Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV09301, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV09301    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

 

Defendant Alcorn Fence Company’s motion for leave to file a cross-complaint is GRANTED.

 

Legal Standard

 

CCP § 428.10 provides that a party against whom a cause of action has been asserted may file a cross-complaint setting forth:  “(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.”  (CCP § 428.10(b).) A party shall obtain leave of court to file a cross-complaint if it is not concurrently filed with the answer or at any time before the court sets a trial date. Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.  (CCP § 428.10(c).)

 

If a cross-complaint is compulsory, leave must be granted as long as the cross-complainant is acting in good faith, so as to avoid forfeiture of the causes of action. (C.C.P. §426.50; See Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 101 (concluding that the late filing of the motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint absent some evidence of bad faith is insufficient evidence to support denial of the motion).) To be considered a compulsory cross-complaint, the related cause of action must have existed at the time defendant served its answer to the complaint. (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide (2008), Civil Procedure Before Trial §6:516; See also Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864.) If the cross-complaint is not compulsory, but rather is permissive, the Court has sole discretion whether to grant or deny leave. (Id.)

 

“A party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article, whether through over-sight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action.”  (CCP § 426.50.)  The Court shall grant such a motion if the moving party acted in good faith.  (CCP § 426.50.)   

 

The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence.  (Foot's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897 (evidence insufficient to support trial court's denial of motion to file cross-complaint notwithstanding that defendant waited 23 months after service of complaint and 16 months after filing answer before asserting right to file cross-complaint, where nothing in record suggested that defendant was unusually reprehensible with regard to delay, plaintiff waited for two years to file action, and plaintiff’s counsel equivocated concerning stipulation allowing the filing of cross-complaint at same time counsel conducted discovery concerning the claim defendant sought to assert in the cross-complaint).)   

 

At minimum, a very strong showing of bad faith on the part of the defendant is required before a court will be justified in denial of leave to file or amend a cross-complaint.  (Sidney v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d at 710, 718.)  The burden of showing bad faith rests on the party opposing the allowance of the cross-complaint.  (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94.)  

 

A determination that the petitioner acted in bad faith may be premised on “substantial injustice or prejudice” to the opposing party. (Foot's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court, 114 Cal.App.3d at 903; See also Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 558-59 (stating that leave was properly denied when the defendant’s motion “was merely a tactical strategic maneuver to deprive plaintiffs of a right to a jury trial”).)

 

Judicial Notice

 

Defendant seeks judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint, its answer, and its substitution of attorney. The requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d).

 

Discussion

Defendant Alcorn Fence moves to file a cross-complaint against Global Environmental Network, Inc. At the time it answered the complaint, counsel for Alcorn Fence had not yet completed its investigation regarding the facts surrounding the underlying incident, including obtaining all of the relevant contracts concerning the repair work. The combined job files from the City, the County and Alcorn Fence are voluminous, consisting of thousands of pages of documents. Upon completing the review of Alcorn Fence’s job file, defense counsel discovered that Alcorn Fence had subcontracted with Global Environmental Network, in part, for weekly inspections of the construction site. Moreover, the contract between Alcorn Fence and Global required Global to defend, indemnify and hold Alcorn Fence harmless against any liability arising from Global’s performance or non-performance of the contracted services. Defense counsel promptly filed the present motion immediately upon discovering that Alcorn Fence had a meritorious claim against Global Environmental. The Court should grant Alcorn Fence’s motion given that its proposed cross-complaint will result in no prejudice to any party because adding Global Environmental as a party will not expand the issues in this case. Moreover, the City of Malibu will be filing a ROE amendment naming Global Environmental as well. Finally, Alcorn Fence has not been dilatory in seeking to file a cross-complaint, as it did so immediately after discovering Global Environmental’s potential liability in this matter.

The Court finds that the cross-complaint is compulsory because it arises out of the same occurrence, namely, Plaintiff’s motorcycle collision. “Cross-complaints for comparative equitable indemnity would appear virtually always transactionally related to the main action.”  (Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 38.)  Thus, there must be substantial evidence that Defendant Alcorn acted in bad faith to justify a denial of its motion to file a cross-complaint.

 

The Court finds that no party has made any showing of bad faith.

 

As such, the motion must be granted.

 

Conclusion

 

Therefore, Defendant Alcorn’s motion for leave to file a cross-complaint is GRANTED.

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.