Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV04473, Date: 2023-05-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV04473 Hearing Date: May 1, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant
County of Los Angeles’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to
allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary
support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal
without the need for trial. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c)
“requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge
v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for
summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts
to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf
v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. ) Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as
to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the
motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Discussion
I.
Cause
of Action for Negligence
A public entity
is not liable for an injury unless that liability is provided for by
statute. (Gov. Code, § 815(a).) “[T]o state a cause of action every
fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with
particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. [Citation.]”
(Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792,
802.) “Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by
statute or ‘enactment,’ the statute or ‘enactment’ claimed to establish the
duty must at the very least be identified.” (Ibid.)
Here, Defendant
is a public entity. A review of the Complaint shows that Plaintiff has
failed to specify the statute on which the negligence cause of action is based,
other than Government Code section 835. Plaintiff’s cause of action for
negligence thus fails against Defendant as a matter of law.
Defendant is thus
entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence.
II.
Cause of Action for Premises Liability/ Dangerous
Condition of Public Property
A. Trivial Defect Doctrine
Defendant moves
for summary judgment on grounds that the height differential where
Plaintiff fell is a trivial defect.
Government Code section 835 states:¿“Except as
provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous
condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in
a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was
proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred,
and either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission
of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created
the dangerous condition; or¿
(b) The public entity had actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient
time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the
dangerous condition.”
“‘The trivial defect doctrine originated to shield
public entities from liability where conditions on public property create
a risk ‘of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the
surrounding circumstances . . . no reasonable person would conclude that the
condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent
property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably
foreseeable that it would be used.’’” (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 (quoting Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities,
Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 27).) “The trivial defect
doctrine is not an affirmative defense.” (Id.) “It is an
aspect of duty that a plaintiff must plead and prove.” (Id.)
“In appropriate cases, the trial court may determine . . .
whether a given walkway defect was trivial as a matter of law.” (Id.)
“‘Where reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion—that there was no
substantial risk of injury—the issue is a question of law, properly resolved by
way of summary judgment.’” (Id. at 1104-05 (quoting Caloroso v.
Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 929).) “If, however,
the court determines that sufficient evidence has been presented so that
reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect presents a substantial
risk of injury, the court may not conclude that the defect is trivial as a
matter of law.” (Id. at 1105.) “In determining
whether a given walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law, the court
should not rely solely upon the size of the defect—in this
case, on the depth or height of the walkway depression or elevation—although
the defect’s size ‘may be one of the most relevant factors’ to the court’s
decision.’” (Id. (quoting Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71
Cal.App.3d 719, 734) (emphasis in original).) “The court should
consider other circumstances which might have rendered the defect a dangerous
condition at the time of the accident.” (Id.) “These other
circumstances or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged
edges in the area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material
obscured a pedestrian’s view of the defect, the plaintiff’s knowledge of the
area, whether the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the
weather at the time of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any
other accidents.” (Id.) “In sum, ‘[a] court should decide
whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of the
circumstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more
dangerous than its size alone would suggest.’” (Id. (quoting Caloroso,
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at 927) (alteration in original).)
Plaintiff testified she fell due to a
protruding edge of the sidewalk. (Rashidi Decl., Exh. 2: Plaintiff’s Depo.,
42:7.) Defendant argues the alleged defect here is trivial as a matter of law
as the height differential for the protruding edge is one inch. (Defendant’s
Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 16; Rashidi Decl., Exh. 8a.) “Sidewalk elevations ranging from
three-quarters of an inch to one and one-half inches have generally been held
trivial as a matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th 1092,
1107.) Further, Defendant argues there were no other aggravating factors.
The photographic evidence produced by Plaintiff shows that the protruding edge
was not jagged and there were apparently no broken pieces of the sidewalk. (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that she did not see anything around the area where she
fell, and she did not see the protruding edge at the scene until she had fell.
Based on Plaintiff's testimony she cannot attest to the presence of debris.
