Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV25306, Date: 2023-01-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV25306 Hearing Date: January 19, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant Cruise America Inc.’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.7 is DENIED.
Legal Standard
“Code of Civil Procedure section
437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if
all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show
that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not
separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense
to that cause of action.” (Id. at §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may
satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because
of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union
Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the
defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a
“triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
“When deciding whether to grant
summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the
papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well
as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi,
159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)
Discussion
The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the
vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by
reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that
results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle
during the period of the rental or lease, if—
(1) the owner … is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing
motor vehicles; and
(2) there is
no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner …
Here, Cruise rented the subject vehicle to Higgins. (UMF
7.) Cruise is in the business of renting camper and motor home vehicles.
(UMF 8.) Cruise conducted due diligence to
determine that Higgins’ foreign driver’s license was valid for driving the
Camper in California before leasing him the same. Cruise also inspected the
Camper prior to renting it to Higgins and found no malfunction or defect that
would prevent its safe operation. (UMF 11-12.) The only relationship between
Cruise and Higgins was an arm’s length rental agreement. (UMF 7, 10.) At the
time of the Accident, Higgins was not, and had never been, employed, hired, trained,
supervised, or was otherwise controlled by Cruise. (UMF 10.)
Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim, “ ‘ “It is
generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle
in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is
charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for
an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the
plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by
the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” ‘ [Citation.]”
(Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063
quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708.)
In Flores v. Court of Appeal of California (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 1055, the court addressed the question of rental cars and potential
liability for rental car companies. Flores held that a rental car
agency was not liable for negligent entrustment where the rental agency had
complied with the requirements of Vehicle Code §§ 14604, 14608 and 14609 and
the customer did not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time of
rental. (Id.) It also held that they were also not required to check DMV
records to investigate the driving history that may be relevant to that license
status. (Id.)
At all times
relevant to this litigation, Higgins was an Australian tourist visiting the
United States. (UMF 5.) At the time of the Accident Higgins was driving a 2017
Ford F-350 Camper conversion, Arizona License Plate No. BYH6594, Vehicle
Identification Number 1FDWE3DL0GDC29985. (UMF 6.) Higgins rented the Camper from
Cruise for 15 days on October 10, 2019. (UMF 7.) Per Vehicle Code section
12804.9, the Camper, a noncommercial Class C vehicle, does not require a
specialized license to operate in California. Moreover, Vehicle Code section
12502(a)(1), in relevant part, allows a “nonresident over the age of 18 years
having in his or her immediate possession a valid driver license issued by a
foreign jurisdiction of which he or she is a resident” to operate a motor
vehicle within the state. Cruise, as part of its normal business practices,
reviewed and inspected Higgin’s Australian driving credentials, which showed he
was over 74 years old at the time, to determine that Higgins met California’s
licensing requirements before renting him the Camper. (UMF 9.)
Defendant’s evidence
shows Defendant is in the business of renting vehicles and it rented the
vehicle to Defendant Higgins. Also, Defendant properly confirmed
Defendant Higgins’ eligibility to drive. Further, Defendant presents
evidence that it inspected the vehicle, and no defects of malfunctions were
found. Defendant has demonstrated the Graves amendment bars Plaintiff’s
action against Defendant. Defendant has also shown that it properly
ensured Defendant Higgins was licensed to drive the rental vehicle. The
burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition and thus has not shown a triable
issue of material fact as to any other independent theory of negligence against
Defendant.
Request for Continuance
Plaintiff requests a continuance of
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Higgins has not yet appeared in the action.
CCP section 437c(h) provides that: “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or
both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist
but cannot, for reasons stated, be
presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as
may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary
discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date
the opposition response to the motion is due.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c(h).) A summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the
losing party of trial on the merits. (Bahl v. Bank of America
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) To mitigate this harshness, the drafters
of CCP section 437c included a provision making continuances virtually
mandated. (Id.)
“The
nonmoving party seeking a continuance must show: (1) the facts to be obtained
are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts
may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these
facts. [Citations.]” (Wachs v. Curry (1993)13 Cal.App.4th 616,
623.) Where the opposing party submits an adequate affidavit showing that
essential facts may exist but cannot be presented in a timely manner, the Court
must either deny summary judgment or grant a continuance. (Dee v.
Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30,
34-35.)
Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted a
memorandum of points and authorities, arguing that Defendant Higgins may have evidence that
points towards negligence that falls outside of the protections of the Graves
Amendment. For example, Higgins deposition testimony or responses to written
discovery might reveal that his license in Australia was suspended from DUI and
that he was not questioned on this issue by Cruise America. Similarly, Higgins
deposition testimony might reveal that he had no knowledge regarding the
operation of such a large vehicle, but was not questioned or tested on his
ability to operate one by Cruise.
However, Plaintiff’s counsel has not submitted an
affidavit attesting to these facts. Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration merely
attests to being unable to locate Higgins. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown
that these facts are essential to opposing the motion. As noted above, the
Court in Flores v. Court of Appeal of California, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th
1055 held that the defendants were not required to check DMV records to
investigate the driving history that may be relevant to the driver’s license
status. Third, Plaintiff must show that there is reason to believe these
facts exists. The points and authorities do not state any reasons to believe
that Higgins had a DUI or he did not know how to operate such a large vehicle.
As such, the request for a continuance is denied.
Sanctions
Legal Standard
CCP section 128.7
states that a court may impose sanctions on a party or attorney that presents a
pleading, petition, motion, or other similar papers in the following
circumstances:
1) the document is presented primarily for
an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.
2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law.
3) the allegations and other factual
contentions have no evidentiary support;
4) the denials of factual contentions are
not warranted on the evidence.
CCP section 128.7
permits the Court to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney or an
unrepresented party that violates any one of these requirements. (Eichenbaum
v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal App 4th 967, 976.) In addition, section 128.7
does not require a finding of subjective bad faith; instead it requires only
that the Court find that the conduct be objectively unreasonable. (In
re Marriage of Reese & Guy (1999) 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1221.)
Under section
128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed
for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or
factually. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189–190.) A claim
is factually frivolous if it is “not well grounded in fact” and is legally
frivolous if it is “not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” (Ibid.) In
either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's
conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. (Ibid.) A
claim is objectively unreasonable if “any reasonable attorney would agree that
[it] is totally and completely without merit.” (Ibid.) However, “section
128.7 sanctions should be ‘made with restraint’ [Citation], and are not
mandatory even if a claim is frivolous.” (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 428. at 448.)
After notice and a hearing, a court may impose sanctions on an attorney,
law firm, or party that violates Code Civ. Proc., section 128.7(b), subject to
the “safe harbor” conditions specified in Code Civ. Proc., section 128.7(c). (Id.;
Optimal Markets, Inc. v. Salant (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 912, 920.) A motion for sanctions under Code Civ. Proc., section 128.7
must be made separately from other motions and “shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7(c)(1).) A party seeking sanctions under Code Civ. Proc., section 128.7, follows a two-step procedure. (Optimal,
supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.)
First, the moving party serves notice of the motion for sanctions on the
offending party. (Code Civ. Proc., §
128.7(c)(1).) Service of the motion starts a
safe harbor period during which the motion cannot be filed with the court. (Id.)
If the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation or denial is
not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days, the second step is to file or
present the motion for sanctions to the court (i.e., presentment). (Code Civ.
Proc., § 128.7(c)(2).)
“This permits a party to withdraw a questionable pleading without
penalty, thus saving the court and the parties time and money litigating the
pleading as well as the sanctions request. [Citations.]” (Optimal, supra,
221 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.) “While section 128.7 does allow for reimbursement
of expenses, including attorney fees, its primary purpose is to deter filing
abuses, not to compensate those affected by them. It requires the court to
limit sanctions ‘to what is sufficient to deter repetition of [the
sanctionable] conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.’
[Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 920–921.)
Discussion
Defendant also
moves for sanctions under CCP section 128.7, arguing that Plaintiff’s continued prosecution of this
case against Cruise without factual or legal support, or even argument relating
to any non-frivolous extension of existing law, is in violation of Code of
Civil Procedure section 128.7.
The motion is denied. First, sanctions under CCP section
128.7 are not mandatory. Second, the Court finds that the record does not
reflect an adequate basis for a finding that the complaint is frivolous to
warrant sanctions of any kind under Section 128.7, as the Court cannot say the
complaint is indisputably
without merit. Plaintiff was entitled to conduct discovery in this matter to
see whether he may have had an independent basis for negligence against Cruise.
The
Court additionally notes that, “section 128.7 sanctions should be ‘made with
restraint’ [Citation], and are not mandatory even if a claim is frivolous.” (Peake
v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428. at 448.)
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion
for sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.7 is DENIED.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice.