Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV05565, Date: 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV05565 Hearing Date: December 7, 2022 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendants MV Transportation, Inc. City of Los
Angeles, Los Angeles World Airports, and Teresa Ann Lee Sutton’s demurrer to the second amended complaint
is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend in part. The
demurrer is overruled as to the third cause of action for Violation of Vehicle
Code 20001(a), and SUSTAINED as to the fourth cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.
Legal Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a
cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent
on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings
alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at
747.)
Meet and Confer
The demurrer and motion to strike are accompanied by the
declaration of Jackson A. Zimmerman which satisfies the meet and confer
requirements. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41.)
Discussion
Third Cause of
Action for Violation of Vehicle Code 20001(a)
Defendants
contend that Plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish this
cause of action because his allegation that Sutton failed to provide
identifying information has no factual basis whatsoever. Further, Plaintiff’s
allegations that he suffered addition injury following the incident is devoid
of any facts.
California
Vehicle Code section 20001 provides that “[t]he driver of a vehicle involved in
an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or herself, or
in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident and shall fulfill the requirements of [providing identifying
information] . . . .” (Veh. Code §
20001(a), 20003, 20004.) Violating section 20001 is a felony. (Id. §
20001(b).) A violation of section 20001
gives rise to civil liability only if it is a proximate cause of further injury
or death. (See People v.
Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148; Brooks
v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669,
679; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
1308, 1340.)
As relevant here, the SAC alleges that following the
two collisions, Plaintiff motioned to Defendant Sutton to pull over in an
attempt to exchange information. Instead, Defendant Sutton made a dismissive
waiving motion with her hand and immediately fled the scene after the collision
without exchanging information with Plaintiff. Plaintiff was immediately aware
he was injured. Despite the injuries and
pain Plaintiff was experiencing, Plaintiff was forced to "give chas
to the bus and Defendant Sutton, through the streets of Los Angeles for
approximately thirty minutes, delaying treatment for Plaintiff’s physical
injuries and exacerbating the injuries to Plaintiff’s neck and back, among
other things.
The Court finds that the allegations to
support the element that Plaintiff suffered further injury are now supported
with a factual basis. The SAC alleges that Plaintiff’s injuries were
exacerbated because he had to give chase and thus, his treatment was delayed.
Thus, Defendants’
demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is OVERRULED.
Fourth
Cause of Action for IIED
Defendants contend
that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts of severe emotional distress.
“The
elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing,
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2)
the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual
and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous
conduct.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d
868, 903, internal quotations omitted.) For conduct to be
outrageous it must be “so extreme as to
exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (See Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
120, 130.) Liability does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) “Severe
emotional distress means . . . emotional distress of such substantial quantity
or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be
expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co.
(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376.)
“[I]t
is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or
even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even
that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation
which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.”
(Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.) “Liability
has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
(Id.) While there is no bright-line as to what constitutes
outrageous conduct and thus this involves a case-by-case analysis, courts can
determine whether conduct was sufficiently outrageous at the demurrer
stage. (Id. at 494.)
Regarding
severe emotional distress, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff
has continuing fear and anxiety when driving his vehicle, including but not
limited to extreme fear when driving near buses and other larger vehicles and
when driving on the freeway. Prior to this incident, Plaintiff did not
experience the fear, anxiety, and other extremely negative emotions while
driving his vehicle. The stress from driving impacts Plaintiff’s life on a
daily and consistent basis as he is required to drive almost every day for work
and personal business. Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress of such a
quality that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to
endure. Among other things, as a proximate result of Defendant Sutton’s
intentional conduct, as described above, Plaintiff suffered severe mental
anguish, suffering, anxiety, fear, stress, worry, shock, and nervousness which
was substantial and/or long-lasting following the incident such that no
reasonable person should be expected to bear.
The Court again finds that Plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts
that he suffered severe emotional distress of such a quality that no reasonable
person in a civilized society should be expected to endure. His fear and fear
of driving is not extreme emotional distress and is common among many
drivers.
As a result, Defendants’ demurrer
as to the cause of action for IIED is SUSTAINED. The Court will permit one
final leave to amend.
Motion to Strike Legal Standard
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may
serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and
upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court
rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v.
Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)
Discussion
Defendants also move to strike the
allegations regarding punitive damages asserted against Defendant Sutton only,
arguing Plaintiff failed to allege with specificity any acts of oppression,
fraud, or malice.
To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section
3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant
has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be
pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions
are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if
proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud
or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191
Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)
“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as
“despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been
defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.”
(See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing,
Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)
To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove
negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court
(1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible
manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the
substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations
must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct
was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital
Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)
There must be an
actionable tort underlying any claim for punitive damage; it cannot be asserted
as an independent cause of action. (Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co.
(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391.) Vehicle Code
section 20001 provides that “[t]he driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or herself, or in the death
of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and
shall fulfill the requirements of [providing identifying information] . . . .”
(Veh. Code § 20001(a).) Violating section 20001 is a felony. (Id. § 20001(b).) A violation of
Vehicle Code section 20001 gives rise to civil liability only if it is a
proximate cause of further injury or death. (See People v. Corners
(1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1340.) In Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co.
(1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, the court held that a hit and run cannot give rise to
damages unless the fact that the defendant fled the scene was “a proximate
cause of further injury or death” beyond the accident itself. (Id.
at 679.) Brooks did not consider the issue of whether punitive
damages can be imposed based on a hit and run. It did, however, hold that
fleeing an accident scene only constitutes a tort if the act itself causes the
plaintiff additional injury above and beyond the damages caused by the
collision that preceded flight. (Id.)
As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently set forth his
cause of action under Violation of Vehicle Code 20001(a). Because the basis for
Plaintiff’s cause of action under Vehicle Code 20001(a) is the same here: a hit
and run causing further injury, Plaintiff has also properly pled punitive
damages against Sutton.
Defendants
MT Transportation Inc., the City of Los Angeles, and Los Angeles World
Airports, argue that
for several reasons, they cannot be liable for punitive damages. However,
defendants acknowledge that the SAC makes clear punitive damages are asserted
against Defendant Sutton only. Thus, the Court does not need to address these
arguments.
Conclusion
Based
on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the second amended complaint is
OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend in part. The
demurrer is overruled as to the third cause of action for Violation of Vehicle
Code 20001(a), and SUSTAINED as to the fourth cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.
Moving party is
ordered to give notice.