for
hazards at the subject grocery store (including, but not limited to, liquids,
debris, and/or foreign substances on the floor). (UMF No. 27.) If she had seen
any liquids, debris, or foreign substances on the floor at the time she walked
through the "front end" before the alleged incident at the subject
grocery store, she would have either cleaned it up immediately myself after
seeing it or instructed another employee to clean it up immediately. (UMF No.
28.)
The Court finds Defendant’s evidence is sufficient
to show that Defendant did not have actual notice of the dangerous
condition. However, the Court finds Defendant has failed to demonstrate
that, as a matter of law, it should be found to have lacked constructive
notice. Defendant has failed to show that, as a matter of law, the
twelve-minute period of time between the
inspection of the subject area and Plaintiff’s fall is too short a time for
constructive knowledge to be found. Whether the dangerous condition has
existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it thus
remains a question of fact for the factfinder, especially when Defendant’s
store is a self-service store selling produce that potentially triggers a greater need
to make frequent inspections. (See Ortega, supra,
26 Cal.4th at 1205 (“If the owner operates a self-service grocery store, where
customers are invited to inspect, remove, and replace goods on shelves, ‘the
exercise of ordinary care may require the owner to take greater precautions and
make more frequent inspections than would otherwise be needed to safeguard
against the possibility that such a customer may create a dangerous condition
by disarranging the merchandise’ and creating potentially hazardous
conditions.”); see also Louie v. Hagstron’s Food Stores (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601, 608.) Defendant has thus failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot establish that
Defendant had constructive notice. As such,
the burden does not shift to Plaintiff. Summary judgment is denied on this
basis.
Causation
The substantial factor test is used to
determine whether the causation element is satisfied. (Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Ameron Pole Products LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 974, 981-982.) A court may
grant summary judgment because there is no triable issue of material fact
regarding causation only when there is no other reasonable conclusion. (Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 864.)
Defendant also
argues that causation cannot be proven. Defendant argues that as plaintiff was walking into the check-out stand and stood there
was her items were getting checked
by the cashier, before the incident occurred, she never saw any kind of liquid on the floor. Plaintiff
does not know what caused her to slip and fall on the date of the incident, or whether there was anything on the floor that caused her to slip and fall. When asked to describe how the incident occurred, plaintiff responded: "I have no idea how that happened." (UMF No. 11.) When asked if she recalled seeing any liquid on the floor before the incident, plaintiff responded: "I was not paying attention to nothing on the floor. I wasn't even looking down," and clarified, "No. I don't remember seeing nothing." (UMF No. 13.) When asked if she saw any debris or foreign substance on the floor where she slipped and fell before the incident, plaintiff responded: "I never paid attention. As you can see, I just was talking to the gentleman at the register. So, no, I didn't." (UMF No. 14.) When asked how the incident happened and if she slipped on liquid, plaintiff responded: "I --- I do not know. I don't know. I really honestly don't know." (UMF No. 15.) Even after watching the video, when asked if plaintiff knew what she slipped on, plaintiff responded: "I have no idea." (UMF No. 17.) Finally, when asked if she saw what she slipped on after the incident, plaintiff responded: "All I know is that the back of my clothes is wet." (UMF No. 18.)
Thus, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not know what caused her to fall,
let alone Defendant’s alleged negligence caused her to fall.
Defendant has not met its burden on
summary judgment to show that no triable issues of material fact exist as to
causation. At a minimum, the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence show
that the floor was wet where Plaintiff fell. Although Plaintiff did not see the
water, there is evidence that her clothes were wet after she fell, which tends
to show that she slipped on liquid. Further, the surveillance footage clearly
shows Plaintiff slipping on a puddle of liquid at 5:00 p.m. As to whether
Defendant’s alleged negligence caused the incident, the owner's duty of care also extends to dangerous conditions
on the premises “which are not due to the negligence of the owner,” such as
those caused “by natural wear and tear, or third persons, or acts of God or by
other causes.” (Hatfield v. Levy Brothers (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798, 806; See Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 447.) In such cases, the owner's liability turns on whether it
has made reasonable efforts to discover and remedy those dangerous conditions.
Because there are triable issues of fact as to reasonable inspections, this argument
also fails. Thus,
as Defendant has not met its burden, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff.
Summary judgment is also denied on this basis.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice.