Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV46933, Date: 2022-09-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV46933    Hearing Date: September 30, 2022    Dept: 29

Harlon Caldwell v. Jason Arnoldo Esparza, et al.

TENTATIVE 

Defendant Constantino Moncada’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant Jason Arnoldo Esparza’s motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Legal Standard 

            Demurrer

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) 

            Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

Meet and Confer 

The demurrer is accompanied by the declaration of Christopher K. Opfell, which satisfies the meet and confer requirements. The motion to strike is accompanied by the declaration of Sarkis Yeretsian, which also satisfies the meet and confer requirements. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435.5, and 430.41.)  

Discussion 

Defendant Moncada demurs to the third cause of action for negligent entrustment on grounds that the cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and is uncertain.

A.      Demurrer

To hold a defendant liable for negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) that the defendant was an owner of the vehicle operated by the driver; (3) that the defendant knew, or should have known, that the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; (4) that the defendant permitted the driver to use the vehicle; and (5) that the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff.  (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 863-64.) 

The complaint alleges the following.  Defendant Esparza and Doe Defendants engaged in reckless driving and speed exhibitions on a public roadway. (Complaint ¶ 81.) The police report indicates that Defendant Moncada was the owner of the subject vehicle that was at-fault. (Id., ¶ 24.) Defendant Moncado was fully aware and knew or should have known that Defendant Esparza and/or the Doe Defendants were going and intended to participate in drag racing with his vehicle.  (Id., ¶ 77.)  Moncado allowed and entrusted his subject Camaro vehicle to Defendant Esparza and/or the Doe Defendants. (Id., ¶ 78.) Moreover, as a result of such wanton and reckless behavior, Plaintiff and others were injured due to Defendant Moncado’s authorization. (Id., ¶ 81.)

The Court finds sufficient facts have been alleged to state a cause of action for negligent entrustment.  Plaintiff has alleged all necessary facts to state this cause of action, including Defendant Moncado’s knowledge of Defendant Esparza’s unfitness to operate the vehicle, entrustment of the vehicle, and harm that resulted.  The conclusory allegations regarding Defendant Moncada’s knowledge of Defendant Esparza’s unfitness to operate the vehicle are permitted because Defendant Moncada necessarily possesses this information.  (See Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157 [holding specificity requirements are relaxed when the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy or when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the defendant].)  Therefore, the demurrer must be overruled as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligent entrustment. 

B.      Motion to Strike

Defendant Esparza moves to strike the allegations of punitive damages, arguing that the Complaint contains no factual allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud under which would entitle it to punitive damages.

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)  

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)  

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.) 

The Court finds Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to claim punitive damages.  There are no facts alleged indicating Defendant crashed into Plaintiff’s bus intentionally.  There are also no facts asserting that Defendant knew of the probable consequences of engaging in a street race.  There are similarly no facts alleged indicating that Defendant willfully and deliberately ignored those probable consequences.  The mere facts that Defendant engaged in a street race at excessive speeds is insufficient. 

Further, there is no indication that Defendant’s speeding and racing was despicable conduct.  While it could certainly be described as negligent or even grossly negligent, it could hardly be considered so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. As such, the motion to strike punitive damages is granted with 30 days leave to amend.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant Moncada’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant Esparza’s motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Moving parties are ordered to give notice.