Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 22STCV27630, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV27630    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendant Romauld Ansermert’s demurrer is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and OVERRULED as to the rest of the causes of action (negligence; battery; NIED; assault; and false imprisonment). Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend the complaint.

 

Legal Standard 

 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) 

 

Demurrers for uncertainty are strictly construed, because discovery can be used for clarification, and apply where defendants cannot reasonably determine what issues or claims are stated. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶¶7:85-7:86.) “A demurrer for uncertainty will not lie where the ambiguous facts alleged are presumptively within the knowledge of the demurring party.” (Bacon v. Wahrhaftig (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605.)

 

Meet and Confer 

 

The demurrer is not accompanied by the declaration of defense counsel and thus does not satisfy the meet and confer requirements. (CCP section 430.41(a).) Nevertheless, as this is not a basis to overrule the demurrer, the Court will address the merits.

 

Discussion

 

              Failure to Allege Sufficient Facts and Uncertainty

Defendant Ansermet demurs to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action in the complaint, arguing that they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain.

              First Cause of Action for Negligence

 

The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)  In California, negligence may be pleaded in general terms. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 407-408.) 

 

“Ordinarily, negligence may be alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how the injury occurred, but there are ‘limits to the generality with which a plaintiff is permitted to state his cause of action, and . . . the plaintiff must indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently performed.  He may not recover upon the bare statement that the defendant’s negligence has caused him injury.’ [Citation].”  (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.)

 

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 (citing Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205; Civil Code § 1714(a)).)  In order to impose liability on a property owner for a dangerous condition, the owner must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able to discover the condition by the exercise of ordinary care.  (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1206.) 

The complaint alleges that Defendants chased down Plaintiff in their mutual apartment lobby with their dog and proceeded to attack him, making physical contact by punching the Plaintiff in the face and placing him into a headlock, resulting in head, neck, back, shoulder, wrist, and foot pain. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff would suffer foreseeable injuries, damages and harm as a result of Defendants’ failure to exercise reasonable ordinary care as alleged above. Defendants chased Plaintiff with violent pretenses. Defendants proceeded to punch Plaintiff, causing visible injury to Plaintiff’s face.

The Court finds that these allegations are ultimate facts and are thus sufficient to plead general negligence against Defendant. The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550.) Any further clarifications as to the allegations and claims can be resolved during discovery.   Further, the complaint is not uncertain as ultimate facts have been pled. As such, the demurrer to the first cause of action for negligence is overruled.

Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.  (Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.)  To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendant’s conduct “‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’”  (Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Tererice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).) 

 

“[I]t is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.”  (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.)  “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  (Id.)  While there is no bright-line as to what constitutes outrageous conduct and thus this involves a case-by-case analysis, courts can determine whether conduct was sufficiently outrageous at the demurrer stage.  (Id. at 494.)  

Defendant argues the Complaint makes a conclusory allegation that Defendant’s actions were both outrageous and intentional, but does not allege any facts that rise to the level of outrageousness.

The complaint alleges that Defendants acted in an extreme and outrageous manner by, among other things, harassing Plaintiff, verbally and physically abusing Plaintiff, harassing Plaintiff while under the influence of alcohol, making Plaintiff feel unsafe in his domicile, and getting into a physical altercation with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead extreme and outrageous behavior and thus intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant. As such the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for IIED is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.

 

Defendant has not made any argument regarding the NIED claim and thus, the demurrer is overruled as to the fifth cause of action for NIED.

 

              Third and Sixth Causes of Action for Battery and Assault

 

“A battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with the person of another.”  (Daley v. Regents of University of California (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 595, 602 [citation and quotation omitted].)  “The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.”  (Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-69.) 

Defendant argues that the nature of Plaintiff’s injury is not identified - indeed no body part, no location, or absolutely anything else is referenced. Defendant argues that one cannot tell if the allegation is simply that Plaintiff was punched or was there an actual physical injury. However, all throughout the complaint, Plaintiff alleges he suffered injuries. This is sufficient to withstand demurrer.

As such, the demurrer is overruled as to the causes of action for assault and battery.

Defendant also argues the cause of action is impermissibly duplicative of the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress cause of action. However, the Court does not address this argument as the demurrer is sustained to the cause of action for IIED.

Seventh Cause of Action for False Imprisonment

 

The tort of false imprisonment consists of the “nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” (Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1001, bold emphasis added.) Many cases state that the “length of time can be as brief as 15 minutes.” (Ibid.) However, the statement is dictum, because the cases involved confinements of more than 15 minutes. In Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, for example, the confinement was for more than an hour. (Id. at 707.) Likewise, in Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 735, the plaintiff was detained for about 15 minutes. (Id. at 736.) The court had no reason to address shorter time periods in either case. Indeed, at least one federal court applying California law in this area concluded that there “does not appear to be any case law that sets a floor as to what constitutes an appreciable period of time.” (Robles v. Agreserves, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2016) 158 F.Supp.3d 952, 976.) This court also identified California cases in which the period of confinement appeared to be “significantly less than 15 minutes.” (Id. at 976-977 [citing cases].)  

 

Defendant argues that the cause of action for false imprisonment fails because Plaintiff does not allege he was confined and Plaintiff does not allege any particular period of time that his confinement lasted.

 

Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he was walking away from Defendants with the intention of deescalating the situation but Defendants intentionally deprived Plaintiff of his freedom of movement by force and physical barrier when Defendants put Plaintiff in a headlock, and by threat of force when the Defendants surrounded Plaintiff, preventing him from moving.

 

Thus, contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiff alleges he was confined when Defendant put him in a headlock. While Plaintiff does not allege any particular period of time that his confinement lasted, the Court cannot conclude that the confinement alleged did not last for an “appreciable length of time, however short.”

 

The demurrer is overruled as to the false imprisonment cause of action.

 

Punitive Damages

 

Defendant also demurs as to the claim for punitive damages.

 

However, Defendant improperly filed a demurrer as to punitive damages because it is not a cause of action. A demurrer can be used to challenge a particular cause of action or defense in a pleading. (CCP § 430.50.) Punitive damages allegations are not subject to a demurrer. “There is no cause of action for punitive damages. Punitive or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances [set forth in Civil Code section 32944] .... ‘Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action, and can never constitute the basis thereof.’ [quoting from Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 365, 373, fn. 3].” (Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391.). (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.) Defendant may file a motion to strike if it so chooses.

             

Conclusion

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and OVERRULED as to the rest of the causes of action. Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend the complaint.