Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 22STCV27107, Date: 2023-10-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV27107 Hearing Date: October 23, 2023 Dept: 31
TENTATIVE
Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is
GRANTED in part. The Court awards
$34,237.15 in attorney fees and $5,518.15 in costs to Plaintiff’s counsel.
Legal Standard
Attorneys’ fees
are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ.
Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)
In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may
be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code,
§ 1794(d).) Section 1794 provides:
If the buyer prevails in an action under this
section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the
judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including
attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to
have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the
commencement and prosecution of such action.
(Civ. Code, § 1794 [emphasis added].) Thus, the statute includes a
“reasonable attorney’s fees” standard.
The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee
claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent
evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d
553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a
particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees,
even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Id.)
A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the
costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d
677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of
work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the
specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the
evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or
unrelated to not suffice.” (Lunada
Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California
Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees
that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 395.)
In determining a
reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the
number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly
rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24,
36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted
based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair
market value of the legal services provided.
(Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting
them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other
employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)
Discussion
Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney
fees in the amount of $46,447.65, which includes $40,929.50 under the lodestar
method, and $5,518.15 in costs.
A. Entitlement to Attorney Fees
Defendants have agreed that Plaintiff is the
prevailing party for purposes of the present fee motion in the accepted
settlement offer. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 17).
The Court finds Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action
entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney fees.
B. Reasonableness of Fees
i.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for
similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The
experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services
rendered in [her] court.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff seeks
to recover attorneys’ fees for 2 different attorneys and a law clerk who worked
on the case. Partner Michael Saeedian bills his time at rate of
$695.00 per hour, bill managing attorney Christopher Urner at a rate of $525.00
per hour, and law clerk Jorge Acosta bills $250.00 per hour. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶
3-5.)
Attorney Michael Saeedian attests to the attorneys’ legal experience and
the reasonableness of their rates. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, 12.)
Defendant contends
that Plaintiff’s counsels’ hourly rates are excessive because a reasonable
hourly loadstar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys conducting
non-contingent litigation of the same type. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s counsel has proffered no admissible evidence as to the prevailing
rate for attorneys conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type on
lemon law litigation in Southern California. There is no evidence reflecting
what a client, paying for the hourly services of Lemon Pros, would pay for
prosecuting a lemon law action. Defendant argues the only evidence cited by Mr.
Saeedian to support his claimed hourly rate is the Laffey Matrix. (Saeedian
Decl., ¶ 12.) Defendant argues
Laffey Matrix constitutes inadmissible hearsay because Mr. Saeedian does not
claim to have played any role in creating it. However, the Court notes that
Defendant has not objected to this evidence, and thus, the Court has not ruled
on any evidentiary objections to this evidence. Moreover, an adjusted Laffey
Matrix can be used to support a trial court’s determination of reasonable
attorney fees in California cases.¿¿(See¿Syers Properties III, Inc. v.
Rankin¿(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 695-696, 702 [legal malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty action].)¿¿
Next, Defendant argues the qualifications of Lemon Pros attorneys do not justify their alleged hourly rates. Defendant contends that Mr. Saeedian has not presented any evidence of his lemon law experience to justify his hourly rate of $695/hour. The declaration only states that he has experience in personal injury matters. (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 2.) Thus, Kia requests the Court set $300 as the hourly rate.
After reviewing
the parties’ arguments and the evidence submitted, the Court finds, based on
the submitted evidence and its own experience, that Plaintiff’s requested
hourly rates for Urner is reasonable based on the hourly rate of similarly
situated attorneys in the Los Angeles area. (See Goglin v BMW of North
America (2016) LLC 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-74 [approving $575 per hour fee
on lemon law action for attorneys in Los Angeles]. Further, the Laffey Matrix
shows that attorneys with similar years of experience as Urner has comparable
hourly rates. However, based on this Court’s experience, as to Saeedian, the
Court finds the $695 hourly rate is excessive as his declaration does not
attest to his experience handling lemon law cases. However, as lead counsel and
partner (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 1),
the Court finds $525 to be a reasonable hourly rate for Saeedian.
Based on the Court’s calculation, Saeedian has spent 31.6 hours of attorney time in this matter. (Id., Exh. A.) Thus, $5,372 is deducted from the lodestar amount (31.6 hours x 695 = $21,962; 31.6 hours x 525 = $16,590; $21,962 - $16,590 = $5,372).
ii.
Reasonable Hours Incurred
“A trial court
assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on
the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation
of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is
within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration
of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues,
the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The
court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary
or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443,
448.)
Plaintiff’s fee
recovery is based on the 74.8 hours spent by her attorneys and law clerk
litigating this case through this motion. Plaintiff has submitted billing
records. (Saeedian Decl. Ex. A.) At the rates identified above, Plaintiff
represents that she is seeking a lodestar of $40,929.50.
Defendant objects to tasks that Defendant argues would never be accepted by a paying client.
First, Defendant contends counsel is seeking to recover 3.3 hours incurred before drafting the Complaint. These fees are related to the business decision of determining whether to represent Mr. Garcia, who did not enter into the “attorney-client fee agreement until May 2, 2022. (Saeedian Decl., Exh. A.) Defendant argues Mr. Garcia did not incur any fees before he was represented by Lemon Pros, and thus these fees are not recoverable. However, Defendant has cited no authority that these fees are not recoverable under Civil Code section 1794(d), which allows for attorney fees in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.
Next, Defendant argues that counsel also
seeks to recover for administrative work and requests the court award 13.7
hours and $3,425 for work performed by non-attorneys. Defendant
contends it appears the non- attorney (Jorge Acosta) was largely performing
work as an administrative assistant, including filing and serving documents,
calendaring deadlines. Defendant argues a legal professional is not necessary
for this type of administrative work. Kia requests the Court reduce this time
to 7.0 hours and reduce the non-attorney hourly rate to $100. However,
the Court will not decide what work should or should not be delegated to
Plaintiff’s law clerk. Further, Defendant has not pointed to specific entries
it is objecting to for this Court to determine whether the work billed for is
administrative or requires a legal professional. Thus, this argument is
rejected.
Lastly, Defendant argues nearly every single document prepared by Lemon Pros in this matter are form documents used prior cases. For example, Lemon Pros billed 2.5 hours on the form complaint, 3.3 hours on template discovery requests, billed 4.1 to “review” defendant’s discovery responses and send form meet and confer letters, and 9.7 hours was spent on this form motion for attorney’s fees. Kia requests an additional 15% reduction of 11.2 hours on the lodestar to account for the overbilling on form documents.
The Court agrees the complaint should not have taken more than one hour to draft. However, the Court notes that there are billing entries by the law clerk for communication with One Legal, among other things. As Defendant has not objected to those entries, the Court notes 1.5 of attorney time was spent on drafting the complaint. Thus, the Court will reduce 0.5 hours of attorney time, and will allow a total of one hour of counsel’s time to draft the complaint. The Court thus reduces the fees by $270.35.
The Court finds the time spent on reviewing and drafting the discovery is reasonable.
Lastly, the Court finds that the attorney time spent on this motion is excessive and reduces two hours of attorney time, i.e., $1,050.
Having analyzed
the motions and pleadings filed, and having reviewed the billing statement
provided, the Court determines that a reasonable lodestar in this case, to
limit any duplicative and excessive fees, is $34,237.15.
Defendant does not object to costs. As such, the Court finds no grounds to strike any costs and the costs of $5,518.15 are reasonable.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for
attorney fees is GRANTED in part. The
Court awards $34,237.15 in attorney fees and $5,518.15 in costs to Plaintiff’s
counsel.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.