(UMF Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22. 23.) As to Plaintiff’s knowledge of the area,
Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff had visited the LAC+USC Medical
Center prior to the date of the incident. (UMF 18.) And she walked across the
very protruding edge the day of the incident and did not notice the protruding
edge. (UMF 22, 23.) As to the time of day and weather, Plaintiff fell early in
the afternoon, on a day when the weather was clear, the lighting was sunny, and
the sun did not obscure Plaintiff's vision. (UMF 24.) Lastly, Defendant
presents evidence that there is no evidence of any other accidents or claims
related to this protruding edge. Individuals employed by the County of Los
Angeles are responsible for conducting monthly inspections of County premises
that encompass the incident location of pedestrian walkway enroute from parking
lot P5 to LAC+USC Medical Center, and no defects pertaining to the incident
location were noted during inspections within five years prior to the incident.
(UMF 28-34.)
Therefore,
Defendant has provided sufficient evidence of to show there are no triable
issues of fact as to whether the condition was trivial as a matter of law, as
the height differential was only one inch, and that there are no aggravating
conditions to raise the existence of triable issues of material
fact as the weather conditions were sunny and clear, there were no jagged edges
or any evidence of debris on the ground, and Plaintiff had been to this
location before and thus, was familiar with the area. The burden now shifts to
Plaintiff to raise triable issues of material fact.
Plaintiff has not
filed an opposition to meet her burden on summary judgment. Thus, Defendant’s
motion is GRANTED.
B. Notice
Defendant also moves for summary judgment on
the ground that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged
dangerous condition.
Government Code section 835 provides that “a public
entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if
the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) [a] negligent or
wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope
of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) [t]he public entity
had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section
835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect
against the dangerous condition.” (Govt. Code, § 835.)
Notice, in the context of Section 835
liability, is defined in Government Code § 835.2 as follows:
“(a) A public entity had actual notice of a
dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 if it
had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have
known of its dangerous character.
(b) A public entity had constructive notice
of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835
only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a
period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the
exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous
character.” On the issue of due care, admissible evidence includes but is not
limited to evidence as to:
(1) Whether the existence of the condition and its dangerous character
would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate
(considering the practicability and cost of inspection weighed against the
likelihood and magnitude of the potential danger to which failure to inspect
would give rise) to inform the public entity whether the property was safe for
the use or uses for which the public entity used or intended others to use the
public property and for uses that the public entity actually knew others were
making of the public property or adjacent property.
(2) Whether the public entity maintained and operated such an inspection
system with due care and did not discover the condition.”
(Gov. Code, §
835.2(a)-(b).)
“Constructive
notice may be imputed if it can be shown that an obvious danger existed for an
adequate period of time before the accident to have permitted the state
employees, in the exercise of due care, to discover and remedy the situation
had they been operating under a reasonable plan of inspection.” (State v.
Superior Court for San Mateo County (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 396, 400.) The
primary and indispensable element of constructive notice is a showing that the
obvious condition existed a sufficient period of time before the accident, and
the secondary element is the method of inspection. (Ibid.)
Here, Defendant argues, there is no
evidence that the County had actual notice of the protruding edge on the P5
pedestrian walkway for LAC+USC Medical Center, or of its dangerous character.
There were no complaints or service requests about the protruding edge. (UMF Nos.
28-34.) And there is no evidence of any prior claims being made to the County
for personal injury connected to the protruding edge. (UMF Nos. 28-34.) Further,
Defendant presents Plaintiff’s discovery responses and argues Plaintiff gave no
information in response to the County's special interrogatory requesting information
pertaining to the County's knowledge of the purported dangerous condition. (UMF
Nos. 10, 12, 27.) Further, Defendant argues that the defect was so minor that
it did not in and of itself amount to constructive notice. “A minor defect…
does not…by its mere existence, charge the city with constructive notice of its
presence.” (Nicholson v. Los Angeles (1936) 5 Ca1l.2d 361, 364.)
"It is a matter of common knowledge that no sidewalk is
perfect...." (Id., 365.)
The Court finds that Defendant has met its
initial burden on summary judgment to show no triable issues of fact exist as
to notice as there is no evidence that Defendant had actual notice of the condition
because no complaints were made to Defendant and it is apparent the condition
was so minor and could not have imparted constructive notice to Defendant. (Nicholson
v. Los Angeles, supra, 5 Ca1l.2d at 364.) The burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Again, as Plaintiff has not filed an
opposition to meet her burden on summary judgment, Defendant is also entitled
to summary judgment due to a lack of evidence regarding notice.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Defendant County of Los Angeles’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.