Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV44946, Date: 2023-01-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV44946 Hearing Date: January 3, 2023 Dept: 29
Moheb
Samuel v. Frontier Mission Fellowship, Inc., et al.
Tuesday, January
3, 2023
CASE NUMBER: 21STCV44946
UNOPPOSED
Demurrer with Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Frontier Mission
Fellowship, Inc.
Background
On December
8, 2021, Plaintiff Moheb Samuel filed a complaint against Defendants Frontier
Mission Fellowship, Inc., U.S. Center for World Missions dba Judson
International School, and Palomar Baptist Camp, Inc., alleging four causes of
action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence, (3) premises liablity, and (4)
negligence per se. The complaint alleges that defendants negligently,
recklessly, intentionally, wantonly, and/or unreasonably conducted a night game
at camp around an active burning firepit, crowded by campers, at the Doane
Valley Site, in direct violation of the California Code of Regulations § 4319
which states that “No Person shall engage in games or recreational activities
that endanger the safety of person, property, resources or interfere with
visitor activities except as permitted by the Department.” During the activity,
plaintiff fell into an active burning firepit causing him to suffer burns to
his left hand and his left back.
On September 29, 2022, Defendant filed a
demurrer with motion to strike. No opposition has been filed.
Summary
Moving Arguments
Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action for negligence per se in
the complaint, arguing that Complaint
fails to specify all alleged statutory violations with his use of “among others”
and it is uncertain. Defendant also
moves to strike portions of the complaint using language for punitive damages
contained in Civil Code section 3294, arguing
because it is a religious corporation, CCP §¿425.14 requires Plaintiff to
obtain leave of court before alleging punitive damages.
Opposing Arguments
None filed.
Reply Arguments
None filed.
Legal Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a
cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally
and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent
on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings
alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing
is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)
A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the
complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)
Meet and Confer
The demurrer and
motion to strike are accompanied by the declaration of Thomas M.
Regan which satisfies
the meet and confer requirements. (Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a).)
Request
for Judicial Notice
Defendant
requests judicial notice of its California Registry Verification Details.
(Regan Decl., Exh. D.)
The request
for judicial notice is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452(c) and
(h).
Discussion
A.
Demurrer
Defendant
demurs to the fourth cause of action for negligence per se in the complaint,
arguing that Complaint fails
to specify all alleged statutory violations with his use of “among others.”
“The doctrine of negligence per se … codifies
the rule that a presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a
statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff
is a member against the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered as a result of
the violation.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1256, 1285.)
The complaint provides that:
Defendant negligently and/or intentionally committed and/or assisted in the
commission of the following Statutory Violations, among others: California Code
of Regulations § 4319 which states that “No Person shall engage in games or
recreational activities that endanger the safety of person, property, resources
or interfere with visitor activities except as permitted by the Department”,
California Code of Regulations § 4302 which states that “No person shall use []
any portion of a unit under the control of the Department of Parks and
Recreation for which a use fee has been established by the Department, without
paying such fee, California Code of Regulations § 4311 which states “No person
shall light, build, use, or maintain a fire within unit except in a []
fireplace provided, maintained, or designated for such purpose, unless by
authority of the Department”, and various other federal, state, municipal,
county and other local Statutory Violations.
To the extent the fourth cause of action in the complaint
for negligence per se cites to the above statutes, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has properly alleged the statutes violated for a negligence per se
cause of action. A general demurrer does not lie to
only part of a cause of action. If there are sufficient allegations to entitle
plaintiff to relief, other allegations cannot be challenged by general
demurrer. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.) As such, the allegation relating to the statutes
cited above sufficiently entitle Plaintiff to relief. Thus, the demurrer to the
cause of action for negligence per se is OVERRULED.
Uncertainty
A demurrer to a complaint may also be brought on the ground the
pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code of Civ. Proc.,
§ 430.10, subd. (f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is
disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain
in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty may be sustained when a
defendant cannot reasonably determine to what he or she is required to
respond. For example, when a plaintiff joins multiple causes of action as
one, fails to properly identify each cause of action, or fails to state against
which party each cause of action is asserted if there are multiple defendants,
a complaint is uncertain. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
Here, the complaint: (1) does not join multiple causes of action as
one; (2) properly identifies each cause of action; and (3) identifies the party
each cause of action is asserted against. Defendant fails to demonstrate
that the allegations are so uncertain or unintelligible that they cannot determine
what issues to admit or deny.
Defendant’s demurrer based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.
B. Motion to Strike
Legal Standard
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may
serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and
upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court
rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v.
Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)
Discussion
Defendant also moves to strike portions of the complaint using language for
punitive damages contained in Civil Code
section 3294, arguing because it is a religious corporation, Code of Civil Procedure
section¿425.14 requires Plaintiff to obtain leave of court before alleging
punitive damages.
