Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV36261, Date: 2023-01-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV36261 Hearing Date: January 5, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant City of
Los Angeles’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The
motion is granted without leave to amend as to the cause of action for
negligence but denied as to punitive damages.
Legal
Standard
Code of Civil Procedure
section 438 states, in relevant part:
“(b)(1)
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings. . . . (c)(1)
The
motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following
grounds: . . . . (B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of
the following conditions exist: (i) The court has no jurisdiction of
the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. (ii)
The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against that defendant.”
A motion for
judgment on the pleadings “has the purpose and effect of a general
demurrer.” (Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (1995) 11
Cal.4th 138, 146 (citation omitted).) “[T]he trial court generally
confines itself to the complaint and accepts as true all material facts alleged
therein. As appropriate, however, it may extend its consideration to
matters that are subject to judicial notice. In this, it performs
essentially the same task that it would undertake in ruling on a general
demurrer.” (Id. (citations omitted).)
A party moving
for judgment on the pleadings must meet and confer in person or telephonically
with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to
determine if an agreement can be reached regarding the claims raised in the
motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).) The
moving party must file a declaration detailing the meet and confer
efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a)(3).)
Discussion
I.
Meet and Confer
The Court finds
Defendant has filed a code-compliant meet and confer declaration. (Kahramanian
Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)
II.
Government
Claims Act
Government
Code § 815 provides, in pertinent part, that, except as otherwise provided by
statute, a “public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or
any other person.” (Government Code § 815(a).) (See Nasrawi v. Buck
Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 341 (“A public entity…is
subject to direct liability only as provided by statute or required by the
state or federal Constitution. [Citations]”).) (See also San Mateo Union
High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418,
427-428.)
A. Second Cause of Action for Negligence
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to
Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence, arguing that the sole
statutory basis for a claim imposing liability on a public entity, based on the
condition of the public entity’s property, is Government Code section 835.
Government Code section 835 states: “Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable
for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff
establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the
injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that
the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of
injury which was incurred, and either:
(a) A
negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
(b) The
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition
under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
Here,
Plaintiff cannot seek to assert a cause of action against Defendant City for negligence
other than on Govt. Code, section 830 et seq. Generally, the sole statutory
basis for a claim imposing liability on a public entity based on the condition
of the public entity’s property is Govt. Code, section 835. (Metcalf v.
County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1121, 1129; Zelig v. County of
Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112; Brown v. Poway Unified School
District (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820.)
In Longfellow
v. San Luis Obispo County (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 379, the Court of Appeal
affirmed that claims against public entities arising from property defects must
be based on that condition—and cannot be based on theories of vicarious
liability:
With respect to Plaintiffs’ cause of action pursuant to
section 815.2 of the Government Code, the law was settled by Van Kempen v.
Hayward Area Park Etc. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 100 Cal.Rptr. 498, that
public entity liability for property defects is not governed by the general
rule of vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but rather by the
provisions in sections 830 to 835.4 of the Government Code. A public employee
is not liable for injuries caused by a condition of public property where such
condition exists because of any act or omission of such employee within the
scope of employment.
(Id.
(emphasis added).) In continuation, the Senate legislative committee comment
which accompanies section 835 states the statute’s purpose with greater
precision: “The section is not subject to the discretionary immunity that public
entities derive from Section 815.2, for this chapter itself declares the limits
of a public entity's discretion in dealing with dangerous conditions of its
property.” (Id.)
The second cause of action
for negligence is based on the same alleged dangerous condition of public
property based on the same facts and theory (Government Code section 835) as
the first cause of action. Thus, the essence of Plaintiff’s cause of
action is based on the harm she allegedly experienced due to a dangerous
condition on public property that was allegedly and negligently created by
Defendant.
As
discussed above, the sole statutory basis for a claim imposing liability on a
public entity based on the condition of the public entity’s property is
Government Code section 835. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42
Cal. 4th 1121, 1129.) Therefore, the
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action for
negligence is granted without leave to amend.
III.
Punitive Damages
A motion for
judgment on the pleadings is not the correct procedural vehicle for challenging
punitive damages. This motion may be brought due to the Court’s lack of
jurisdiction or a plaintiff’s failure to plead sufficient facts to constitute a
cause of action. A failure to plead sufficient facts to allow a prayer
for punitive damages is not grounds for a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
159, 163-164.) “There is no cause of action for punitive damages. Punitive
or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove
the facts and circumstances [set forth in Civil Code section 32944] ....
‘Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action, and can never
constitute the basis thereof.’ [quoting from Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic
League (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 365, 373, fn. 3].” (Hilliard v. A.H. Robins
Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391.). (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.)
Defendant may
file a motion to strike if it so chooses. The Court cannot rule on this matter
as a motion to strike has not been brought before the Court.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. The
motion is granted without leave to amend as to the cause of action for
negligence but denied as to punitive damages.