Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 21STCV47108, Date: 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV47108    Hearing Date: January 12, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendants Ricardo Isaac Leon and Yolanda Leon’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Meet and Confer 

The motion to strike is accompanied by the declaration of Christina Toroyan, which satisfies the meet and confer requirement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5.)  

Legal Standard 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

Discussion

Defendants move to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint praying for punitive damages, arguing that plaintiff has failed to plead any allegations which give rise to punitive damages. 

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)  

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)  

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ricardo Isaac Leon ("Ricardo") negligently drove his vehicle by failing to maintain proper lookout and control, consequently colliding with Plaintiff’s ehicle causing bodily injury to Plaintiff and his three children. Defendant Yolanda Leon ("Yolanda") insures the vehicle that Ricardo owns and operated.

The Court finds insufficient facts have been alleged to pray for punitive damages.  In essence, Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages for the failure to properly operate an automobile. The causing of negligent harm through operating an automobile does not suffice as a prima facie case for punitive damages.  

Therefore, the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages for oppression and malice. 

Conclusion 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend. Moving party is ordered to give notice.