To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section
3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant
has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be
pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions
are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if
proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud
or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191
Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)
“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as
“despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been
defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.”
(See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing,
Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)
To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove
negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court
(1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible
manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the
substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the
allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that
Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)
CCP §¿425.14 provides that “[n]o claim for punitive or exemplary damages
against a religious corporation or religious corporation sole shall be included
in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an
amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive or exemplary damages to be
filed…” (CCP §¿425.14.)
Defendant
references its Request for Judicial Notice in support of its qualification as a
religious corporation.
As Defendant is a religious corporation, the Court finds that Plaintiff
must comply with CCP §¿425.14 if he seeks to allege punitive damages against
Defendant.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion to
strike punitive damages is GRANTED.
TENTATIVE
Defendant Frontier Mission Fellowship, Inc.’s demurrer is
OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED.
Legal Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a
cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent
on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings
alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at
747.)
A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the
complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)
Meet and Confer
The demurrer and
motion to strike are accompanied by the declaration of Thomas M.
Regan which satisfies
the meet and confer requirements. (Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a).)
Request
for Judicial Notice
Defendant
requests judicial notice of its California Registry Verification Details.
(Regan Decl., Exh. D.)
The
request for judicial notice is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code sections
452(c) and (h).
Discussion
A.
Demurrer
Defendant
demurs to the fourth cause of action for negligence per se in the complaint,
arguing that Complaint fails
to specify all alleged statutory violations with his use of “among others.”
“The doctrine of negligence per se … codifies
the rule that a presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a
statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff
is a member against the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered as a result of
the violation.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1256, 1285.)
The complaint provides that:
Defendant negligently and/or intentionally committed and/or assisted in the
commission of the following Statutory Violations, among others: California Code
of Regulations § 4319 which states that “No Person shall engage in games or
recreational activities that endanger the safety of person, property, resources
or interfere with visitor activities except as permitted by the Department”,
California Code of Regulations § 4302 which states that “No person shall use []
any portion of a unit under the control of the Department of Parks and
Recreation for which a use fee has been established by the Department, without
paying such fee, California Code of Regulations § 4311 which states “No person
shall light, build, use, or maintain a fire within unit except in a []
fireplace provided, maintained, or designated for such purpose, unless by
authority of the Department”, and various other federal, state, municipal,
county and other local Statutory Violations.
To the extent the fourth cause of action in the complaint
for negligence per se cites to the above statutes, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has properly alleged the statutes violated for a negligence per se
cause of action. A general demurrer does not lie to
only part of a cause of action. If there are sufficient allegations to entitle
plaintiff to relief, other allegations cannot be challenged by general
demurrer. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.) As such, the allegation relating to the statutes
cited above sufficiently entitle Plaintiff to relief. Thus, the demurrer to the
cause of action for negligence per se is OVERRULED.
Uncertainty
A demurrer to a complaint may also be brought on the ground the
pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code of Civ. Proc.,
§ 430.10, subd. (f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is
disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain
in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty may be sustained when a
defendant cannot reasonably determine to what he or she is required to
respond. For example, when a plaintiff joins multiple causes of action as
one, fails to properly identify each cause of action, or fails to state against
which party each cause of action is asserted if there are multiple defendants,
a complaint is uncertain. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
Here, the complaint: (1) does not join multiple causes of action as
one; (2) properly identifies each cause of action; and (3) identifies the party
each cause of action is asserted against. Defendant fails to demonstrate
that the allegations are so uncertain or unintelligible that they cannot
determine what issues to admit or deny.
Defendant’s demurrer based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.
B. Motion to Strike
Legal Standard
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may
serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and
upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court
rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v.
Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)
Discussion
Defendant also moves to strike portions of the complaint using language
for punitive damages contained in Civil Code
section 3294, arguing because it is a religious corporation, Code of Civil Procedure
section¿425.14 requires Plaintiff to obtain leave of court before alleging
punitive damages.
To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section
3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant
has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be
pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions
are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if
proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud
or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191
Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)
“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as
“despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been
defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.”
(See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing,
Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)
To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove
negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court
(1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible
manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the
substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the
allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that
Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)
CCP §¿425.14 provides that “[n]o claim for punitive or exemplary damages
against a religious corporation or religious corporation sole shall be included
in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an
amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive or exemplary damages to be
filed…” (CCP §¿425.14.)
Defendant
references its Request for Judicial Notice in support of its qualification as a
religious corporation.
As Defendant is a religious corporation, the Court finds that Plaintiff
must comply with CCP §¿425.14 if he seeks to allege punitive damages against
Defendant.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion to
strike punitive damages is GRANTED.