Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV42289, Date: 2023-04-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV42289 Hearing Date: April 21, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Cross-Defendant Ennis-Flint, Inc.’s
unopposed motion to quash service of summons and cross-complaint is GRANTED.
Legal Standard
“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or
more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).)
California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis
consistent with the Constitutions of California and the United States.
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 410.10.) “When a defendant moves the trial court to
quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has
the initial burden of proving that sufficient contacts exist between the defendant
and California to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (Malone
v. Equitas Reinsurance Ltd. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436.) “Once facts showing minimum
contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the
defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449.)
There are two main ways for a court to exercise jurisdiction pursuant
to the Due Process Clause, specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction. (Young v. Daimler AG (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 855, 861.) “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (Daimler AG
v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 137.) General
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists if the defendant’s contacts in
the forum state are “substantial … continuous and systematic.” (Id. at
445-46, citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. (1952) 342
U.S. 437, 445, 446.) If the contacts are not pervasive, the court may only exercise
jurisdiction based upon contacts that relate directly to the transaction or
activity out of which the suit arises. (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976)16 Cal. 3d 143, 147-148.) This is called “specific
jurisdiction.” (Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall (1984) 466
U.S. 408, 411, fn. 8.) A nonresident may be subject to specific
jurisdiction if: (1) the nonresident has purposefully availed itself of the benefits
and protections of the state’s laws; (2) the
controversy arises out of the nonresident’s contacts with the state; and (3) it would
be fair and just to assert jurisdiction. (Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472; Pavlovich,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at 269.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s requests for judicial notice are GRANTED.
Discussion
Specially
Appearing Cross-Defendant Ennis-Flint (Cross-Defendant) moves to quash service
of summons and cross-complaint on the ground that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction because it is a North Carolina Corporation with
its principal place of business in North Carolina. Greer
Decl., ¶
4, Exh. A to Request for Judicial Notice.) Cross-Defendant does not
own, control, manage, or otherwise have any relationship to the Vons store
located at 18439 Ventura Blvd. in Tarzana, California. (Id., ¶ 5.)
Nor has Cross-Defendant made any sales to the other named defendants to this action,
Vons and Safeway, Inc. Accordingly, this court lacks personal jurisdiction,
either in general or specific form, over Cross-Defendant Ennis-Flint. (Beck
Decl., ¶ 4; Exh. B. to Request for
Judicial Notice.)
Regarding general
jurisdiction, “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . .
corporations . . . when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
state.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, supra,
131 S.Ct. at 2851, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
326 U.S. 310 at 317.) In further explaining the basis for general
jurisdiction over a corporation, the Supreme Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman
(2014) 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 clarified:
Goodyear made clear
that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant
amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there. “For an individual, the paradigm
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile;
for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is
fairly regarded as at home.” 564 U.S., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 2853–2854 (citing
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L.Rev. 721,
728 (1988)). With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and
principal place of business are “paradig[m] ... bases for general
jurisdiction.” Id., at 735. See also Twitchell, 101 Harv. L.Rev.,
at 633. Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each
ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily ascertainable. Cf.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029
(2010) (“Simple jurisdictional rules ... promote greater predictability.”).
These bases afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum
in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.
While the Daimler Court
recognized that “Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject
to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has
its principal place of business,” it also acknowledged that the exercise of
general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is not appropriate “in every
State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and
systematic course of business.’ ” (Id. at 761.) The Court
found that such a broad formulation would be “unacceptably grasping.” (Id.)
Here, Cross-Complainant has failed to meet its burden of proof
to demonstrate facts justifying the court’s exercise of general jurisdiction
over Cross-Defendant, as Cross-Complainant has not filed an opposition. Thus,
Cross-Complainant not met its burden to show that Defendant has minimum
contacts with California to establish general jurisdiction.
As to specific jurisdiction, Cross-Complainant
offers no argument or proof to show that the
nonresident has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of
the state’s laws. “For
purposes of the purposeful availment prong, the ‘... United States Supreme
Court has described the forum contacts necessary to establish specific jurisdiction
as involving variously a nonresident who has ‘purposefully directed’ his or her
activities at forum residents [citation], or who has ‘purposefully derived
benefit’ from forum activities [citation], or ‘purposefully avail[ed himself or
herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,’ or ‘deliberately’ has
engaged in significant activities with a State [citation] or has created
‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum
[citation].’ [Citation.]” (Gilmore Bank, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p.
1568.)
“In Vons, a tort case, our Supreme
Court applied the forum benefits test for purposeful availment, not the effects
test. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, […].) There, Vons Companies, Inc.
(Vons), the California cross-complainant, alleged negligence and other tort
causes of action against a franchisor whose principal place of business was
California (Jack-in-the-Box) and several of Jack-in-the-Box's Washington-based
franchisees. [Citation.] Our Supreme Court held that California had specific
jurisdiction over the Washington franchisees because they had ‘purposefully
availed themselves of benefits in the forum by reaching out to forum residents
to create an ongoing franchise relationship.’ [Citation.] The Washington
franchisees had ‘purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of doing
business with [Jack-in-the-Box]. They formed a substantial economic connection
with this state. To require them to answer Vons's claim, as well, is not to
allow a third party unilaterally to draw them into a connection with the state;
rather, it was [the Washington franchisees] who established the connection.’
[Citation.] Our Supreme Court recognized that Vons ‘was not a party to the
franchise contract, and thus the claim is not on the contract.... This
distinction, however, does not render the exercise of specific jurisdiction
improper.’ [Citation.] ‘The due process clause is concerned with protecting
nonresident defendants from being brought unfairly into court in the forum, on
the basis of random contacts. That constitutional provision, however, does not
provide defendants with a shield against jurisdiction when the defendant
purposefully has availed himself or herself of benefits in the forum.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1570-1571.)
“Thus, the test for purposeful availment
does not hinge mechanically on whether the plaintiff's claim sounds in tort or
contract. Rather, a court must apply ‘a ‘highly realistic’ approach’ on a
case-by-case basis and select the most appropriate test for purposeful
availment based on the particular facts presented. [Citations.] Indeed, because
California's long-arm statute ‘manifests an intent to exercise the broadest
possible jurisdiction’ [citation], its courts may apply the purposeful
availment test most conducive to establishing specific jurisdiction over a
defendant in a particular case, consistent with due process.” (Id. at p.
1571.)
There is no evidence that Cross-Defendant purposefully
directed its activities at forum residents, or has purposefully derived benefit
from forum activities, or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, or deliberately has engaged in
significant activities California, or has created continuing obligations between
its and residents of the forum.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s motion to
quash service of summons and cross-complaint is GRANTED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.