Judge: Serena R. Murillo, Case: 22STCV32804, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV32804 Hearing Date: April 6, 2023 Dept: 29
TENTATIVE
Defendant Fenton Charter Public Schools’
demurrer is OVERRULED.
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff
requests that the Court take judicial notice of two
items. First, the State of California Statement of Information for Fenton
Charter Public Schools, and Chicago Title Property Profile for 1070 N. Van Ness
Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90038-3252.
Although the existence of a document may
be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and
its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters
are reasonably disputable. (StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20
Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9.) “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure
for determining the truth of disputed facts.”
(Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.) The
hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing
through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose
truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. (See Del E. Webb Corp.
v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605.)
Thus, while
the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the State
of California Statement of Information for Fenton Charter Public Schools Evidence Code section 452(d), the
Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the statements contained in
that document. The request for judicial notice as to the Chicago Title properly
profile is denied as no basis is provided to grant the request and the Court is
unaware of any specific basis allowing it.
Legal Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a
cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent
on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994).) A demurrer tests the pleadings
alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at
747.)
Discussion
Meet and Confer
The demurrer is accompanied by the declaration of Andrei
Serpik which satisfies the meet and confer requirements. (Code Civ. Proc. §
430.41.)
Merits
Defendant demurs to the complaint, arguing
that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for negligence and premises
liability fail to state facts sufficient to
constitute causes of action because Defendant is a public entity and
is not subject to claims for common law negligence and premises liability.
Government
Claims Act
Government
Code § 815 provides, in pertinent part, that, except as otherwise provided by
statute, a “public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or
any other person.” (Government Code § 815(a).) (See Nasrawi v. Buck
Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 341 (“A public entity…is
subject to direct liability only as provided by statute or required by the
state or federal Constitution. [Citations]”).) (See also San Mateo Union
High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418,
427-428.) In order to properly assert a claim in
tort against a California governmental entity, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that a statute provides a basis for liability. (Williams v. Horvath
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 832-838 [“Government Code section 815 restores sovereign
immunity in California except as provided in the Tort Claims Act or other
statute. Thus the intent of the [A]ct is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against
governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability rigidly
delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements
of the [A]ct
are satisfied”].)
However, first, the complaint
cites to Government Code section 835, and thus, does provide a statutory basis
for a claim imposing liability on a public entity. Government Code
section 835 states: “Except as
provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous
condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in
a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was
proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred,
and either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission
of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created
the dangerous condition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient
time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the
dangerous condition.”
Next, as to
Defendant’s argument that it is a public entity, in Wells v. One2One
Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 1164, the California Supreme Court
concluded that charter schools are not government or public entities for
purposes of the Government Tort Claims Act, e.g., Gov. Code § 810, et seq.
(See Id., at p. 1214.) In Knapp v. Palisades Charter High School (2007)
146 Cal. App. 4th 708, the Second District Court of Appeal similarly concluded
that “the charter school is not a ‘public entity’ under the [Tort Claims Act].”
(See Id., at p. 710.)
Thus, it appears the
requirements of the Tort Claims Act do not apply to Defendant, and the demurrer
based on this argument is overruled. Defendant
argues that the appellate court’s holding in Knapp specifically hinged
on the charter school in that case being “a nonprofit corporation independent
from the LAUSD.” Defendant argues it is not independent from LAUSD, because
it is a charter management organization that operates public schools, one of
which receives Title 1 funds as a local educational agency. However, at the
demurrer stage, the court cannot consider matters extrinsic from
the pleadings. As such, the Court cannot consider this argument.
Duplicative
Defendant
also argues that the negligence and premises liability causes of action are
duplicative.
A demurrer may be
sustained when a cause of action is duplicative of another cause of action and
“thus adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of
recovery.” (Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d
494, 501; see Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.)
As pointed out by
Plaintiff in opposition, the general negligence cause of action also contains
allegations for vicarious liability. To this extent, the general
negligence and premises liability claims are not duplicative.
Accordingly, the
demurrer on this ground is overruled.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.
Moving party is
ordered to give notice.